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The International Distribution of Credit under the
Impact of World-wide Deflationary Forces
For about twelve months after the critical decisions of June
1927 the international effects of generally easy money were
among the most fundamental causes of a world-wide upswing
in business.1 Though prices in gold standard countries were
falling gradually, increasing productivity would probably
have forced them much lower had it not been for the ex-
pansion of credit. There was an upward pressure in many
price groups. Profits from security and real estate speculation
stimulated demand for many commodities. Low interest rates
made it easy to finance valorization schemes and price
arrangements and promoted the issue of foreign loans, par..
ticularly in the United States. Foreign loans in turn helped
to maintain prices in many debtor countries and also pre-
vented the growth of tariffs from checking the expansion of
international trade.2 The continued extension of interna-
tional credit was a dam that was holding back the onrushing
torrent of economic readjustment. The strength of this darn
depended upon the continued de facto cooperation of the
center countries in reinvesting their currently accumulating
credits in debtor countries. It did not long survive the com-
pletion of the gold standard facade.
The End of De Facto Cooperation by the Nucleus
Until the end of 1928 the principal stock exchanges of the
world were enjoying a common upward trend in security
1 League of Nations, Course and Phases of the World Economic Depression,
prepared by Bertil Ohlin (rev. ed., Geneva, ,p.127.Thissource will
becited below as 'Ohlin.'
2 League of Nations, World Economic Survey, 1931/2,pp.111—2, 152—3.
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prices. The amount of capital exports from most creditor
countries was consequently curtailed by the attractions of-
fered speculators and investors at home by local booms. The
new issues market in London was no exception to this rule,
though Professor Ohlin has drawn from the British balance
of payments figures for 1928 the inference that the reduction
in the outflow of capital from Great Britain by new issues
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November i 1,009 6,673
December 6,699 1,237
SOURCE: Midland Bank figures
was replaced by other forms of capital export.3 For the first
seven months of 1928 average monthly new foreign issues
placed in the United Kingdom were £14,725,000 and for the
last four months only £9,830,000 (Table 63)andthrough-
out the year new foreign issues in London were a progres-
sively declining proportion of total new issues. In the United
States new foreign issues also declined in the second half of
when they were only $409 million as compared with
$842 million in the first six months. As in Great Britain they
were a declining percentage of total new issues. Here also
there was an offsetting factor, for "during the second half of
the year foreign borrowers were able to draw upon their
Ohlin, cit., pp. 200, 210.
4 seasonally low total for August distorts the comparison and is omitted.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
deposits in American banks consisting largely of the proceeds
of loans previously floated."
The beginning of a contraction in total international
ing in 1928 was accompanied by a phenomenon far more
serious in its implications for world stability—a diversion of
this lending from debtor countries. The superior attractions
of the New York market from a speculative point of view
diverted a portion of the reduced long term capital exports
of other creditor countries to New York, and shifted to
London, and to other creditor markets in less degree, the
burden of short term advances needed by debtors. Professor
Ohlin has described this process (op. cit., p. 205)
"In the second quarter of 1928 the (American) boom gathered
strength, bond yields began to rise and continued to do so
the autumn of 1929.Theconsequence was an increase in the
tual interest rate necessary to induce lenders to take up issues of
fixed interest securities, and this increase, though small, was suf
ficient to discourage such issues in the United States. Foreign
ernments to a large extent turned to other capital markets where
conditions, although affected by those prevailing in the United
States or by local booms, were generally less unfavourable. hi
other cases these governments were able to meet their require.
ments for current expenditure or for refunding of matured loans
by short term banking advances, thus avoiding the flotation
new bonded loans or at least postponing it in anticipation of
more favourable conditions in the market."
The Independent Course of the New York Market in 1929
Thesemore favorable conditions did not appear in 1929. By
about the end of 1928 and the beginning of 1929 the gath-
ering forces of postponed economic adjustment had begun
to be reflected in most of the world's stock exchanges. Stock
prices began to fall in Zurich, Amsterdam, Vienna, Milan,
Paris, Brussels, Berlin, and Tokio. On the London Stock
Exchange the upward trend in share prices that had been in
progress since the autumn of 1925, came to an end in the
5Ohljri, cit., pp.200, 208—9, especiallythe chart on p. 208.812 EXPERIMENTATION
summer of 1928, and in January 1929 share prices began to
fall steadily. In these countries a turning point in the cycle
had clearly been reached. Exports of capital from most credi-
tor countries were now reduced because their markets were
unfavorable for capital flotations in general. In the United
Kingdom new foreign loans were on a very small scale after
February 1929 (Table 63), but they were no longer a de-
clining proportion of total new issues. New foreign loans
in America also declined sharply, as shown in the accompany-
ing tabulation.
Movement of Long Term Capital Items inthe American Balance of
Payments, 1927_19296
Capitalimports +, Capital exports —(millionsof dollars)
1927 1928 1929
Newforeign security issues —1,183 —1,124
Directinvestments (net) —178 —258 —261
Movement of old securities (net) +422 +416 +556
Bond redemption and sinking fund (net) +234 +291 +199
Netmovement of long term capital —705 —675 —141
* Refundingexcluded and after discounts and underwriting commissions are
deducted.
The reasons for the reduced capital exports from the
United States were not the same as those for the reduced
capital export from other creditor countries, but are to be
found in the independent course of the New York stock
market. The general downward turn in the world's stock
exchanges at the beginning of 1929 was reflected in New
York by a temporary check to the tide of rising stock prices
during the first four months, but this was followed by a new
and rapid rise in stock prices from June to September. The
diversion of international long term funds to New York
continued, but there was no offsetting American short term
capital export. On the contrary, short term funds moved to
6From unpublished thesis, Some Post-War Balance of Payment Problems of
the United States, by E. J. Stone, p. 102.The1928 figures are smaller than
those given by Professor Ohlin; they are net after discounts and underwriting
commissions have been deducted.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 813
New York from all over the worldto take advantage of high
interest rates (Chart 49). The dollar was, in consequence,
strong on the world's exchange markets, and to support their
exchanges central banks in other countries were obliged to
raise their rates and to sell some of their balances in New
York. This contributed still further to stop capital exports
from other creditor markets.
In the first half of 1929 America drew gold in large
amounts from Germany, Great Britain, Canada, and Argen-
tina, while French demand was concentrated first on Ger-
many and then on Great Britain, thus undermining the
whole basis of the inter-central bank cooperation of 1927.
NewYork was continually a competitive bidder for gold in
the London bullion market (Chart 50), while at the same
time, and as a direct consequence of developments in New
York, an increasing demand by other countries for short term
accommodation, even for ordinary commercial needs, was
concentrated upon London. The traditional British tech-
nique of making a cyclical adjustment by cutting down long
term foreign lending while shifting a part of the burden to
the short term shoulder was made extremely difficult to apply
at a time when the New York market was following a course
that diverged from that of the London market. For the world
as a whole the position was rendered extremely difficult be-
cause the two great center countries did not act as a unit at
the turn of the cycle according to the precedents set by the
single center before the war.8
The American Credit Base and Credit Superstructure
June 1928toOctober 1929
Theindependent course of the American market that led to
these results was due to the long continued prosperity in the
United States under the stimulus of the cheap money policy
Cf. Hardy, op. cit., p. 51.
8Cf.Ch.ThePre-War Technique of Shifting from the Long Term to the
Short Term Shoulder in International Lending.814
of 1927, which had prevented the public mind from realizing
the weaknesses of the American economic position °andhad
weakened the faith of bankers and other money market
practitioners in the applicability of the danger signals of
other days to the new situation. The Federal Reserve system,
indeed, was aware of the dangers inherent in the situation,
but it was divided in counsel and followed a vacillating
policy while the American credit superstructure continued
to expand.
In our description in Chapter i8 of the restrictive policy
followed by the Federal Reserve system in the first half of
1928, we pointed out that by June the member banks were
heavily in debt to the Reserve banks, and that a further gold
import movement might fix a substantial amount of reserve
funds represented by rediscounts permanently in the Ameri-
can credit system. The open market sales of securities, which
had chiefly caused the rediscounts, were suspended in May
1928, but the Federal Reserve banks continued to liquidate
their holdings of bills until the end of July. Since rediscounts,
which amounted to $1,037 million on June 27, 1928,con-
tinued at approximately that level until August, member
bank reserve balances declined moderately in midsummer,
even though gold exports had ceased. In August, however,
the principle of distinguishing between the use of Federal
Reserve credit for speculative and for legitimate business
purposes was again applied.'0 The Reserve banks made sub-
stantial purchases of bills in the open market while their
government security holdings were kept nearly constant.
This took care of the financing of the fall expansion of the
currency, and enabled member banks to reduce their bor-
rowings $48 million and at the same time to increase their
reserve balances million.Interest rates were actually
9Cf. Ch. i8, The Continental Background.
'°Cf. B. H. Beckhart, ed. The New York Money Market (Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1932)IV,log. This section draws heavily on Professor Beck-
hart's of Federal Reserve policy from August 1928toOctober 1929,
cit., IV, 109—47passim.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 8i5
slightly reduced, and the checks placed on speculative
in the first half of 1928 far from being reinforced, we:e
in effect relaxed. Concerning this Professor Beckhart writes:
"It is significant that during this period when the Reserve
banks were expanding their open market operations the
security loans of the reporting member banks increased by
5.6%,whereas from January to August 1928, a period marked
by a rapid reduction in the open market portfolios their
security loans increased by only 0.007%."Atthe same time
the Standard Statistics index of stock prices rose from 148.3 to
171.4.
Thetheory upon which the bill buying policy was based
had clearly not been justified by the event, and that policy
was not carried through December. Year-end seasonal re-
quirements for currency had to be met by an increase hi
rediscounts, and immediately after the turn of the year the
bill portfolio was allowed to run off sharply. No seasonal
easing of the money market was permitted as a result of the
return flow of currency. It was clear that the Federal Reserve
was attempting a more restrictive policy, but the pull of the
speculative market in New York was now beginning to draw
gold from abroad. At the end of January gold began to move
from London to New York on an arbitrage basis and
ernor Norman came to New York for consultation with
American bankers. The incoming gold only partly offset the
effects of the decline in the Federal Reserve bill holdings,
and rediscounts began to rise again, returning to the one
billion dollar level in March and April. These relationships
may be most clearly seen in a segment of the chart of Federal
Reserve credit regularly published in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin, reproduced in Chart 53.
Advantage was not taken in the spring of 1929 of the
increasing demand for Federal Reserve accommodation to
enforce a contraction of credit by a higher discount rate,
Instead a policy of 'direct action' or 'moral suasion' was pur-
"Ibid., p.8i6 EXPERIMENTATION
sued by the Federal Reserve Board, in spite of recommenda-
tions for higher rates made by the Federal Reserve Banks of
New York and Boston. On February 7 a letter from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board to the member banks was made public





lativepurposes. On the same day the Bank ofEngland raised
its rate to 51/2 per cent and the flow of gold from London to
New York was, for the time being, stopped. The new policy
of direct action remained in force until the first part of June.
It was effective in bringing about a reduction in brokers
loans by New York banks which was not offset by increases in
loans to customers on securities. It was not so effective in the
case of out-of-town banks, for these,like the New York banks,
reduced their loans to brokers, but unlike them, increased
their loans to customers on securities by an almost equal
amount. The supply of speculative credit as a whole was not
reduced, for the loans withdrawn by New York banks were
replaced and increased by loans from private banks, foreign
banks, and by 'loans for the account of others.' The rise in
stock prices was checked only for a short time, and in May
the upward movement was resumed with vigor. In June the
'direct action' policy was relaxed, New York once again beganTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 817
to draw gold from London, and soon afterward Governor
Norman once more visited New York.
Not until August 8, 1929 was permission given to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to raise its rate to 6 per
cent. Simultaneously the buying rate on acceptances was
reduced from 51A to 51/8percent. The fundamental thesis
that it was possible to distinguish between Federal Reserve
credit released for speculative purposes and that released
to facilitate legitimate business was thus fully maintained.
This famous 'straddle' policy was bullishly interpreted by
the market. From August io to October 19 the bill portfolio
of the Federal Reserve banks was increased $261 million and
rediscounts were reduced. Banks outside New York City con-
tinued to increase their security loans to customers, and the
speculative markets continued to draw supplies of credit
from outside the banking system.12 The New York banks
continued to exercise restraint and moderation in extending
speculative credit in order to be prepared to meet future
contingencies already looked forward to with growing anx-
iety, but the speculative boom on the Stock Exchange, by
now highly selective, continued until September. New York
continued to draw foreign funds and on September 26 the
Bank of England raised its rate to 61/2 per cent.
From June 1928 to October 1929 the restrictive measures
of the Federal Reserve banks, as a whole, were less effective
in checking the growth of bank credit in America than were
the measures taken from January to June A relatively
stable credit base was maintained in part by shifting from
the discount shoulder to the bill portfolio shoulder and back
again, and in part by fixing Federal Reserve funds created
in the first instance by rediscounts permanently in the Ameri-
can credit structure by gold imports. On this relatively stable
12Beckhart,ibid., p. 146,givesthe changes in brokers loans from August 7,
1928toOctober t6, 1929,inmillions of dollars: Own Account, +6; Out-of-
Town Banks, +42;Others,+752.
Ch.i8, The Attempt to offset Gold Redistribution without having
previously offset Gold Accumulation.8i8 EXPERIMENTATION
credit base the unexhausted powers of expansion of the
American commercial banking system continued to build an
expanded credit superstructure (Table 64)
TABLE 64






TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) ACCOUNTS
Increase in Monetary Gold Stock +263
Decrease in Money in Circulation outside the Reserve
Banks, the Treasury, and All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +2
Increasein Cash in Vault of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) —25
Increase in Treasury Currency +2
Decrease in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks —66
Increase in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks +gg
Decrease in Bills Discounted at the Reserve Banks —101
Increase in Other Deposits at the Reserve Banks —35
Increase in Unexpended Capital Funds of the Reserve Banks —go
+366 —317
Increase in Member Bank Reserve Accounts due to these
Items +49
Actual Increase in Member Bank Reserve Accounts +54
The results of fifteen months of effort to prevent the cl-ca-
tion of credit for, or its diversion to, speculative purposes
were far from brilliant. American banks as a whole, without
any substantial increase in their reserves, increased their total
loans and investments a billion and a half dollars. Though
their investments declined $1,167 million, their 'loans and
discounts (adjusted) 'increased$2,695 million, mostly in the
form of loans on securities. Bank credit directly supported
the speculative boom, and at the same time the bankingTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 8ig
system was accumulating an additional contingent liability
in the form of an uninterrupted growth in loans for the
account of others. From June 1928 to September 1929 these
TABLE 64
June 30,1928—OCtober4, 1929,aPeriod during which the Federal Reserve
System was carrying out a Cycle of Open Market Operations in Bills Bought






TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) THE COMPTROLLER
Increase in Monetary Gold Stock +263
Decrease in Money in Circulation outside the Reserve
Banks, the Treasury, and AllReportingBanks
(estimated) +2
Increase in Treasury Currency
Increase in Commercial Bank Float (incomplete) +570
Decrease in Net Indebtedness to Foreign Banks (Member
Banks only) +87
Increase in Loans plus Investments (adj.) of All Reporting
Banks +1,527
Decrease in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks —66
Increase in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks +gg
Increase in Real Estate owned by All Reporting Banks
(estimated on basis of a monthly increase of 7 million) + 105
Increase in Capital Funds of All Reporting Banks
(estimated on basis of a monthly increase of 42 million) —630
+2,655 —696
Increase in Deposits (adj.)All Reporting Banks due to
these Items +1,959
Actual Increase in Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting Banks +1,782
increased $1,858 million as shown by the accompanying
monthly figures.
Loans for the Account of Others (millions of dollars)
1928 1929
June 1,744 January 2,434
July 1,760 February 2,656
August i,88r March 2,879
September 1,924 April 2,893
October 2,048 May 2,965
November 2,248 June 2,940
December 2,319 July 3,290
August 3,642
September 3,602820 EXPERIMENTATION
The International Redistribution of Funds of 1929COfl-
trastedto the Redistributions of 1914andof 1919—1920
Thecontinued expansion of the one-way American banking
system after the cyclical forces of economic adjustment were
making themselves felt found no counterpart in the English
banking system. The deposits of the London clearing banks
ceased to rise at the close of 1928, and the increase in their
advances, in progress since 1925, stopped in February 1929
(Chart 45). Both in internal credit policy and in interna-
tional lending practice the 'active partners' in the world's
international gold standard nucleus had ended their de facto
cooperation. The 'silent partner' in the nucleus was also
pursuing an independent course. At the moment of greatest
divergence in the international positions of the New York
and London markets France, for reasons already described in
detail,14 appeared upon the international stage as a sort of
segment of the 'automatic gold standard' of the textbooks
operating in a world in which the other segments were miss-
ing, and able, by strict adherence to orthodox principles, to
exercise a puii over the exchanges and draw gold to herself.
Because two strong magnets, Paris and New York, were
pulling upon the international flow of funds, a redistribution
of inter-market indebtedness took place during the culminat-
ing stages of the prosperity phase of the international busi-
ness cycle of 1920—29thatwas comparable in importance to
the redistributions of '9 19—20 and of 1914. Its significance for
the interpretation of the post-war gold standard is sharply
brought out by comparing it with these two earlier periods
of disturbance in the mechanism of inter-money market ad-
justment.
In the opening sentences of Book One we stated that in
1914 an entirely new current of payments back to the central
money markets was superimposed upon the normal move-
ment of inter-market and international indebtedness, cul-
minating in a temporary breakdown of the world's financial
14Cf.Ch. 20,TheForeign Exchange Portfolio of the Bank of France in 1929.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 821
machinery. This movement disclosed the hierarchy of finan-
cial centers as it then existed. In this hierarchy London was
supreme, and the whole movement was dominated by the
calling in of foreign assets by London, yet the strength of
Paris was sufficient to allow France to draw gold from London
at the height of the crisis.
During 1919—20 there was another major redistribution of
inter-money market indebtedness, again dominated by a
single center, this time by New York. It was part of the
liquidation of the indebtedness to America and to neutrals
incurred by European countries during the war and post-war
booms.'5
In 1929 New York was again the predominant influence
in a world-wide movement of funds, but the situation was
more complex than during 1919—20 and still more complex
than in 1914. A double pull was being exercised on the
world's exchanges, for just as France shared with London in
the major movement of funds at the international centers
in 1914, so the flow of funds to New York in 1929 coincided
with a calling in of foreign assets by France. But in 1929 the
double pull of the franc and the dollar over the world's ex-
changes was complicated by many cross currents. The most
spectacular was the flight of foreign capital from Germany in
connection with the negotiation of the Young Plan, followed
by a return flow, especially of short term funds, when a final
agreement was reached by the Experts. The return flow was
so strong that in June and July 1929 the Reichsbank was
moved to intervene in the foreign exchange market to pre-
vent gold exports from London to Berlin in order to fore-
stall an increase in interest rates in London detrimental to
the Berlin money market.16 Less spectacular, but far more
fundamental was an underlying movement of funds from
15Cf.Ch. g, Clearing the Decks for a General Stabilization Program.
16Cf.Vervaltungsbericht der Reichsbank fuer das Jahr 1929,p.6. The actual
language employed in this report is less direct than that in the text, but the
meaning is the same.822 EXPERIMENTATION
debtor to creditor countries characteristic of the recession
phase of international business cycles in general, and illus-
trated by the concentration of gold exchange standard bal-
ances in the hands of central banks of creditor countries
(Tables 6o and 67). The major international flow of funds
during 1929, however, was the movement toward New York
to take part in the American boom. Like the movement of
funds to France, and the flow to and from Germany in con-
nection with the Young Plan, this was not part of the cyclical
readjustment. It was not part of an adjustment of any sort,
but was a new disturbing element in an already strained
situation.
In 1914 the movement of funds to the international financial
centers was due to the withdrawal of funds regularly invested
or employed abroad and the failure to reinvest them. It was
the exercise of a power which in past crises had been of the
essence of London's centralized control over the international
gold standard system. This power may often have been used
to force the burden of gold standard adjustments largely
upon. countries other than Great Britain, but it was funda-
mentally of a stabilizing nature when employed in modera-
tion. Only when combined with the catastrophe of a great
war which divided the world economic system into two parts
was its use destructive of stability. During 1919—20 the flow
of funds to and through New York was also due to a calling
in of debts. It was a genuine liquidation of part of an un-
balanced short term international debt structure. As such it
was part of an adjustment of war-time distortions in inter-
national relations and was constructive in character. Neither
the situation of 1914northat of 1919—20waslikely ever to
be repeated unless the World War itself was repeated. But
in 1929 the flow of funds to New York was the result of the
immense deposit and investment attracting power of the
United States, a power inherently disturbing to a stable in-
ternational gold standard system, and which, given the specu-
lative temper of the American people, was likely to come intoTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 823
play at the end of every cycle even in time of peace. In 1929
it was used on a scale that brought to an end the tendency
of international capital movements to equalize international
interest rates, forced a competitive raising of central bank
rates quite foreign to orthodox gold standard theory,17 pro-
longed the prosperity phase of the cycle, postponed many
necessary economic adjustments, broke down the de facto
cooperation of the center countries necessary to operate suc-
cessfully an international gold standard in a world with a
decentralized financial structure, and finally violated the
first principle of any stable gold standard system—the prin-
ciple that there must be stable credit conditions at the center.
Deflationary Effects of the Ending of Competitive
International Long Term Lending
The culmination of American speculation in the New York
stock market crash of October 23, 1929, relieved many inter-
national strains. It resulted in a return flow of foreign funds
from New York and a consequent release of sterling and
other exchanges from pressure. Indeed the actual crisis in
New York had been preceded, and in some measure, hastened
by the withdrawal of French funds as early as July when the
end of American prosperity was already evident to many, and
by the withdrawal of European participation in the stock
market.'8 This release from the temporary though acute
international difficulties associated with the American specu-
lation left all the center countries, including the United
States, face to face with the double problem of dealing with
economic depression within their own borders and of de-
veloping a common international policy in the face of world-
wide deflationary forces.
Production and Trade before October 1929
Themonths just preceding the crisis of October 1929 were
characterized by the maturing of an unbalanced relation
'TCf, Hardy. op. p.51.
18 Beckbart, op.Cit., p. 147.824 EXPERIMENTATION
between the supply of and demand for many important
products. This was a common feature of the position of some
of the major crude food staples in 1928—29. Under the stimu-
lus of new techniques wheat production was growing rapidly
outside Europe, but the long run trend in world demand
continued downward. Russia was still an importer of wheat,
but was in a position soon to reenter the world markets, for
a bumper crop in 1928 was partly withheld from the market
and stored. Somewhat similar conditions prevailed in other
staple products, such as sugar and coffee. In the latter com-
modity a doubly dangerous situation was developing because
the Brazilian 'coffee defense' was being financed by foreign
loans. Over-production, or tendencies in that direction were
clearly in evidence in rubber, timber, copper, and nitrates.
Excess capacity, rather than over-production in the narrow
sense, was the outstanding feature of manufacturing industry.
In certain industries •this was in large degree due to the
economic changes caused by the war. In others it was due to
continued rationalization and failure to scrap old machinery
and to liquidate less efficient firms. Owing to the monopo-
listic price policy successfully pursued by many industries,
the creation of excess capacity went hand in hand with good
profits and helped to conceal its dangers. Since the boom had
been largely in durable consumption goods and the capital
equipment needed for their consumption and utilization, the
industries that had expanded most rapidly were unusually
subject to sudden shifts in demand.
The accumulating dangers of this situation were reflected
in the character of international trade just before the end of
the American boom. Up to October 1929thevalue of the
international trade of 45 countries did not decline, though
production curves in most countries were by then already
falling. The importance of raw materials in world trade was,
however, declining. The import statistics of several important
manufacturing countries showed a definite movement toward
a higher relative proportion of finished manufactures and aTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
lower proportion of raw materials. In those countries, there-•
fore, the market for certain kinds of raw materials was nar-
rowing. From 1925 to 1929, for the world as a whole, trade
inprimary goods increased 15 per cent while trade in manu-
factured goods increased 31 to 32 per cent. This change in the
compositionof the articles entering into world trade tended
not only to make it more sensitive to shifts in world demand
for secondary products, but also introduced a new element th
instability because it caused a new geographical distribution
of the major risks and dangers inherent in any dislocation
of world trade as a whole.'9
The outstanding features of world production and trade
before October 1929, therefore, were, first, the tendency to
actual over-production in crude foodstuffs and raw
as evidenced by divergent tendencies in supply and demand
and by efforts to hold up prices through price controls unac-
companied by production controls; second, excessive produc-
tive capacity in many manufacturing industries depending
increasingly upon elastic types of demand; third, the reflection
of these phenomena in international trade and the develop-
ment of actual or potential strains in raw material producing
countries and in entrepot centers. Any diminution of the flow
of new loans from the center countries was certain to disclose
these basic instabilities,
The decline in funds available for lending abroad by Great
Britain and the United States in 1928—29, accompanied and
even preceded by the withdrawal of French funds abroad and
the movement of short term funds to Paris, was therefore a
profoundly deflationary force in many parts of the world. The
first effect on the balance of payments of various
was felt in gold movements and the shifting of internationai
balances rather than in changes in commodity exports and in-
ports,2° but by the middle of 1929 the financial repercussions
Thegeneralizations in this section are based on Ohlin, op. cit., pp.41—5, 48-.
9, 53—4, 64—j,1117; andWorld Economic Survey, 1931/2,pp. 86—7, 146—SO.
Ohlin,op. cit., p.127.826 EXPERIMENTATION
of the ending of competitive international long term lending,
and of the independent course of the New York money mar-
ket had been translated into other forms of economic pressure
which have been well summarized by the World Economic
Survey, 1931/2 (p.43):
"The shrinkage of overseas loans in these various ways was ac-
companied by a distinct industrial and investment boom in the
main creditor countries, while at the same time it created credit
stringency in the borrowing countries.... Theborrowing coun-
tries were forced to decrease imports and increase exports. In the
raw-material producing countries there was a contraction of credit
which forced extra sales and efforts to counteract lower prices by
increased production. On the other hand the credit contraction in
such heavy borrowing countries as Germany forced a restriction
of imports and a consumption of stocks. Both tendencies contrib-
uted to a derangement of the markets and raw material prices
sagged. When the investment boom burst in the autumn of 1929,
theweak position of these commodities precipitated a rapid fall
in prices."
Temporary Revival of Long Term International Lending
in 1930
These pressures were relieved by a vigorous but temporary
revival of foreign lending in the spring of chiefly by the
United States, but also by the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
to some extent by the United Kingdom. Table 65 shows
clearly the concentration of new lending in the first part of
1930andits subsequent decline in both London and New
York. It needs, however, careful interpretation. After a quiet
start the bond market in New York improved in March,
April, and May. An optimistic spirit prevailed and the opin-
ion gained ground that the recession was merely temporary.
The foreign bond market was stimulated not only by favora-
ble domestic conditions, but also by active purchases from
abroad for the repatriation of foreign issues. The latter in-
fluence was largely due to French purchases 21andwas there-
21.U.S.Department of Commerce, Trade In formation Bulletin 746, pp. 6—7.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
fore part of the continuing movement of capital into
which, from a world point of view, was a deflationary force
offsetting the relief given by increased American and
international lending. The peak of activity in placing new
foreignissues in New York was reached in April; thereafter a
downward trend in the volume of new foreign issues began,
TABLE 65
New Foreign Loans offered in the London and New rork Markets
Refunding excluded, monthly(thousands)
1930 193!
United United United United
States Kingdom States
January $ 6x,g86 £5,589 $ 95,657 £
February 96,038 18,190 5,156 13,654.
March 111,391 9,436 7,246
April 151,211 9,381 42,553 316
May 100,639 20,083 15,284 !o,Q86
June 177,615 5,522 35,286 8,466
July 78,238 3,324 1,900
August 17,000 3,1 o6 none
September 4,829 2,630 23,602
October 85,661 17,734 none
November 1,347 8,394 2,150 74
December 19,377 5,415 none
Total $905,333 £108,803 $228,834 £46,078
SOURCES: United States: Trade Information Bulletins 746 and 802; United
Midland Bank fIgures, Board of Trade Journal, Jan. 7, 1932, p. 8
broken in June by the flotation of the German
Loan (the Young Loan) and in October by a large Canadian
government issue. The declining trend was intensified
the last three quarters of the year by the deepening of the de-
pression itself, and also by unfavorable political
abroad, including revolutionary activities in certain Latin
American countries, and the electoral victory of the German
Nazi party in September. British foreign lending did not, lie
that of the United States, experience a genuine revival in the
spring of 1930, but like the American lending it was much
heavier in the first than in the second half of the year. With
22Cf. World Economic Survey, 1932/3,p.291, table.828 EXPERIMENTATION
the exception of February and May the only large monthly
total during 1930 was in October,23 and this was almost en-
tirely accounted for by a single large loan to India. After May
1930 new competitive foreign lending declined steadily in
both New' York and London. Its character and geographical
distribution also changed.
In New York Canadian borrowing amounted to $281 mil-
lion in 1930,andan unusually large proportion of all loans
was relatively short term, from one to three years. Such loans
amounted to $167 million, of which the bulk was for the Ar-
gentine government. The American share of the international
loans to Germany and Austria amounted to $125 million.
These three types of loan accounted for millionof a
total of $905 million for the year. The revival of American
capital export to debtor countries other than Canada, of the
type that had constituted the major part of the flow of Ameri-
can, credit supporting the international gold standard facade
from 1926 to 1928, was therefore much less than is suggested
by the increase over 1929 in the total of new foreign issues.
New long term lending in London in 1930alsogave less sup-
port to the international gold standard system in general than
the total of new issues would indicate. Of the £109millionof
new capital provided, £7° million went to the Empire, and of
this a large proportion was Indian government borrowing. Of
the remaining million for the rest of the world the bulk is
accounted for by a few special transactions of an emergency
character. Of the £'7 million lent to South America, £8 mil-
lion was the British share of an international Coffee Realiza-
tion Loan to Brazil, and of the £18 million lent to Europe
£14millionwas the British share of international loans to
Germany and Austria.
When the course of foreign borrowing in the American and
23 The British share of the Young Loan, amounting to £12 million, was floated
in June but is not included in the Midland Bank figures. Since the proceeds
were retained by the government, contrary to French wishes and in the face
of French pressure, the effect of the loan in the London market was held to
be the equivalent of a government conversion loan.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 829
British capital markets in 1930 is considered in conjunction
with the simultaneous flow of capital into France, it is clear
that the relief from deflationary pressure experienced by the
world as a whole from a revival of the central capital markets
in 1930 was wholly inadequate to postpone further funda-
mental economic adjustments. These adjustments themselves,
complicated by unfavorable political factors, reacted on
willingness of the central capital markets to lend, and poten-
tial borrowers were also in many cases unwilling to assume
heavy future obligations under such unfavorable circum-
stances. In 1931 long term foreign lending by the central mar-
kets, American loans to Canada excepted, had virtually
ceased. Of the small total of American foreign loans in 1.931,
63 per cent went to Canada.24 The only loan to Latin America
was for the reorganization of an American company in Cuba.
Only one loan was made to Japan, and only two to Europe,
both to American-owned corporations, the International
Match Company and Ford Motors Ltd. Indeed, when the
tal movement of old as well as new securities is considered,
the United States in 1931 had become a net importer of long
term capital.
Movement of Long Yerm Capital Items in the American Balance of Payments,
1930—193125
Capital imports +, Capital exports —(millionsof dollars)
1930 1931
Newforeign security issues —833
Direct investments (net) —183 182
Movement of old securities (net) +565 +4C6
Bond redemption and sinking fund (net) +173 +207
Net movement of long term capital —278 +2:8
*Refundingexcluded and alter discounts and underwriting commissiors aire
deducted.
The figures in the accompanying table are to be compared
with a net outward movement of long term capital from the
United States of $141 million in 1929, $675 million in 1928,
24 In the last quarter of 1930 Canadian loans were 95 per cent of the
25 E. J. Stone, op. cit., in note 6.830 EXPERIMENTATION
and $705 million in 1927. New capital lent abroad by Great
Britain in also fell to a very low figure, £46 million. Of
this, £21 million went to India, partly to take advantage of a
moment of easy money induced by the Bank of England and
the Treasury in preparation for a British government con-
version loan.26 The only loan to Argentina was to repay tem-
porary advances, and it was arranged that the proceeds of the
only loan to Chile were to be left in London.27 Only one issue,
a Greek loan, was placed for all Europe.
As in i 930, France continued to be an importer of capital
and the revival of lending in the smaller creditor markets of
1930 was not repeated. The stream of competitive long term
international lending had dried up.
Capital Flows Uphill
This was the main constituent in a general reversal of the in-
ternational movement of capital. Beginning in 1929 it became
increasingly evident, in the felicitous language employed by
the World Economic Survey, 1931/2(p.177), that "capi-
tal was flowing uphill from the debtor to the creditor coun-
tries." This was strikingly true of the situation prevailing in
1931, when the United States had a very small surplus of capi-
tal exports, the United Kingdom was a net importer of capi-
tal, and France still further increased her capital imports. The
efforts made by the center countries to fill the gap created by
the decline in long term advances and the private movement
of securities by granting short term credits, according to the
precedent set by Great Britain before the war, were totally in-
adequate,28 and several important debtor countries were
26 The Economist's comment in this connection is (May 23, 1931, p. ii i8):
"The fall in the Bank rate has already produced a stirring of activity in the
moribund capital market. The Indian government's short term issue of £10,-
ooo,ooo at 6% prompted slightly amused comment in view of the expeditious
use of an opportunity believed by the market to have been arranged by the
'powers that be' for quite a different purpose."
27 The Economist, April 4, 1931, p. 742.
28Cf.Ch. 28, The Attempt to Finance the Depression by Short Term Inter-
national Lending.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
in the position of actually exporting capital on
Under these conditions the flow of international capital
tended to accentuate rather than to equalize international in
terest rate differentials. The World Economic Survey, 193.1/2
makesthis point as follows (p. 188):
"In the main creditor countries the price of long-term capital Pell
from 1929 to the middle of 1931. A precisely opposite movement
is clear in the debtor countries where the yields on bonds rose
rapidly from the middle of 1929 on. A temporary resumption of
capital movements in the first half of brought a fall in these
yields, but from the middle of 1930, they increased again rapidly
until in the financial crisis of the latter months of 193 itheyrose
to alarming heights.... Throughoutthis period there has been
a flight of capital from countries of high interest rates to those
whose interest rates were low and falling."
To the deflationary consequences of the ending of the flow
of competitive international long term lending already
tioned, one further consequence must therefore be added, its
contribution to increasing the cost of long term capital in
debtor countries.
Prices, Production, and Trade, October .1929toMid-i93i
From the end of 1928 to the early part of 1931 the artificial
barriers that impeded the full tide of economic readjustment
from asserting its power gradually yielded and finally crum
bled away. With the drying up of competitive long term
ternational lending new defenses against deflation were estab
lished at strategic points by special types of government loan
and by short term financing. At the same time the ability of
various segments of the world economy to resist the necessary
adjustments by price and production controls was being put
to a series of severe tests, and a very unequal power of
sistance was displayed in different fields of production. In tfie
fertile soil created by such a series of rear guard actions
29Cf.table of international capital movements, 1928—32, in World Economic
Survey, 1932/3,p.291.832 EXPERIMENTATION
against deflation, an ever increasing movement toward the
further restriction of world trade by tariff and other barriers
grew and flourished. In this whole process the ending of the
speculative boom in New York marked a major turning point.
PRICES AND PRODUCTION
The fall in prices at the end of the boom was heaviest in
crude foodstuffs and raw materials where supply was least
elastic, and smallest in manufactured goods where supply was
most easily restricted. The dominant factor in the depression
in 1930 and 1931, in fact, was the fall in agricultural prices.
Agricultural producers, when faced with a declining demand
had, in general, to accept large reductions in price. Their ef—
forts to resist these price declines through schemes of price
control and valorization led to a breakup of the world market
in certain commodities and to an accumulation of stocks in
certain producing areas that pressed continually on world
prices. The weakness, moreover, that developed in the financ-
ing of some of the price control schemes in raw materials
added greatly to the fall in world prices, when one after
another these schemes broke down. Industrial producers were
better able to maintain prices by large reductions in output.
These began in the second half of 1929. Though checked
somewhat in the spring, when a more hopeful view of the
general economic situation was bringing about a revival in
the capital markets, the downward trend of production gath-
ered force in the second half of i 930 and continued in i 931.
It was heaviest in the United States and Canada where credit
expansion had been most pronounced, and in Germany, Po-
land, and other countries whose industrial production had
been most dependent on foreign borrowing.
In the general fact that raw material production was main-
tained while prices were low, and industrial production was
low while prices were maintained, lay perhaps the most im-
portant key to the depression. Price maintenance and produc-
tion control of the raw materials for producers' goods andTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 833
equipmenthelped to concentrate the full force of the
trophic decline in prices on the uncontrolled raw
producing areas, and at the same time, by helping to keejp uP
the cost of producers' goods, it encouraged still more the
traction of industrial production. A sort of 'price deadlock'
occurred which, according to the World Economic
1931/2 (p. 132) ,was"a central cause of the persistence
pressed conditions."
TRADE
The interaction of so many mutually forwarding deflationary
forces could not fail to leave an unmistakable impress upon
the value, the quantum, the direction, and the barter terms of
international trade after October i 929. From that time on
descending spiral of world trade, the graphic portrayall of
which forms so depressing a frontispiece to the World &o-
nomic Survey, 193 2/3, began to accelerate. The value of
world trade expressed in dollars in 1930 was 19 per cent
than in 1929, and during the first six months of '93' fcll
another13 per cent. The volume of world trade declinedi,
however, only 7 to 8 per cent from 1929 to 1930.80
Though long term lending by the central capital markets
to European borrowing countries was curtailed earlier audi
more severely than long term lending to countries outsidle
Europe, European trade was relatively well sustained during
1930. This was partly due to favorable barter terms of trade
with non-European raw material countries and partly to a
shift in the source of the imports of cereals and animal prod-
ucts taken by western European countries from other conti-
nents to eastern Europe. The United States also benefited by
the change in the barter terms of trade, but the quantum cE
North American trade in 1930 fell far more than that of Eu-
rope, partly because of the dependence of American exports
on new foreign lending. This dependence was as
30LeagueofNations,Memorandum on Trade and Balances of
1930:Vol.I, Review of World Trade, 1930(Geneva, p.7.834 EXPERIMENTATION
long as America continued to receive interest from abroad
and to attract to herself a large and steady stream of private
foreign capital. In part the drop in North American trade was
due to the passage of the Hawley-Smoot tariff bill in June
1930 by which nearly 900 duties were raised. Special develop-
ments, in both Europe and America, therefore, intensified the
impact of the depression on the raw material producing
countries of other continents. The unequal incidence of the
fall in prices upon the economies of individual countries is
brought out in Table 66. Such a movement of prices meant a
loss of purchasing power abroad on the part of countries de-
pendent on food and raw material exports and reacted on the
trade of other countries, especially after the revival of foreign
lending in the first half of 1930 had run its course. Professor
Ohlin, in his schematic presentation of the spread of the de-
pression from the original sources of disturbance, therefore,
describes the crisis in the food producing countries—Argen-
tina, Australia, the Balkan countries, Brazil, Canada, Colom-
bia, Cuba, and Hungary—and in the raw material producing
countries—Bolivia, British Malaya, Chile, Egypt, Ecuador,
Finland, India, Mexico, Dutch East Indies, New Zealand,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela—as combining with
the 'original recession' in manufacturing industries in Ger-
many and the United States to spread the influence of falling
demand and prices in world markets, first, to countries sensi-
tive to foreign conditions—Austria, Czechoslovakia, Greece,
Japan, Poland, and the United Kingdom—and, finally, to
countries less sensitive to foreign conditions, or selling much
to Europe—the Baltic countries, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Italy, Irish Free State, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.BL
The adverse terms of trade experienced by raw material
and food producing countries not only contributed to the
spread of the depression, but also greatly increased the bur-
den of foreign debts owed by countries of this type. Many
81op.cit., p.240, diagram.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 835
debtor countries were in the position of seeing the payment
and service of their foreign debt absorb an increasing pro-
portion of the proceeds of their exports. They were faced with
the alternative of cutting down their imports, defaulting on
their foreign debt, or increasing their exports. In their effort
to choose the third alternative they encountered a severe
TABLE 66





5Raw silk (Japan) —30




1 oSugar (Czechoslovakia) —20
iiButter (Denmark) —i9
12Bacon (Denmark) —t5
13White cotton piece goods (U.K.) —ii
14Petrol (U.S.A.) —ii
15Frozen meat (Argentina) —9
i6Silk tissuCs (France) —9
17Wood pulp (Sweden) —8
i8Motor cars up to $iooo (U.S.A.) —2
'9News print paper (Sweden) —'
20Steel girders (Belgium) —'
Pig-iron (U.K.) +3
22Coal (U.K.) +3
SOURCE: League of Nations, Review of World Trade, 1930,I,12
check in the growth of tariff barriers. As already noted, shortly
after i 927 the growth of agricultural protection brought to
naught the efforts of the World Economic Conference at Ge-
neva to promote freer trade. With the deepening of the de-
pression this movement gained great impetus, and several
debtor countries found that they could not increase their ex-
ports or even maintain them. Hence they had to reduce im-
ports. This was true mainly of countries whose terms of trade
were very adverse, but with the passage of the Hawley-Smoot
tariff bill and other tariffs established either in retaliation or
for similar reasons, similar pressures developed on debtor836 EXPERIMENTATION
countries dependent more on the export of manufactured
goods, of which Germany was the outstanding example. The
desire of debtor countries of all classes therefore to reduce
imports in order to maintain their credit abroad and to sup-
port their exchanges by building up an active trade balance
became an added impetus after 1929 to the growth of a severe
international tariff raising competition.
With the falling off of demand for manufactured goods on
the part of countries producing chiefly raw materials and
food, with the general spread of the depression throughout
the world, and with the added impediments to trade imposed
by an all round increase in tariffs and the introduction of
other trade barriers, the clearly marked characteristics of the
decline in international trade in 1930 were gradually lost in
1931. Manufacturing countries reduced their exports at least
as much, and in some cases more than other countries. The
value of United States exports as well as imports, for example,
was 36 to 37 per cent lower in the first half of 1931 than in the
first half of i 930. Trade between manufacturing countries,
which had been relatively well sustained in 1930, fell off more
rapidly than trade between manufacturing and other coun-
tries, and by the second half of 1931, "the sequence of events
became so confused that it was not possible to state anything
more than that there was a general decline proceeding at an
uneven pace, and distorted by a variety of restrictive meas-
ures." 32
32 WorldEconomic Survey, 1931/2,p.156.Thegeneralizations in this section
are based on this source, especially pp. 86—gi, and on Ohlin,
op. cit., pp. 146, 198; and the Review of World Trade, 1930,pp.14—15,
25—7, 32—3.CHAPTER 23
The Influence of World-wide Deflationary Forces on the
International Distribution of the Precious Metals
Until the middle of i 931, in spite of all efforts to resist neces-
sary adjustments in commodity balances of trade, there was a
clear tendency for debtor countries to increase their active
trade balances, mainly by drastic curtailment of imports, and
for the major creditor countries to increase their passive bal-
ances or to decrease their active balances.1 This was accom-
plished, however, in very unequal degree and by different
methods in different countries. It was part of a readjustment
in total balances of payments that imposed great strains upon
the whole decentralized world credit structure, introduced
further complications into the mutual relations of the center
countries, and broke down the international gold standard
facade at the periphery. One of the most striking features of
this adjustment was a remarkable redistribution of gold in-
ternationally. In this the Eastern countries, particularly India,
shared, but in a different way from other countries because
of the fundamentally different character of their demand for
the precious metals.
The Influence of World-wide Deflationary Forces on
Indian Demand for Gold and Silver
In the long history of India's demand for gold the three years,
1926, 1927, and 1928, constitute a sort of plateau with very
rough terrain on either side. From 1917 to 1925 her demand
was never entirely independent of the repercussions of the
1 World Economic Survey, 1931/2,pp.172—3, and Review of World Trade,
1930,pp.42—3.
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return of the West to the gold standard. After 1929 it was
deeply influenced first by the impact of the world depression
upon India herself, and later by the impact upon India of the
disintegration of the gold standard system in the West. The
three intervening years may be considered as a brief return
to 'normal' conditions of gold absorption by India, and it may
be recalled with profit that one of these years was the only
one in the whole post-war period during which the inter-
national gold standard existed on a truly world-wide scale.2 In
order to bring out clearly the nature of this 'plateau,' and of
the forces that brought it to an end, it is necessary to gather
the threads of our previous analysis of India's relation to the
gold standard world.
As pointed out in our discussion in Chapter io of New
York as a residual buyer of gold, the most important fact
about Indian demand for gold is that it is a consumer de-
mand. It is part of a total demand for the precious metals
arising from the need of the Indian masses to find a means of
accumulating savings, and is therefore fundamentally limited
by the amount of these savings. The degree to which the will
and capacity of the Indian masses to save has to be satisfied
by imports of the precious metals, instead of being met by the
use of currency, bank deposits, or investments depends upon
the spread of banking facilities and investment habits in In-
dia. In the post-war period these were still in a rudimentary
stage of development but were growing quite rapidly. Given
the total of savings available for the purchase of the precious
metals, the actual amount of gold and silver imports becomes
a function of their cheapness or dearness in rupees. Whether
gold or silver shall be imported and in what proportions de-
pends in some degree upon the relative value of the two met-
als in rupees. Fluctuations in either the rupee-sterling or the
2Theshort duration of 'normal' conditions has been a general feature of
our post-war analysis; e.g., from 1914to1933 in only one month, July 1920,
didthe 'normal' condition of absence of large surplus reserves exist in the
American banking system.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 839
dollar-sterling exchange, or in both, influence the rupee price
of both metals and therefore the ratio between them. These
exchange rates were unstable during Restoration, and
therefore the size and timing of Indian demand for gold dur
ing that period became in part a function of their fluctua*.
tions.3 For this reason the general return of the Western
world to the gold standard, combined with a stable rupee-
sterling exchange rate, eliminated a major disturbing in-
fluence upon the trade of the Orient in the precious metals,
and therefore upon Indian and other Eastern demand for
gold in the West.4
The combination of a stable dollar-sterling exchange rate
and a stable sterling-rupee exchange rate was an accomplished
fact in April 1925, but a large section of Indian opinion
would not accept it as such. Dissatisfaction with the then
existing is. 6 d. rate on London was widespread, and a
vigorous political agitation was launched to change it to the
pre-war rate of i S. 4 d. This situation offered possibilities to
the gold speculator which resulted in abnormally large im-
ports of gold into India in 1925 and the first part of
These speculative hopes were shown to be illusory when the
Indian government undertook to buy and sell sterling at the
gold points corresponding to the is. 6 d. rate. They were
completely destroyed as a practical market influence by the
passage in March 1927 of amendments to the Currency Act
legally establishing the i 8 d. rupee, but were for a while re-
vived in 1931 in connection with the Round Table Con-
ference.
The amendments to the Currency Act passed in 1927 were
embodied in a measure known as the Ratio Bill, which was
forced through the Legislature only after a bitter three
month struggle. This bill was proposed and passed as the
first step in a program growing out of the recommendations
8Cf. Ch. g,TheChange of Policy in India.
Cf. Ch. 10,TheGold-Silver Ratio in India.
5Cf. Ch. 12,TheEnd of the Regular Pattern of Gold Distribution.840 EXPERIMENTATION
of the Hilton Young Commission for the introduction of the
gold bullion standard in India. It was intended to put India
for a 'transitional' period upon the gold exchange standard.
The second step was to be the passage of a Gold Standard and
Reserve Bank bill, under which the full legal obligations of
the gold bullion standard were to come into effect, and a
central bank was to be established having control of the
Indian note issue and provided with the necessary gold and
other resources and the necessary powers to administer such a
standard. The Currency Act of i 927 placed upon the govern-
ment the obligation to purchase all gold presented to the
mints in India at a fixed price of Rs. 2 1—3—10 per tola, corre-
sponding to a sterling parity of 1s. 6 d. per rupee. It with-
drew the legal tender character hitherto enjoyed by the
sovereign and half-sovereign in India, but provided that these
coins could be sold as bullion to the mints at the same price.6
The Act also placed the government under obligation to sell
gold at Rs. 2 1—3—1O per tola, or sterling at an equivalent rate
at the option of the Controller of the Currency. This rate was
to be calculated on the basis of the cost of shipping gold to
London.7 In practice it was fixed at is. 54%4 d. per rupee.8
The option to sell gold was not intended to be used, for the
government was determined to strengthen its gold holdings
during the 'transition' period in preparation for the perma-
nent gold bullion standard regime in prospect.9
6Annual Report of the Controller of the Currency (India) for 1927—28,pp.
5—6.
The relevant paragraph of the Currency Act reads: "For the purpose of
determining the equivalent rate applicable to the sale of sterling ...twenty.
one rupees, three annas and ten pies shall be deemed to be equivalent to such
sum in sterling as is required to purchase one tola of fine gold in London
at the rate at which the Bank of England is bound by law to give sterling in
exchange for gcld, after deduction therefrom of an amount representing the
normal cost per tola of transferring gold in bulk from Bombay to London
including interest on its cost in transit." Under the Act purchases by the
Mint were limited to a minimum of 40,andsales to a minimum of 1065
tolas fine.
8TheAnnual Report of the Controller of the Currency (India) for 1930—31,
p.14, speaks of this rate as the statutory rate.'
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TheCurrency Act of 192 '7 went into effect on April i.
datetherefore marks the official adherence of Indiathc
gold standard.1° Yet there was an atmosphere of
about the whole procedure. The terms 'gold bullion standard'
and 'gold exchange standard' have no substantive
as applied to India." The Currency Act of 1927 added a
moderate potential monetary demand for gold for the par..
pose of building up the Indian gold standard reserve to
basicconsumer demand of India. Its practical importance,
however, in the actual management of the Indian currency
was nil, except for its power to convince speculators
thatthe government was determined that the is. 6 d, irupec
had come to stay. This determination and the means taken
enforce it, however, were quite independent of gold standard
arrangements in India. The rupee continued to be managth
by a variation of the old Indian Council Bill system. The
government intervened regularly in the foreign exchange
market in order to purchase sterling for the double purpose
of obtaining remittance to meet its statutory obligations
Londonand of controlling the exchange rate. These par-
chaseswere made partly at its own initiative without previous
notice to the market and partly by a system of requesting
tenders of sterling for certain stated amounts, first initiated
in 1927 upon representation by the Exchange Banks that
unexpected government purchases were inconvenient for
them. By varying the amounts of these requests for tenders,
by timing them appropriately, and by refusing to
tenders at rates it did not consider desirable the government
was able to exercise a system of exchange control.12 For ex-
ample, by increasing the amount of tenders requested it
could weaken the rupee, and by reducing the, amount or by
10 In a chronological list showing the progress of the world's return to gold,
published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, Aug. 1928, the date of India's
return to gold is given as April i,1927.
11. Cf. the discussion of Argentina's 'return to gold' by the opening of the
Caja de Conversion in August 1927, Ch. 14, Argentina.
12 The purchase of gold by the government in India, of course, had the
effect upon the rate as the sale of Council Bills in London.842 EXPERIMENTATION
refusing to accept tenders it could strengthen the rupee. This
type of intervention was supplemented, when the rupee was
weak, by government offers to sell sterling in limited amounts
at fixed rates. Such sales, for example, were made at is. 6 d.
in March 1929. When the rupee was exceptionally weak
sterling was made available in unlimited amounts atis.
54%4 d. as required by the Currency Act of 1927. This was
the case, for example, at the end of 1930 and the beginning of
1931. The fact that sterling could be obtained at this rate as
of right did not introduce anything essentially new in Indian
currency management, for under the old system sufficient
sterling would have had to be sold to keep the sterling rate
stable.'8 As under the old system, the exchange control aspects
of government intervention in the exchange market some-
times interfered with its other object, the remittance home of
government obligations in London. When this happened, the
indian government borrowed in London as in pre-war times.
The weakness of the rupee, under the impact of the defla-
tionary forces after i 929 therefore accounts for India's urgent
need to break through the unofficial embargo on foreign lend-
ing prevailing in London intermittently from 1929 to
By these essentially familiar means, and not by the assump-
tion of gold standard trappings, the sterling-rupee exchange
was kept stable, and since the pound sterling was part of the
Fordetailed accounts of these operations, see the Annual Reports of the
Controller of the Currency and the Annual Market Reviews of Premchand,
Roychand & Sons, Bombay.
14Cf.Ch. 22, The Deflationary Effects of the Ending of Competitive Inter-
national Long Term Lending. The Annual Report of the Controller of the
Currency for 1930—31describesthis aspect of the situation during that fiscal
year(p. 14):"Sterlingto the amount of £5,395,000 only having been pur-
chased through the market during the year it was necessary to meet the
Secretary of State's requirements by other means, such as remittance through
the Paper Currency Reserve or by borrowings in London. As described else.
where in this report there were three sterling issues during the year, totalling
£31 millions. In addition to these loans temporary advances to the extent of
£6 millions were taken from the London Office of the Imperial Bank of India
millions in July and £2 millions in August of which only £2 millions
were repaid during the year."THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 843
international gold standard system, the price of gold in India
was also stable. From 1926 to 1928 the price of silver, though
on the whole declining, did not fall sufficiently to offer great
inducementsto holders in India to shift their savings frOm
gold to silver, Freed from speculative influences arising from
currency instability in the Western world and prospective
changes in the sterling value of the rupee, and essentially un•
changedby the legislation of 1927,15 Indian demand for gold
became for a while relatively stable. Imports seemed to have
settled down at a new normal level of about 200
rupees per annum, the 'plateau' referred to at the opening of
these paragraphs. Though from 1926 to 1928 India was reJLa
tively prosperous, this was considerably less than the average
of pre-war years, which confirmed the Controller of the Cur-
rency in the view that "with the growth in the investment
habit in India, gold imports in the future are not likely to be
as large as in the past."An apparently permanent reducdon
in Indian demand had lightened England's share in the
British and American responsibility for the
distribution of gold.17
In 1929 the situation began to change. India's prosperity
was converted into depression by a long series of adverse
developments. The country suffered a series of natural
ities and was subject to grave industrial and political disturb-
ances. These were described by Premchand, Roychand and
Sons in their Annual Market Review for 1929(p.6):
E.g., the Annual Report of the Controller of the Currency(India)for
1927—28saidon pp. 5—6: "In Section 4 of the Indian Currency Act, 1927, an
obligation is laid on government to receive at the Bombay Mint, at the rate
ofRs. 21—B—bper tola fine gold, all gold in the form of bars containing not
less than 40 tolas which may be presented by the public. This section came
into force 1st April 1927, and on that date the conditions attaching to the
acceptance of gold at the Bombay Mint were published. ..Asthe rupee
sterling exchange did not reach the upper gold point in the course of the
year no gold was tendered at the Mint." Yet India was a substantial
importer during the year.
16 Ibid., p. 5.
11Cf.Ch. iS, The One-Way American Banking System in its Relation to the
International Distribution of Cold, and Ch. 19, Changes in the Flow of GokL844 EXPERIMENTATION
"The unusual occurrence of a frosty weather at the beginning of
the year destroyed a considerable part of the winter crops. This
was followed by communal riots in Bombay of such a violent
character that drastic steps were needed to re-establish order and
a curfew order had to be passed. Over a hundred persons were
killed and for ten days the city was in a state of panic. The mon-
soon broke seasonably, but there was an excess of rain in some
parts and drought in others. Sind and Assam suffered from floods
which rendered thousands homeless and did incalculable harm to
crops. Kathiawar and the United Provinces experienced drought
in the autumn. Later, a plague of locusts destroyed the already
scanty crops in Sind and the Punjab. The strike fever continued
throughout the year all over the country. The worst sufferer was
Bombay, where the cotton mills were idle for 210daysduring the
year and the number of workmen on strike was i25,400."
Inaddition, India, in common with all raw material pro-
ducing countries, began to experience very severe declines in
the prices of her principal export commodities. These tend-
encies were all accentuated in 1930andthe beginning of
1931,asis indicated in the following summary statement by
the Controller of the Currency in his report for the fiscal
year April—March (p. 3):
"Economic conditions in India were affected throughout the year
by the doubts and uncertainties attending the efforts to settle the
country's political future. Although the findings of the Royal
Commission appointed to report on the constitutional problem
were not published until the third week of June 1930,theIndian
National Congress inaugurated an elaborate civil disobedience
campaign early in the year, the effect of which was very pro-
nounced not only on internal trade but also on outside markets
where developments in India were being closely watched. The
feeling of nervousness and insecurity which prevailed after the
close of the Lahore Congress in December 1929re-appeared,busi-
ness was paralysed for a time, particularly in Western India, and
disturbances occurred in many parts of the country. The monsoon
which broke at about the normal time was excellent. and gave on
the whole very good harvests withresult that India was placedTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 845
inthe paradoxical position of having large quantities of surpius
exportable crops which could not be exported except at a heavy
loss owing to the prevailing depression and lack of demand. This
was particularly true in the case of the jute and wheat crops."
After 1929, therefore, India's power to purchase the
cious metals was progressively reduced because currently ac-
cumulating savings were severely contracted. At the same
time the price of silver began to fall, owing to a wide variety
of circumstances including famine in China in 1929 and
political disturbance there in a reduced monetary deS.
mand for silver by many countries, and sales of silver from
melted down rupees by the Indian government. The price of
gold remaining stable, silver became cheaper and cheaper in
India as compared to gold. As in 1920—21, when a similar
change in the ratio between the metals took place, an
ducement was offered to the Indian masses to buy silver in••
stead of gold, and even to sell gold to buy silver.'8 An
creased demand for silver instead of gold in 1929—30 and a
diversion of some of the savings of the Indian cultivator
"which would have been invested ordinarily in the purchase
of gold...intocheap silver" in 1930—31areconsequently
noted in the Reports of the Controller of the Currency.
A smaller proportion, therefore, of a reduced demand for
the two precious metals combined went into the purchase of
gold. Gold imports declined substantially in both value and
quantity from 1929 to 1931, while silver imports increased
greatly in quantity, and in 1930—31 even in value, as shown
Imports of the Precious Metals into India, 1925—26to1930—31,fiscal
years (millions of rupees)'9
1925-261926-271927-28 1929-301930-31
Gold 348 194 i8i 211 142 127
Silver 171 ig8 138 97 86 '00
18 Cf.Brown, cit., pp.85—8,for an account of the 1920—21situation.At
that time the main reason for the change in the ratio was a rise in the price
of gold.
19AnnualReport of the Controller of the Currency for 1930—31,pp.52,54,
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in the accompanying table. These annual figures do not, how-
ever, tell the full story of the changes in Indian demand for
gold, for in 193o—31 the inflow was swollen by purchases for
speculative and political purposes and at the same time a
back flow from 'up-country' began to develop which finally
resulted in India's becoming a net exporter of gold. The con-
flict of these two forces is described by the Controller of the
Currency as follows:
"It will be observed that as much asi11/2 croresworth of gold
bullion and sovereigns combined was imported between April
and September, that is to say, about 87 per cent. of the total im-
ports of the year arrived during this period. In particular, the
huge amount of Rs. 32/3 crores was imported in the month of
August alone. The explanation probably is that it was during
this period that the Congress boycott campaign was at its height.
There is a natural inclination to buy gold for hoarding in times
of political uncertainty and this was stimulated in the present
instance by propaganda from certain quarters urging the culti-
vators to buy gold instead of piece-goods and other imports which
were on the boycott list. The result was that India imported more
gold and sovereigns in the early part of the year than the demand
could absorb and the price of the metal in Bombay fell from Rs.
21—i 1—3in April to Rs. 21—3—6 at the close of the year. In the
absence of any improvement in demand, bullion dealers were
unable to hold on to their stocks and were eventually forced to
realise by tender to the Bombay Mint at the Government buying
rate. This movement which began on the 7th March 1931con-
tinued until the close of the year by which time 97 2,2 i6 tolas of
gold had been received in the Mint." 20
In January 1931Indiawas actually a net exporter of gold,
and in June 1931 a regular export movement was begun. It
originated in a small way in the receipt by bullion dealers in
Bombay of 'distress gold' from 'up-country.' 21 Therefore
20 Ibid., pp.9-to.The increases in Indian official gold holdings in 1929 and
in the first half of 1931 (Table are accounted for by purchases to build
up the gold standard reserve in 1929 and by these very unusual gold sales to
the Mint in 1931.
21. Samuel Montagu & Co., Annual Bullion Letter, 1931,p.8.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 847
when England abandoned the gold standard in September
1931,thestage was fully set for a dramatic reversal in India's
traditional role as an absorber of gold from the West. Since
the rupee remained at 1 S. 6 d. and the price of gold in Lon-
don rose, the conditions necessary for a stable gold price in
India were then destroyed. The price of gold in rupees began
to rise in proportion to the decline of sterling in New York.
All the strong motives impelling the Indian cultivator to
part with gold continued to operate, including the relative
cheapness of silver.22 To these was now added the powerful
motive of a substantial profit on past savings. The operation
of this motive in bringing gold out of hoards in India is
admirably described in the quotation from the Times of
India of October 10, 1931,givenin the Annual Bullion
Letter of Samuel Montagu and Company (pp. 8—g):
"The shipments of gold to London by the last two mail boats
have been large enough to excite comment amongst the general
public. Many must be interested to know where this gold comes
from and in what form it arrives in Bombay. The continuous im-
ports of gold year by year into India have been always considered
by western economists as a fact somewhat outside normal eco-
nomic phenomena and explainable only by reference to the pe-
culiarities of oriental psychology. At the is. 6 d. gold ratio the
price of gold in the bazaars was lower than the present price by
Rs. 2 or Rs.Theimports of the last few years, therefore, were
brought in at this low rate. Now that the rate has advanced sub-
stantially—being quoted on Tuesday morning in the bazaar at
one time as high as Rs. 26—12 per tola fine—it is only natural that
the small holders, who must be legion, should want to realise a
profit on their small hoarded savings in the form of gold. In view
of the fact that a very large number of up-country dealers do busi-
ness in Bombay through many different agents, it is very difficult
to discover the source of the arrivals, but it is reported in the
bazaar that probably the majority of arrivals are derived from
22The dedine in sterling in New York, of course, was a common force acting
on the rupee price of both gold and silver. Though it may have some in-
fluence on the ratio in India the relatively low rupee price of silver continued
to reflect the fundamental world demand and supply forces for that metal.848 EXPERIMENTATION
Madras, Rangoon and the Deccan in particular, and the South
generally. However, it seems probable that most other parts of
India must also be contributing their share.
It is naturally the easiest thing for the up-country dealer, who
is also in many cases a bullion dealer and shroff, to melt his cli-
ents' gold trinkets and so make a convenient homogeneous ingot
for disposal in the bazaars of the large ports like Calcutta and
Bombay. When these ingots, large and small, arrive in Bombay,
they are handled mostly by thebigger shroffs and wholesale bul-
lion dealers, who send them into the Mint at Bombay to be re-
fined, assayed and moulded into convenient bars imprinted with
the name of the mint and a number. These bars are then ex-
ported.
Owing to the arrivals from up-country being very large since
the advance in the price, the market has kept well under parity
on the basis of the new London-New York rate. This, of course,
tends to increase the profit for the exporter of gold. Hence the
great export activity at present.
During 1929, 1930,andthe first part of 1931India'scus-
tomary favorable merchandise balance of trade was declining,
and during the latter part of this period there was a certain
amount of capital flight owing to disturbed political condi-
tions. Under these circumstances the reduced import of gold
was very helpful to the currency authorities in their efforts to
support the rupee. Gold must not, however, be thought of as
a 'balancing item' in the Indian balance of payments, as that
term is ordinarily applied to gold standard countries. The
phenomenon of large amounts of imported gold being offered
to the mints of a country whose exchange was close to 'gold
export point' and was being supported by fresh foreign bor-
rowings is in itself sufficient evidence of this fact. Yet the
change in the Indian attitude toward gold was in harmony
with the main lines of international gold distribution during
this whole period.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 849
The Influence of World-wide Deflationary Forces on the
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves of
Central Banks and Governments
In our discussion of the gold exchange standard as a gold
economy measure in Chapter 20 figures were presented to
show the tendency toward a concentration of foreign
change holdings of European central banks in the hands
the central banks of a few creditor countries that existed from
1928 to 1930. This tendency was part of a general decline in
the proportion of the world's 'reserve funds' held by the
central banks and governments of debtor countries and a
general increase in the proportion held by the central banks
and governments of creditor countries which was a
consequence of the development of world-wide deflationary
forces. It is convenient to refer to these changes in the size ofr
the holdings of gold and foreign exchange reserves by
banks and governments as a movement of these reserves from
debtor to creditor countries. The use of such an expression is
justifiable only as a short method of describing the final resuk
of a process that was far from being a simple transfer of
serves from one group of central banks and governments to
another. The whole movement was modified by the
of the flow of newly produced gold into the world's monetary
and banking systems, a flow that was greatly influenced by the
declining rate at which India was importing gold. It was also
modified during the latter part of the period by the beginning
of gold hoarding, and at all times by the withdrawal of cer-
tamforeign exchange holdings completely from use as 're-
serve funds.' Moreover, the channels through which the gen-
eral changes in the size and distribution of gold and foreign
exchange reserves actually worked out were very com-
plex.
A general picture of the movement of gold and foreign ex-
change 'reserves' from 1929 to mid-1931 is given for 32 coun-
tries in Table 67, which shows net changes in millions ofTABLE 67
Goldand Foreign Exchange Reserves of Central Banks and Governments,
Net Changes, 1929-1931 (millions of Swiss francs)
1929 1930 FfrtjHalf of 1931
Foreign Foreign Foreign
Gold exchange Total Goldexchange TotalGold exchangeTotal
United Kingdom —i8i —i8i +42 +42+385 +385
United States' +741 +74'+i,6oi +i,6oi +1,882 +1,882
France +i,g86 —1,371+615+2,425+29+2,454+581 +2+583
Total,Center Countries+2,546 —1,37'+1,175+4,068+29+4,097 +2,848+2 +2,85°
Netherlands +27 —1 +26 —44+56 +12+148 +i'o
Switzerland +62+99+i6i+t18 +69+ig6
Belgium +196 +8+204+142+283+425+45 —69 —24
Total, 6 Creditor Countries +2,83! —1,265 +1,566+4,284+366+4,650 +3,168—36 +3,132
Italy +38—237 +29 225 196+19 110 91
Germany —251+35'+ioo —84 —143—981 574 —1,555
Sweden +12+69+Bi —6+174+i68 133—136
Czechoslovakia +15 —36 21 +44+27 +71 i 82
Austria 0 —41 —41 +33+105+138 0—198—198
Hungary —34, —13 —47 —1 —11 —12 —46 52 —98
Bulgaria +2 —6i +2 —II +2 —ii
Greece +6 —8r —75 —9+1 —8 —' —36 —37
Poland +46—log —63 —8o—66 —146 +3 —37 —34 Lithuania o+17+17 +2+4 +6 0 —to—lo
Latvia 0 —23 0—13 —13 0 —14 14 Finland —10 0+33 +33 0 —10 —10
Denmark —1 33 —34 +13 +13 0 —5 Norway o+24+24 —I —25 —26 0 —26 —2
Danzig 1 +4 +4 —12 —12
Yugoslavia +4+37+41 +4r—148 144 +42 —35 +7
Portugal o +7 +7 0 0 —io
Roumartia +29+209+238 +3 155 152 —14+17 +3
Spain +7 +7 318 —318+178+,o6+284
Canada8 —i88 —i88+168 +i68—''9 —119
Australia —toi—224—325 —72 —63 —135 0+6'+6,
India4 +21 +2! 0 0+119 +1t9
' —899 —8gg —113 —113 —322 —322
Chile +2 47 —' —64 —65 0 —71 —71
Brazil8 249+79 170 692 28 720 77—137 214
Japan +27 +27 —636 —636+65 +65
Total, 26 Debtor and Periph-
ery Countries —1,515 —1,637—1,728—548 2,276 1,1361,4322,568
Grand Total +1,316 —1,387 —71+2,556—182+2,374+2,032—1,468+564
souRczs: For all European countries, the United States, and Japan: Blessing, B.LS. Doe. C. B6o;forother
countries: Federal Reserve BulleUn, Feb. 1930, p. 74; April 1930,p.'7'; May 1931, P. 278; Sept. 1931,p.524
Oct. p. 578;Dec. 193!, p. 675; Feb. 1932, pp. 'ii and 117
All conversions made at par of for countries whose exchanges depreciated after i929this may
involve an error if the foreign exchange in their central bank balance sheets was carried at market.Second Halfof1931 1,929.1930 1929 to Mid-,93, 1929.1931
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign
Gold exchange TotalGold exchange TotalGoldexchange TotalGoldexchange
—1,063 —139 —'39+246 +246 —817
—2,571 —2,571 +2,342 +4,224 +4,224+1,653
+2,448—1,134+1,314 +4,411 1,342 +4,992 —1,340 +3,652+7,440—2,474.+4,9
—1,186 1,134 2,320+6,614—1,342+5,272 +9,4621,340 +8,276 2,474+5,802
+812—306+506 —17+55+38+131 +17+148+943—289 +654
+1,507 +1,19I+180 +97+277+307+j66+473+1,814 150
+803—630+173+338+291+629+383+222 +1,186—408 +77
+1,936—2,386 450+7,115—8gg+6,216+10,283 935+9,348 +12,219—3,321+8,8g8
+7°—478 408+67+462 395 +86—572—486 +156 —894
—539 157—6g6 —1,316—282 —1,598 —1,855 439 2,294
341 —386 +6+243+249 +3+110+113 42 231 273
+17 132 115+59 +50+58 +75 222 147
—18 231—249+33+64 +97 +33—134—101 +15—365
9+12 +3 —35 24 59 —8i —76—157 —90—64 !54
+1 —g —8 +4—74 —7°+6 —7g +7 94 —8
+25 —6i —S6 -3 —8o —83 4—116 120 +21—177 —15
+19 —79 —6o 175 209 31—212—243 —12 291 303
+6 iB 12 +2 +21 +23 +2 +11 +13 +8 +1
+8 9
1 0 —36 0 50 50 +8 31
+1 59 —1 +24+23 —1+14+13 0 45 45
39 —56 —' —20 —21 —' —8o 135 —175
+12 13 1 1 —1 2 —1 —27 —28 +11 40 29
+22 —8 +14 +3 +3 —9 9 +22 —17
+20 —46 —26 +8—III +50—146 —g6 +70—192 122
2 +7'+69 0 32 32 0 42 —42 -2+29
+26 6i +32+54+86+t8+7'+8g +44+10 +54
—179+175 4 311 311 133 —27 —312+281 31
-.47 47 20 20 139 139 —i86 —i86
—120+137+17—'73'287 460 173-226 399 293 —89 —382
+57 +57 +21 +21+140 +140 +197 +197
—503 —503 —1,012 1,012 —1,334 —1,837
+3 39 —3b +1 111—110 -i-i—18r —i81 ±4 22l —21
+46+46 941 +51—890 —i,oi8 —86—1,104—r,oi8 40
—986 —986—609 —609 544 —544—1,530
2,2001,356 3,556—3,243—67o—3,9134,379—2,102 —6,481—6,579 —3,458 10,037
—264 3,742—4,006+3,872 —1,569 +2,303+5,904 —3,037 +2,867+5,640—6,779
FederalReserve Banks and Treasury. 'Total Gold Stock.
Government Reserve against Dominiøn Notes and Savings Bank Deposits and Gold Deposits of
Banks in the Central Reserve.
'Currency and Gold Standard Reserves of the Government.
Government Conversion Fund and Bank of the Nation. All other figures for Central Banks only.
'Bank of Brazil and Government Stabilization Fund.852 EXPERIMENTATION
Swiss francs, in the gold and foreign exchange reserves of cen-
tral banks and, in several important countries, of both central
banks and governments. AU conversions have been made at
par of exchange. These figures are of course incomplete, for
they do not include the unpublished reserves of many central
banks, and the list of countries is far from being all-inclusive.
They, nevertheless, have a revealing story to tell concerning
the strains to which the international gold standard system
was subjected under the impact of the crisis of 1929 and its
aftermath.
The main features of this story are as follows:
1929. The internal strains within the central nucleus resulting
from the end of de facto cooperation between Great Britain,
France, and the United States as international money mar-
kets appear in Great Britain's loss of reserve and the gain in
total reserve by France and the United States, and in the large
French conversion of foreign exchange reserves into gold.23
In 1929 the three center countries together gained 2,546 mil-
lion Swiss francs in gold and lost 1,371millionin foreign ex-
change reserves, making a gain of 1,175 million in total re-
serves.24 This pull over the world's reserve funds was shared
by the smaller creditor powers and is shown by the strength-
ening of the gold reserves of the Netherlands, Switzerland,
Belgium, and Sweden, and of the foreign exchange reserves
of the last three of these countries.
The general loss of reserves by debtor countries, which was
proceeding simultaneously, is shown by the rest of the table,
and is especially noteworthy in the two countries most directly
affected by the decline in raw material prices, Argentina and
Australia. There were, however, exceptions to the rule of two
kinds. First, Germany had a net gain in total reserve that was
28 Cf. Ch. 20, The Foreign Exchange Portfolio of the Bank of France ifl1929.
24 Throughout this summary account of Table 67 the references to 'countries'
individually or by groups are, of course, references to central banks and
governments, as indicated in the notes to the table, not to the whole move-
ment of gold and balances of the country. The references to India, for
example, are misleading unless this is borne in mind.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
largelydue to a return flow of foreign funds after the most
critical period in the international negotiations over
Young Plan had been safely passed.25 Second, there was a gain
intotal reserves by four European countries—Yugoslavfa,
Portugal, Roumania, and Spain, and by Japan, which
gether composed the group that had not yet completed the
'unfinished business' of returning to gold.
It is noteworthy that the 32 countries together actually
reserves during 1929, but that this loss was due wholly to the
decline in the foreign exchange holdings of the Bank of
France. The increase in total reserves of the creditor coun-
tries, including Sweden,2° exceeded by only a trifling amou.it
the loss of total reserves by the debtor countries, but if the
gold reserves alone are considered, the gain of the creditor
countries exceeded the loss of the debtor countries by over
1,300 million Swiss francs.
1930. In '930, with the full strength of world-wide defla-
tionary forces in operation, the underlying pattern is the
same. But it is a pattern modified by the strenuous efforts of
many central banks to strengthen their position and by the
influence of the revival of foreign lending by the
States and Great Britain during the first half of the year.
The striking differences in the position of France, Great
Britain, and the United States that characterized 1929 were
repeated. While England gained a very small amount of gold,
both the United States and France added greatly to their
stocks. There was no further realization of foreign exchange
reserves by the Bank of France, yet the increase in French
gold holdings was 439 million Swiss francs greater, and the
increase in total French reserves 1,839 million Swiss francs
greater than in 1929. The increase in American gold holdings
25 Cf. Ch. 19, Bank Rate and the Defense of Sterling, and Ch. 25,TheGold
and Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Reichsbank.
26 In the subtotals Sweden is not included among the creditor countries be-
cause one of the objects of the table is to group the countries whose power
to attract gold persisted throughout 193 t. Sweden was not one of these.854 EXPERIMENTATION
was86omillion Swiss francs greater than in 1929. This was
more than double the increase in 1929, while the increase in
total French reserves was four times that of 1929. As in 1929
the smaller creditor powers in Europe continued as a group
to add to both their gold and their foreign exchange reserves,
though in this group the Netherlands did not, share in the
large increases shown by Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The creditor countries as a whole (including Sweden) gained
4,278 million Swiss francs in gold and 540 million in foreign
exchange reserves as compared to a gain of 2,843 million in
gold and a loss of i,ig6 million in foreign exchange reserves
in 1929. The gain of this group in total reserves was 3,171
million greater than in 1929.
At the same time the debtor countries as a group were los-
ing 1,722 million Swiss francs in gold and 722 million in
foreign exchange reserves, a loss in total reserves of 2,444
million. This was 726 million greater than the loss in total
reserves in 1929 and was differently distributed. The effects of
international loans floated by Germany and Austria are evi-
dent in the small size of Germany's gold loss and in the actual
increase recorded for Austria, while the influence of the
continued access of Argentina and Canada to the New York
capital market can be seen in the reduced losses of reserves
by Argentina and by the actual gain by Canada. The stren-
uous efforts made by European central banks to strengthen
their positions is reflected in additions to the gold and foreign
exchange holdings of Czechoslovakia, Finland, and Den-
mark. Brazil lost gold heavily, and Poland, Italy, and all four
countries that in 1929 had not yet returned to gold were
heavy losers of gold or foreign exchange or both. Of all
European countries, Spain suffered the largest gold losses,
chiefly because of acute internal political difficulties. During
this year also Japan joined the gold losing countries. Indeed,
the Japanese loss of 639 million Swiss francs accounted for
over one-third of the gold loss of all the debtor countries to-
gether.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 855
In 1930 the countries that had not returned to gold before
the beginning of the crisis behaved much like other debtor
countries, but since they again displayed a group characteristic
in 1931, they may still be set out as a separate element in the
whole picture. The countries whose exchanges were suffering
depreciation in London and New York were also beginning
to show group characteristics. The representatives of this
group in Table 67 are Argentina, Chile, and Australia. The
decline in the losses of reserves by Argentina and Australia
was of course influenced by the course of their exchanges as
well as by their continued borrowing.
The 32 countries together gained in total reserves 2,374
million Swiss francs in 1930 in contrast to the small loss of
1929. Gold holdings increased a billion and a quarter Swiss
francs more than in 1929 and, in the absence of further liqui-
dation of foreign balances by the Bank of France, foreign
exchange reserves declined one billion 200 million less than
in 1929. Creditor countries as a group gained in total re-
serves about twice as much as debtor countries lost.
1929 and 1930. For the two years together the general char-
acter of the changes appears more clearly than for either
1929 or 1930 separately. This may be seen by arranging the
several countries according to the size of the changes in their
total reserves (Table 68 A). To bring out the predominant
role of a few countries in the whole movement a division is
made between countries gaining or losing more and those
gaining or losing less than 200 million Swiss francs during the
two years. Such an arrangement of countries does not portray
adequately the geographical spread of pressures threatening
the preservation of the gold standard as an international in-
stitution, for equal changes have of course entirely different
meanings in countries of unequal size and importance. Nor
does it necessarily indicate the severity of the strains imposed,
for the changes in reserves are the net result of the pressures
experienced and the means employed to counteract them. It856 EXPERIMENTATION
TABLE 68
Countries Gaining and Losing Reserves
A1929-1930 (millions of Swiss francs)
COUNTRIES .GAINING OVER COUNTRIES LOSING OVER
200 MILLION IN RESERVES 200 MILLION IN RESERVES
France 3,069 Argentina —1,012
United States 2,342 Brazil —890
Belgium 629 Japan —Gog
Switzerland 277 Australia —460
Sweden 249 Italy —395
Spain
Poland —209
Total, 5 countries 6,566 Total, 7 countries —3,886
COUNTRIES GAINING LESS THAN COUNTRIES LOSING LESS THAN
200 MILLION IN RESERVES 200 MILLION IN RESERVES
Austria 97 United Kingdom —139
Roumania 86 Chile —'
Czechoslovakia 50 Yugoslavia —103
Netherlands 38 Greece —83
Lithuania Bulgaria —7o
Finland 23 Hungary —59
India 21 Germany —43





Total, 8 countries Total, 12 countries —718
Total, 13 CountrieS gaining Total, 19 countries losing
reserves 6,907 reserves —4,604
Net gain, 32 countries 2,303
BI 929—JUNE 193 I (millions of Swiss francs)
COUNTRIES, GAINING OVER FOREIGN
200 MILLION IN RESERVES GOLD EXCHANGE TOTAL
United States 4,224 4,224
France 4,992 —1,340 3,652
Belgium 383 222
Switzerland 307 i66
United Kingdom 246 246
Total, 5 countries 10,152 —952 9,200THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 857
COUNTRIESGAINING LESS THAN FOREIGN
200 MILLION IN RESERVES GOLD EXCHANGE TOTAL
Netherlands 131 17 148
India 140 140
Sweden 3 110 113
Roumania 18 71 89
Lithuania 2 I I 13
Finland I 14 13
Total,6 countries 293 223 516
COUNTRIES LOSING OVER
200 MILLION IN RESERVES
Germany —1,316 —282 —1,598
Argentina —1,334 —1,334
Brazil —1,018 —86 —1,104
Japan —544 —544 Italy 86 —572 —486
Australia —'73 —226 —399 Poland —31 —212 —243
Total, 7 cOuntries —4,330 —1,378 —5,708
COUNTRIESLOSING LESS THAN
200 MILLION IN RESERVES
Chile —182 —i8i
Hungary —8r —76 —157
Canada —139 —139
Greece —4 —rr6 —120
Austria 33 —134 —101
Yugoslavia 50 —146 —g6
Denmark —I —79 —8o
Bulgaria 6 —85 79 Latvia 0 —50 —50
Portugal o —42 —42
Czechoslovakia 58 —90 —32
Norway —1 —27 —28
Spain —133 io6 —27
Danzig —9 —9
Total, 14 countries —211 —930 —1,141
Total, x z countries gaining
reserves 10,445 —729 g,7z6
Total,21 countrieS losing
reserves —4,541 —2,308 —6,849
Net gain, 32 countries 5,904 —3,037 2,867
Compiled from Table 67858 EXPERIMENTATION
does, however, clearly disclose two facts of major importance
in the history of the gold standard during these two years:
(i)therewas a persistent 'shift' Of reserves from debtor to
creditor countries;(2)neither the United Kingdom nor
Germany participated in this shift on a substantial scale.
First Half of '93'. The figures for the first half of in-
dicate a still further accentuation of the whole process of
concentration of reserves, and, for the first time since the be-
ginning of the depression, a large participation by Great
Britain and Germany in the general movement. The gains of
the creditor countries in these six months were 69 per cent of
the amount gained during the full year 1930. The losses of
the debtor countries were ioo per cent of their losses during
the full year 1930. Of the three center countries the United
States became the chief magnet for gold. American gold
holdings increased more in six months than in the entire
year 1930,whileFrench gold holdings grew at a rate only half
as great as in 1930.TheUnited Kingdom also gained gold
substantially, its increase of 385 million Swiss francs being
not very far from the French increase of 581 million. The
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium continued to gain
gold, but Belgium lost in total reserves. The efforts of the
smaller European central banks to improve their positions
seem to have been inadequate. With the exception of Rouma-
nia, Yugoslavia, and Spain, their reserves, especially in foreign
exchange, declined. In many countries gold reserves were be-
coming immobilized, while the small group of countries that
had not returned to gold by 1929 was still trying to reach the
goal of de jure stabilization and was building up reserves.
This was true also of Japan which returned to gold in 1930
andduring the first six months of 1931showedan actual in-
crease in gold in place of the large loss of 1930.Thethree
ABC countries and Canada continued to lose reserves, but
Australia, which had readjusted its exchange, was a small net
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however, was the loss of both gold and foreign exchange by
Germany. The German losses were sufficiently large to ac-
count for the entire increase in the rate at which the debtor
countries as a group were losing gold during the first six
months of 1931 as compared with 1930.
1929 to Mid-i93i. When the figures for the two and a half
years ending on June 30, 1931 are arranged according to the
size of changes in total reserves (Table 68 B), the underlying
forces are even more clearly suggested than they were by the
1929—30 totals.
The foregoing examination of the behavior of the reserve
funds of these 32 countries from the beginning of the depres-
sion until the eve of the confidence crisis of 1931 reveals cer-
tain progressive changes in the character of the concentration
movement:
i)a progressive increase in the rate at which debtor countries as
a whole were losing, and creditor countries as a whole were gain-
ing reserves;
2)a progressive tendency for an increasing proportion of the loss
of reserves by debtor countries to take the form of a loss in for-
eign exchange reserves;
3) a tendency for gold reserves in the hands of the central banks
and governments of the 32 countries together to grow at an in-
creasing rate.
The figures suggest also a fourfold grouping of countries
which provides a key to the interpretation of the history of
the international gold standard during these years:
i)the group of countries which, under the pressure of loss of
reserves, abandoned, or seriously modified the form of their ad-
herence to the gold standard;
2)the group of countries whose position in the depression period
was dominated by circumstances peculiar to themselves; in par-
ticular, Italy whose adaptation to the situation was a test of a
controlled economy, and Germany whose adaptation to the situa-
tion was inextricably related to the reparation problem and who
therefore also had, to a certain extent, a controlled economy;86o EXPERIMENTATION
3)the group of countries that were still attempting to return to
gold during the depression;
thecenter countries as a group.
The rest of our discussion of the disintegration of the gold
standard system will be carried out largely in terms of this
fourfold grouping of countries.CHAPTER 24
The Disintegration of the International Gold
Standard System at the Periphery
The forces responsible for the movement of gold and foreign
exchange reserves from the central banks of debtor to those of
creditor countries after 1928 also caused the exchanges of a
few debtor countries to depreciate in dollars and sterling, or,
if the expression is preferred, 'in gold' (Table 6q and Chart
54). This was an outward and visible sign of the disintegra-
tion of the international gold standard system at the pe-
riphery.
Meaning of the Phrase
This phrase is here employed, however, to connote some-
thing more than the mere deviation of exchange rates from
par. It includes also modifications in practice in many coun-
tries that constituted a clear departure from the accepted
canons of behavior implicit in the idea of the return to gold
as generally understood during the Restoration period, and
carries certain deeper implications that touch the substance
as well as the form of the international gold standard system.1
There can be no periphery without a center. The economic
adjustments in the countries whose exchanges were allowed
to depreciate during the early phases of the depression were
achieved because of, and their permanence was predicated
upon the continued existence of a large group of stable ex-
change rate countries with reference to which they were
depreciated. As long as the mutual economic relations of the
center countries are sufficiently adjusted to the system of ex-
1Cf.Ch. 2,TheGold Standard, Form and Substance.
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change rates subsisting between them to make that system of
rates stable, a real standard of reference exists for the pe-
riphery countries. If the central group of stable exchanges
breaks up, then the terms of the problem of the periphery
countries are altered, but the center is not destroyed. Instead
of being a stable system of rates it becomes an unstable sys-
tem of rates, but still a system binding the major currencies
of the world together (cf. Ch. 33 and 34). The center coun-
tries, by the very fact of their economic dominance in the
world, can never shift to the periphery, and the periphery
countries have to consider the sum total of their relations to
this central system of rates in determining their currency
policy.
The phrase, 'the disintegration of the gold standard system
at the periphery,' therefore, carries the further implication
that generalizations made concerning the economic effects of
leaving the gold standard and depreciation 'in gold' on the
basis of the experience of the periphery countries cannot be
applied indiscriminately to all countries. Itisthe pons
asinorum of elementary instruction in banking that what is
true of one bank in a system of banks is not true of all banks.
What one bank can do depends partly upon its size and in-
fluence, and partly upon what other banks are doing. It is of
the essence of clear thinking on international gold standard
problems to recognize that all generalizations concerning the
role of gold standard arrangements in a given country depend
first upon its position in the world economy, and second upon
certain assumptions, more often implied than expressed, con-
cerning the relations of other countries to the gold standard.
The international gold standard as a practical and working
institution cannot be understood in terms of any abstract
formula. For any single country there is no general answer
to the question of whether adherence to the international
gold standard is a deflationary, a stabilizing, or an inflationary
policy. The answer must always be that it depends upon the
circumstances.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
The Depreciated Exchanges
Australia and New Zealand
The circumstances that determined the currency history of
Australia during the earlier years of the depression have a
triple interest for the student of the international gold stand-
ard: first, because Australia shared the difficulties felt by all
raw material producing, debtor countries, and experienced
them earlier, more acutely, and in simpler form than almost
any other country; second, because of the peculiar relations
of the Australian pound to the pound sterling, amounting, as
in the case of South Africa, to an identification of the two
currencies in the public mind; third, because Australia, dur-
ing these years, developed a deliberate policy of taking ad-
vantage of her position on the periphery of the gold standard
to bring about a redistribution among various economic
groups within her borders of the losses of real income caused
by the depression.
It is an outstanding characteristic of Australian economic
history that periods of crisis and depression have been
associated with periods in which the inflow of British capital
investment in the Commonwealth has either been cut off or
sharply diminished.2 This was true of the severe crisis of
1920—21, which was followed, after an interval, by a period of
prosperity lasting from 1925 to 1929, based on "high export
prices, a growing volume of exports and a fairly regular, but
excessive inflow of capital."
2 Cf. Gordon Wood, Borrowing and Business in Australia (London, Oxford
University Press, ,passim.
8 Douglas Copland, Australia inthe World Crisis, 1929—1933(Macmillan,
1934), p. ii. In these Alfred Marshall Lectures, delivered in Cambridge Uni-
versity in October and Dr. Copland combines in high degree
theoretical insight with mature and balanced judgment gained in practical
experience. Heavy drafts are made upon this source in this section.
Dr. Wood states that the crisis of 1920—21 was followed by a period of de-
pression lasting "with brief interludes" until 1929 (op. cit., p. ,butDr.
Copland states that the country was undoubtedly prosperous from 1925 to
1929. Whether 1925—29 may be considered a brief interlude in the period
1922—29 is a question the writer cannot attempt to decide.864 EXPERIMENTATION
This prosperity did not, however, rest on very firm founda-
tions, and it was partly undermined by deflationary forces
directly associated with the joint return to gold of Australia
and Great Britain. Export prices fell sharply between 1925
and 1926, reflecting the rise of the external value of the
Australian pound,4 and the terms of trade, which had been
moving in favor of Australia until 1925, began to move
against her, though they were still favorable in From
1922 to 1928 capital imports averaged just under £3o million
per annum, but Australian long term borrowing in London
was very uneven. It was sharply interrupted in 1923, 1925,
and 1927 by a series of events, elaborately treated elsewhere in
these studies, that were directly connected with the return
to and the maintenance of the gold standard by Great Britain.6
During each interruption in long term borrowing the gap
was substantially made good by short term accommodation in
accordance with the British practice of shifting from the long
to the short term shoulder in time of stringency. So custom-
ary, indeed, had this practice become in the case of Australia
that Australian Treasury officials were wont to use the very
striking phrase 'arrears of borrowing.'Nevertheless, the ir-
regularity in long term capital inflow did have a depressing
effect upon Australian business, which was accentuated by
the reflection, in higher rates in Australia, of the relatively
high interest rates prevailing in London as part of the de-
fense of sterling.
These inheritances from the return to gold were still
4Wood, cit., p. 218.
Copland, op. cit., p. '5 and table, p. cf.Gordon Wood, op. cit., pp.
190—i.Dr.Copland's figures, on 1911asa base and for calendar years, show a
steady improvement from 1920 tO 1924 and 1925, while Dr. Wood's figures,
Ofl 1914 as a base and for trade years, show a sharp adverse movement in
1924 followed by an improvement in 1925 and 1926. Variations in the terms
of trade, Dr. Copland points out in dealing with the extremely adverse posi-
tion of the depression years, are not a measure of changes in real income in
Australia, but are a main cause of such changes (op. Cit., p. 43).
cit., table and chart on pp. i86 and 187.
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presenton the eve of the world depression; in addition,
internal organization of the Australian economy was rigidi
and brittle. The wage system was rigid and industry was
organized on a semi-monopolistic basis.8 A high
tariff system was in force and government expenditures foT
social services were on a high level. Finally among the inelastic
elements in the Australian economy must be included a
strong belief in the supreme importance of parity with
sterling.0 All these constituted foci of resistance to the forms
of economic adjustment desirable in Australia on account of
her extremely vulnerable position in the face of falling ex-
port prices and a decline in her import of capital from
abroad, and all were supported by powerful interests. Aus-
tralia, however, had equipped herself between 1924 and 1929
with three instruments of economic control which proved
capable of giving her an unexpected degree of flexibility in
meeting the impact of such forces—the Loan Council, the
Commonwealth Bank, and the Court of Arbitration.1°
The Loan Council was first conceived of as a defensive
measure taken by the various governments in Australia in the
face of increasingly severe scrutiny of Australian borrowing
in London after 1925. By an agreement between the Com-
monwealth and the States arrived at on December 12, 1927,
and legally sanctioned by the Financial Agreement (Valida-
tion) Act of 1929, the Commonwealth took over all the pub-
lic debts of the States, subject to arrangements for their service
by the States. The Commonwealth also agreed to make an-
nual contributions from its revenue toward payments on the
State debts, and sinking funds were established. The manage-
ment of the public debt of both Commonwealth and States
and the determination of future borrowing policy was then
entrusted to a special body known as the Loan Council. This
8Wood,op. cit., pp.214—23. Thecost of living index rose in Australia after
1925.
Copland, op. cit., p. 75.
'°Cf. ibid., Ch. IV, The Flexibility of Institutions, passim.866 EXPERIMENTATION
body consisted of one representative of the Commonwealth
and one of each State. Each government, Commonwealth or
State, had to submit to this Council the amount it wished to
borrow for each financial year. The Council was given power
to decide whether the total could be raised on reasonable
terms and conditions, and if not, to fix the amount to be
borrowed and to allocate it to the Commonwealth or States'1
The Loan Council thus established became a powerful in-
strument by which Australian public bodies could deal as a
unit with the English financial powers. It proved to be a
highly constructive agency for solving Australian foreign
exchange problems during the world crisis, and in time be-
came the directing authority of Australian financial policy.
tinder a new charter granted in 1924 the Commonwealth
Bank entered the crisis with an issue and banking depart-
ment on the plan of the Bank of England, a savings bank,
and a rural credit department. It was obliged to hold a legal
reserve of 25 per cent in gold against its note issue and could
issue notes against Australian and British government securi-
ties and approved short term bills. In cooperation with the
Loan Council the Commonwealth Bank gradually acquired
during the crisis all the essential characteristics of a central
bank. The steps in this evolution will be indicated briefly in
our account of Australian currency history during the first
years of the depression.'2
This centralized control over financial policy was paralleled
by the control of wages by the Court of Arbitration. The
Court was the main wage fixing authority in the Common-
ii Wood, op. cit., p. 222, note.
12 This evolution overshadowed and finally sidetracked efforts to establish a
new centralbanking institution,largelyunder government control,in
Australia. On April 5, 1930 the government introduced a Reserve Bank Bill
modeled on the South African Reserve Bank legislation(The Economist,
April 5, 1930, p. 767). This legislation took various forms as the conflict
tween inflationary and deflationary ideas proceeded (ibid., July 12, 1930, p.
75; Aug. g, p. 275; Dec. 6, 1930, p. 1056).THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 867
wealth, for "by a decision of the High Court in 1926 Corn
monwealth awards in any industry took precedence over
State awards." 13TheCourt was instructed by Parliament to
take into account economic considerations in determining its
awards, and unless the law governing its constitution were
tered the Court was independent of the government of
day.
This was also true of the Loan Council and the
wealth Bank, and since, when a Labour Government was
victorious in the Commonwealth elections of October 1929
the Senate remained in the hands of the opposition, this indc••
pendence was preserved throughout the depression. Final
cisions on basic economic policy could therefore be taken by
the Council, the Bank, and the Court that ran counter to the
views of the dominant party and the ministers.
The position of Australia as a gold standard country dur-
ing the early years of the depression can, in its essentials, be
stated very briefly. The decline in the price of wool and
wheat, a short wheat crop in 1930,anda domestic situation
that interposed serious obstacles to cutting down imports
caused an increasingly adverse merchandise trade balance.
The simultaneous shutting down of capital imports from
Great Britain turned this into a very acute balance of pay-
ments problem and brought on a foreign exchange crisis. The
two factors combined resulted in large losses of real income
within the country, unemployment, and budget deficits. Be-
cause of the great relative importance of goods export and
capital import in sustaining the national income the inci-
dence of the depression was very unequally distributed within
Australia. Consequently, currency policy and internal policy
clashed on many issues which had to be compromised. Within
each field, moreover, were serious conflicts. 1n the develop-
ment of currency policy at least four elements are clearly
distinguishable:
'3Copland, cit., p. 88.868 EXPERIMENTATION
i)a vigorous and unsuccessful resistance on the part of the
banks and the government to the depreciation of the Australian
pound in London;
2)a series of changes in the formal relationship of the Australian
pound to gold that were directly related to this resistance;
abreakdown in the system of arbitrage between Australia and
New Zealand that was also part of this resistance;
4)a final transition to a pure form of sterling exchange standard
based upon administrative policy rather than upon law.
The main issues of domestic policy were rooted in an acute
conflict between inflationary and deflationary schools of
thought, ending in a middle of the road policy which used
elements of both. On the deflationary side it included com-
pulsory wage and interest reductions and on the inflationary
side the expansion of central bank credit and planned cur-
rency depreciation. The interaction of these forces can be
best seen in a brief chronological summary of events.
By August 1929 long term borrowing by Australia in Lon-
don ended, partly for reasons connected with Australian
credit and partly because of the general situation in the Lon-
don capital market. Accommodation was secured in London
by the sale of two issues of treasury bills of C5millioneach,
supplemented early in the depression by overdraft money ob-
tained at a London bank. The prices of wool, metals, and
wheat were already falling; in consequence, Australia had to
draw upon her existing funds in London to support the ex-
change. These funds had been very substantial from 1922 to
1928, standing in the latter year at £47 million.'4 At the same
time the gold reserves of the Australian banking system were
£48 million. The immediate difficulty could therefore be met
by drawing on previously accumulated balances and by ship-
ping gold. The London funds of the Commonwealth Bank
'4lbid., p.112, note. A chart showing the fluctuations in these funds is
presented on p. 113,asestimated according to the method used by Roland
Wilson in his Capital Imports and the Terms of Trade (Melbourne Univer-
sity Press, 1931). butno table is given. Mr. Wilson's tables show only the
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were reduced £10 million in the second half of From
June 30, 1929 to June 30, 1930 total Australian banking
funds abroad fell £261/2 million.'6 As Dr. Copland points
Australia acted in fact in accordance with the
principle that a country with large foreign indebtedness
should accumulate large reserves in good times with which to
meet her fixed foreign obligations in bad times.
These resources, however, quickly proved inadequate to
meet the situation. At the time of the break in the New York
Stock Exchange in October 1929 the new Labour
ment was faced with a serious exchange problem. The Aus-
tralian pound was steadily, if gradually, declining in London.
Gold was moving out. Reserves in London were being de-
pleted. The government was therefore prompted to take
steps that really put an end to the functioning of the gold
standard in Australia on traditional lines. In December 1929
an act was passed that gave power to the Treasurer to author-
ize the Commonwealth Bank to require returns of all gold
held privately and to requisition it, if necessary, in exchange
for Australian notes. This act also gave power to the Treas-
urer, upon recommendation of the Commonwealth Bank, to
prohibit the export of gold. The first of these provisions was
modeled upon section ii of the English Currency and Bank
Notes Act of 1928. There was, however, an important dif-
ference between the English and the Australian laws, for a
statement by the Treasurer clearly indicated that the power
to requisition residing in the Commonwealth Bank could be
used to prevent the export of gold, because gold obtained in
exchange for notes could be requisitioned immediately.'7 The
Act in fact suspended the right of private banks to export
gold when it was profitable to do so and concentrated power
over all gold in Australia in the Commonwealth Bank. In
the words of that Bank's Chairman this was done to safe-
Copland,op. cit., chart of Commonwealth Bank London funds, p.1io.
16Wilson,op. cit., p.table.
17TheEconomist, Dec. 7, 1929,p.1079;Jan.11,1930,p. 73.870 EXPERIMENTATION
guard the gold standard.18 It was the same kind of 'safeguard'
employed by Great Britain herself in preserving her own
gold standard during the war.19
Deprived of the right to obtain gold for remittance to Lon-
don, the private banks looked to the Commonwealth Bank to
provide the necessary sterling exchange to meet current
needs. With continued declines in the yield of exports and in
the absence of any.restriction on imports, it became clear that
radical measures must be taken if the Australian pound was
not to depreciate further. The necessity of avoiding exchange
depreciation was still an unquestioned dogma of sound fi-
nance in Australia, particularly, as Dr. Copland says, in the
view of the banking institutions directed from London.2° Ac-
cordingly, a double line of policy was pursued. First, the
Loan Council took steps to reduce government borrowing to
one-half its former level in order to eliminate the need for
further borrowing abroad, a clearly deflationary policy that
sharpened the political controversy between the advocates of
'sound' or orthodox finance and the advocates of inflationary
measures. Second, on January 23, 1930 an agreement was
reached whereby gold held by the private banks was to be put
at the disposal of the Commonwealth Bank to meet general
needs, and the available foreign exchange in London was to
be rationed. This was deemed necessary because the banks
were already quoting the Australian pound at a 21/2percent
discount, and an outside or 'black' market in which a greater
discount was quoted, had already appeared.21 Under these
agreements the Commonwealth Bank shipped £7 million in
gold to London on February 7,1930, bringing the total
shipped since July 1929 to £17 million. Gold continued to be
18 Ibid.) cI. the Report of the Commonwealth Bank for the second half of
1929 in which it is contended that these measures by no means took Australia
off the gold standard.
19 Cf. Ch. 2, The International Gold Standard as a Code of Practice during
the War, and Ch. 3, Measures of Suppth.
20Copland, op. cit., p. 73.
21 The Economist, March 29, 1930, p. 708.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 871
shipped;nevertheless, even the official exchange rate con•
tinued to fall (Table 69).
These measures—the exercise of its full powers over the
public debt by the Loan Council, the centralization of gold
reserves, the transfer of the function of gold export from
private to official hands, the artificial pegging of the sterling
rate, the beginning of the rationing of foreign exchange sup-
plies—were the weapons forged by Australia in her effort to
meet the impact of the depression and to preserve the out•
ward semblance of adherence to gold. Control of imports was
a logical next step22 andwas soon attempted by means of a
general increase early in 1930 of the already high import
duties and the prohibition of some luxury imports.
One basic rule governing the behavior of the foreign cx
changes under the gold standard was also broken during this
period. New Zealand was able to borrow in London afte:-
Australian accommodation was cut off, and her export trade
had not suffered in the same degree as that of Australia.
the New Zealand pound was dragged down with the Aus-
tralian pound by the action of the banks that controlled the
market. In the spring of 1930, however, a gap began to ap..
pear between the Australian and New Zealand pounds in
London. The rate between Australia and New Zealand was
nevertheless maintained at par.28 In the name of defending
the gold standard in Australia, the functioning of exchange
arbitrage was suspended between the two Dominions.
Though drastic, these measures were proving inadequate to
meet the underlying difficulties of Australia. These were ad.
mirably summed up in a despatch to The Economist from
Australia in June 1930 in which the following points were
made:
i) Net borrowings abroad had been reduced from about
million per year to practically zero.
22 Cf. the integration of exchange controls with measures of direct control
over imports during the war; Ch.Measuresof Support.
28 The Economist, Dec. 27, 1930, p. 1224.TABLE 6g
ExchangeRates of Certain Debtor Countries, 1929-September 1931
MonthlyAverages as Percentages of Par in London and York
STERLINGRATES1 DOLLARRATES DOLLARRATES








July 99.4437 99.750 98.845 99.138 100.414 94.34b 75.165
Aug. 99.250 99.500 98.869 99.155 100.051 95.312 75.989
Sept. gg.ooo 99.250 98.8i8 99.138 99.792 94.581 76.450
Oct. 98.875 99.125 98.466 99.255 99.740 94.463 75.150
Nov. 98.750 99.000 97.345 98.202 99.740 93.592 72.481
Dec. 98.5625 96.394 94.372 99.948 91.680 71.409
1930
Jan. 98.375 98.375 94.666 92.638 99.740 89.904 67.896
Feb. 97.875 97.969 89.687 93.252 99.740 86.024 65.777
March 96.375 97.300 88.758 96.162 99.689 86.069 63.797
April 93.875 95.781 91.867 97.993 99.119 89.827 64.673
May 93.875 95.375 90.396 98.946 99.119 89.160 63.357 100.000
June 93.875 95.375 87.558 95.301 98.310 86.224 60.875 95.625
July 93.875 95.375 85.044 90.928 98.445 82.617 59.708 94.230
Aug. 93.875 95.375 85.404 83.252 97.564 80.193 56.352 89.950
Sept. 93.875 95.375 84.322 95.854 .79.649 55.569 86.025
Oct. 93.021 95.375 8o.goo 95.854 76.628 53.595 78.147
Nov. 92.166 95.375 80.967 95.854 77.279 58.528 77.607
Dec. 92.166 95.375 78.308 80.357 95.854 72.513 55.678 75.745'93'
Jan. 82.139 93.733 72.245 75.852 95.854 65.887 53.865 74.582
Feb. 76.923 91.220 74.565 71.571 93.968 66.792 52.771 69.687
March 76.923 91.220 8o.886 65.961 93.264 70.935 55.590 69.657
April 76.923 95.220 79.251 60.752 88.072 65.479 54.264 70.865
May 76.923 95.220 73.291 55.851 85.145 59.398 51.813 69.900
June 76.923 91.220 72.814 62.700 88.937 56.599 50.124 69.825
July 76.923 91.220 72.433 60.142 90.055 52.470 48.253 69.932
Aug. 76.923 91.220 66.927 53.252 89.336 44.492 45.575 69.870
Sept. 76.923 91.220
'T/T Selling Rate. London on Australia and New Zealand, average of weeklyPar is taken as pre-war par, 19.30centsper pe-
quotations published by The Economist. After October 1I, 1930, theAustralianseta for Spain.
rate is the reciprocal of the published quotation which was expressed in terms ofPar is taken as 40centsper sol, the rate of de
LiOo sterling after that date. facto stabilization of the Peruvian pound.
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2) Heavy declines in the price of wool, wheat, meat, dairy
products, and minerals (Australia's chief exports) had reduced
the proceeds of exports about £40 million.
3) There was a loss in income of between £30and£80 million
owing to the reduced expenditure at home of those whose in-
comes from abroad were reduced in these two ways.
Hence, Australian national income was reduced about one-fifth.
4)Prices were falling, especially export prices which had reached
about two-thirds of the import price level.
5) The number of people in the export industries was declining,
but the protected domestic industries were expanding.
Hence, there was growing unemployment, uneconomical domestic
expenditure, and economic unbalance.
6) The normal balance of payments was violently disturbed, and
balances of Australian banks in London were not accumulating.24
Finding its measures to meet the situation inadequate, and
still conceiving of the problem in terms of an effort to main-
tain the Australian exchange in London, the Australian gov-
ernment made an official appeal for advice and help from
Great Britain. A conference was arranged between the Bank
of England, the Australian government, and Australian bank-
ers, and Sir Otto Niemeyer was invited to Australia to per-
form the now familiar functions ofmoney doctor. Acting
in this capacity Sir Otto did not hesitate to impress upon the
Australian authorities the evils of further currency deprecia-
tion and the necessity for further drastic public economies.
24Thid., July 26, p. i66. Dr. Copland's analysis of the basic economic
problem of Australia (op. cit., pp. i8o—i) shows that under these conditions
the expansion of the protected industries and of sheltered occupations could
not be lasting.
Australian gold and merchandise imports and exports in1928—29 and
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Throughout 1930 much emphasis was placed on the necessity
of reducing production costs, and this also was the burden of
Sir Otto Niemeyer's advice. This advice was considered by
the upholders of orthodox finance to contain a series of "un
palatable but salutary home truths." At the time of his visit
Australia was facing early maturities of £18 million of
ury bill and overdraft debt in London, and as The Economist
suavely remarked, the Australian government was 'helped'
in making up its mind to accept Sir Otto's advice by the hard
fact that it had treasury bills maturing in London that could
not be renewed.
The result of these consultations was a further rounding
out of policies already in force. On August 21 a new agree..
ment was reached between the States and the Commonwealth
which proclaimed a settled policy of balancing budgets, and
it was agreed that the Loan Council should raise no more
overseas loans until the existing short term debt in Londor
was completely dealt with. Sir Otto Niemeyer, the Common..
wealth Treasurer, and the bankers agreed also that Australiati
foreign exchange reserves should be pooled in order to give
the Commonwealth a prior claim on available funds to meet
their London obligations. The Australian banks agreed to
find annually £36 million in sterling exchange to be paid to
the Commonwealth Bank in London against payment of a
like amount by the Federal Government into a special ac-
count to be opened in the Commonwealth Bank in Australia.
At the same time the Bank of England agreed to help in pro-
viding for maturing loans in 1930. The first earnest of this
help was the placing of new six month treasury bills in Lon-
don to meet £5 million in bills maturing on September 2.
£'4million of the £18 million short term debt due in Au-
gust was repaid. Since there were no large maturities of long
term Australian loans in London in 1931 and 1932, it was
felt that the crisis had been surmounted and that Australia
had obtained a genuine financial breathing spell.25
25 Ibid., Sept. 20, 1930, p. 530.876 EXPERIMENTATION
These measures constituted a subordination of the needs
of the Australian export trade and of the public works and
social programs of the Labour Governments in Australia to
the maintenance of Australian credit abroad and to the views
of her creditors on currency matters. Dr. Copland has pre-
sented a strong case to show that a policy of no exchange de-
preciation and deflation along the lines urged by Sir Otto
Niemeyer could not, under the circumstances, have been car-
ried out to the bitter end without a breakdown of the social
order.26 There was strong political opposition within Aus-
tralia to any deflationary program. In October 1930 the forces
within the government opposed to such a program 'imposed'
by foreign creditors were strengthened by the election of
Mr. Lang as Premier of New South Wales on a platform of
opposition to retrenchment and to a balanced budget. Never-
theless, the Commonwealth Treasurer adhered to the policy
of not adding to the outstanding short term debt of £37 mil-
lion in London, and, in the face of falling revenues due to
the now rapid decline in imports, the government success-
fully refunded its internal debt.
The foreign exchange position, however, was not materi-
ally The Australian banks, following at a distance the
lead of the open or 'black' market to which they were steadily
losing business and which was the true measure of the value
of the Australian pound in London, were forced to raise their
rates. At the end of the year their selling rate was £A109for
£100sterling,but in the outside market the Australian
pound was at a discount of from 15toi8 per cent.27 Finally
on January 7, 1931theBank of New South Wales broke
away from the bankers' agreement, quoting £A115. 10 s.for
£100sterling,and the other banks had to follow. For four
successive weeks the premium on London was raised until the
official rate quoted by the banks on January 31was130Aus-
tralian pounds for ioo pounds sterling. This decline in the
26Copland, cit., pp. 36—8. 2TJbjd., p. 109.
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Australian pound brought about a heavy liquidation of
tralian securities in London, and in Australia the battle over
inflationwas renewed with increasing fervor. In January the
Courtof Arbitration decreed a general io per cent reduction
in wages, the first genuinely deflationary step taken in Aus-
tralia. On the other hand, a Gold Bounty bill had just been
passed providing for a bonus of Li per ounce for production
in excess of the average of 1928—30, to be paid out in wages.
Ostensibly this was to help unemployment in the gold min.
ing industry. Unquestionably, however, its basic purpose was
to help solve the foreign exchange problem and to help
fend the gold standard, which, in spite of the already
discount of 23 per cent in the exchange and the various
fications in gold standard practice noted above, was still be-
lieved to prevail in Australia. That was certainly the view of
Mr. Lang who in February urged "the abandonment of the
gold standard," and said that New South Wales would pay
no more interest on its overseas debt. This act of repudiation
was prevented from having serious effects upon Australian
credit in London, for the Federal Government assumed serv-
ice of the New South Wales debt under the Financial Agree-
ment (Validation) Act of 1929. But though the
Government earnestly fought the extreme position of Mr.
Lang, it had inflationary proposals of its own. The Federall
Treasurer sponsored a plan to return to the 1929 price level,
and the Federal Government proposed to reorganize the cur-
rency on a fiduciary basis and to requisition the gold of the
Commonwealth Bank for the purpose of meeting its own ob-
ligations in London, and pressed forward its plans to reor-
ganize the Commonwealth Bank on lines bringing it more
largely under political controL
This political battle ended in the spring of 1931 with a
temporary victory for the anti-inflationary forces. On April 2
Sir Ronald Gibson, Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank,
wrote the Chairman of the Loan Council that the Bank coulid
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would limit its advances to £25 million in Australia and £25
million abroad. The latter figure had already been reached
and the margin still available in Australia be exhausted
in two months. The seriousness of the budget problems raised
by this letter led to the appointment by the Loan Council of
a sub-committee consisting of five under-treasurers and four
economists known as the Copland Committee to recommend
plans for achieving balanced budgets by 1934. A month ear-
her, March 6, theChairman of the Commonwealth Bank
had written the Federal Treasurer that the resources of the
Commonwealth Bank in London were exhausted and that
rather than permit default on Australian obligations the
Commonwealth Bank would ship gold. He opposed any
"abandonment of the gold standard," seeming to share with
Mr. Lang the view that that standard still prevailed in Aus-
tralia. As a result of this letter Sir Ronald had been sum-
moned to testify before the Senate at Canberra. His testimony
was followed by the Senate's rejecting in April the govern-
ment's proposals to reorganize the currency on fiduciary lines
and in May the government's plan to reorganize the Com-
monwealth Bank. In order to make possible the shipment of
gold, Parliament authorized a temporary reduction in the
statutory cover against Commonwealth Bank notes from 25 to
15 per cent. £5 million in gold was shipped to London to
meet maturing treasury bills and the due date of a further
government obligation of £5 million at the Westminster Bank
was postponed from June 30 to September 30. A few months
before, in April i 931, the government's transfer problem had
been eased by the negotiation of a new Anglo-Australian war
debt agreement, postponing Australian payments for two
years. Another severe crisis seemed to have been overcome by
strict adherence to orthodox finance, including in that term
appropriate concessions by creditors.
At this juncture, however, a middle of the road policy, de-
parting radically in some respects from the cannons of ortho-
dox finance, was developed which ended the battle betweenTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 87g
unequal and inadequate deflation and uncontrolled inflation.
The Copland Committee had deliberated and submitted
report which was made the basis for the so-called Premfer's
Plan adopted by a Conference of Premiers in June. Its
tial features were:
i)the division of government expenditure into elements
could not be reduced (unemployment, interest and sinking fund,
exchange 'premium') and those which could be adjusted
2)a 20 per cent reduction in all 'adjustable' government
penditure
3)conversion of the internal debt on the basis of a 221/2 per
cent reduction of interest
4)additional taxation
a reduction of bank and savings bank rates of interest on
deposits and advances
6)relief in respect of private mortgages.
The refunding proposals under this plan were carried
at first on a voluntary basis with full cooperation between the
governments, the Loan Council, and the banks, but in the
end they were compulsory. The reduction in private interest
was carried out with greater difficulty even with the coopera-
tion of the State governments. This part of the plan rested on
the ground that the economic situation had altered the es-
sential basis of loan contracts and that an adjustment to the
new conditions was desirable. The reduction in government
wages and salaries was in general harmony with the policy of
the Court of Arbitration.
These steps were severely deflationary, but have been char-
acterized by Dr. Copland as "constructive deflation," 28be-
cause they were only one side of a total policy having as its
aima new economic equilibrium. The other side of this
policy was inflationary. It involved first, an abandonment of
the battle against currency depreciation as an evil in itself
and a frank recognition of its role in distributing part of the
burdens placed upon the export industries to other shoulders
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by adding to bank deposits and sustaining the domestic price
level; second, the adoption of a policy of planned budget
deficits in order to expand the domestic purchasing power of
certain groups. These deficits were financed by a program of
treasury billissues, underwritten by the Commonwealth
Bank with the consent of the Loan Council. Central bank
credit extension to government in this way proved, in the
view of Dr. Copland, a more effective means of adding to the
money incomes of consumers than open market operations of
the type usually attempted during depressions.29
Toward the end of i931 bankdeposits and advances began
to rise in Australia. The decline in wholesale prices was re-
placed by a slight improvement, and the balance of payments
problem began to dissolve under the combined influence of
expanded exports, a reduction in dividend remittances, war
debt concessions by Great Britain, and a great decline in im-
ports. The exchange crisis was clearly over, and relief from
internal deflation achieved.
The steps by which Australia reached this position have
b&n given here in some detail because Australian experience
and experiment furnished many precedents later drawn upon
by other countries. For example, certain features of the
Bruening decrees in Germany in i931 andthe reflation poli-
cies of the United States in 1934hadtheir counterparts in
Australia. Australian experience also illustrates the danger of
generalizing upon the effects of adherence to the gold stand-
ard from the case of a country placed in a particular set of
circumstances. For example, on the basis of Australian expe-
rience Dr. Copland laid down the dictum, as if it were of
universal application, that "in a crisis in which values are
collapsing, rigid adherence to the gold standard is the most
restrictive of all forms of regulation." 30Tofind grounds for
distrusting generalizations of this type, it is only necessary to
recall that in 1920—21 values were collapsing in the United
29Jbid., pp.145—9, i6o—i. p.177.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
States while the gold standard was being rigidly adhered to.
No one would maintain that American adherence to the gold
standard at this time was in any sense a 'restrictive' policy (cf.
Ch. io). In the interpretation of post-1931 international gold
standard history this is a point of cardinal importance, for
the wise and successful use of currency depreciation by
riphery countries to redistribute internal burdens was the
basis of many admonitions to the center countries to do like-
wise. Finally, the steps by which the essential sterling ex-
change standard of Australia was forced during the depression
to drop off one by one its non-essential golden trappings are
of particular interest for our analysis. This process was not
completed within the period treated in Book Three, but the
final steps may be appropriately described here by two further
quotations from Dr. Copland. On December 3,1931the
Commonwealth Bank took over completely the control of the
Australian exchange. Concerning the position then arrived
at, Dr. Copland wrote in 1933 (op. cit., p. 11
Australiafor the past two years has been operating a
well-regulated sterling exchange standard with local currency at
20%depreciationon sterling. In normal times the operation Of
this standard requires
(i) That the Commonwealth Bank buys and sells exchange at
fixed rates within prescribed limits.
(ii) That the Bank holds a sufficient reserve of gold or foreign
liquid assets to enable it to sell exchange freely, pending short
period adjustments in the balance of payments.
(iii) That the Bank controls the currency and has the right
to issue notes against sterling balances.
(iv) That the Bank has sufficient power and authority to
modify internal banking policy to maintain the exchange parity
agreed upon.
The Commonwealth Bank has been steadily moving towards
the exercise of all these powers."
In May 1932 the last tenuous connections between the Aus-
tralian pound and gold were broken by an amendment to882 EXPERIMENTATION
the Commonwealth Bank Act. Dr. Copland describes the
nature and effects of this Amendment as follows(ibid.,
pp. 85—6):
"It was provided that the legal reserve could be held in 'English
sterling' or in gold. English sterling was defined to include bills
at the Bank of England, bills of exchange that will mature in not
more than three months payable in United Kingdom currency,
and treasury bills of the United Kingdom that will mature in not
more than three months. The fiction of convertibility of the note
into gold was deleted and nothing substituted for it. The Bank
was empowered to transfer its gold reserves to sterling reserves,
and any profit accruing on this transaction was to be transferred
to a special reserve and to be available 'from time to time as the
board determines for the purpose of stabilising exchange or for
the purposes of the Note Issue Department.' This legislation is
very important in that it implies that sterling and not gold is the
legal basis of Australian currency, but it does not fix any special
rate at which the Australian note shall be convertible into sterling.
Indeed it does not specify that the Australian note shall be con-
vertible into anything at all. The Bank board has thus very wide
powers of control over the currency. and is probably more inde-
pendent in this respect than the Ban.k of England. In England
the Gold Standard (Amendment) Act 1931relievedthe Bank
of England for two years from September i8th, 1931,ofthe
obligation to sell gold bullion for notes. In the case of Australia
there is nothing in the present legislation requiring the Bank to
pay out gold or sterling or any other currency in exchange for
notes. The Bank is free to manage the currency according to its
discretion for the time being, though the Government may at any
time amend the Act, limiting the discretion of the Bank."
Argentina and Uruguay
ARGENTINA
The Argentine economy from 1929 to 1931 was subject to the
same fundamental pressures as the Australian, and the Argen-
tine exchange followed a course very similar to that of the
Australian pound as quoted in the outside or 'black' market.
Like Australia, Argentina was in striking degree dependentTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
for her prosperity upon the yield of her principal export
products—in her case wheat, wool, meat, and linseed. Like
Australia she had heavy fixed charges to meet in London, and
in less degree, in New York. When the prices of her chief
export products began to fall late in 1928, while at the same
time the inward flow of foreign capital began to
the Argentine peso came under pressure. In the face of a
falling demand in 1929 an unprecedented stock of Argentine
wheat accumulated in Liverpool, and in the last quarter of
that year both wheat and wool were shipped from Argentina
unsold. At the same time payments had to be made for a
very large volume of imports bought during the last nine
months of 1929.32Thepressure on the peso, therefore, be-
came increasingly severe, and on December 17, 1929, by a
decree closing the Caja de Conversion, Argentina abandoned
the shadowy form of gold standard to which she had adhered
since August 1927.
It was shown in our account of Argentina's 'return to gold'
in Chapter 14 that the meaning of that phrase as applied to
her was very equivocal.83 It will be recalled that not more
than one quarter of the gold imported in 1927 and 1928 was
purchased by the Caja, the rest being retained by the banks to
prevent an undue expansion of the currency. The Caja was
not during these years called upon to redeem its notes to pro-
vide gold for export, and when, with the weakness of the
peso in 1929, gold exports became profitable, notes were not
freely presented to the Caja for redemption. During 1929
about 130 million gold pesos in gold were exported to Eng-
land, the United States, and Germany, but most of them were
81 In the balance of payments figures of Tornquist capital imports into
Argentina from October i, 1927 to September 30, 1928wereito million gold
pesos, and from October i, 1928toSeptember1929, only 6o million (H. E.
Peters, The Foreign Debt of the Argentine Republic; Johns Hopkins Presa,
1931, p. 153).
82 The Economist, March 8, 1990, p. 524.
83 Dr. Peters, indeed, in surveying the entire Argentine currency history, was
able to say in that for the past twenty years Argentina had, practically
without interruption, been on a paper standard (op. cit., p. i6o).884 EXPERIMENTATION
shipped by the banks from their own holdings. These ex-
ports had no deflationary consequences beyond a reduction of
the ample reserves of the Banco de la Nacion and an equiv-
alent contractIon of bank deposits. There was no need for
banks in general to replenish reserves from the circulation,
and no multiple contraction of credit, for the deposits of the
Banco de la Nacion were not the reserves of other banks. To-
ward the end of 1929 some notes were presented to the Caja
in order to obtain gold for export, but two measures were
taken to prevent the deflationary results, which, according to
the legal theory of the Argentine gold standard system,
should have followed such withdrawals. First, acting in ac-
cordance with its traditional policy, the Banco de la Nacion
deposited gold with the Caja in exchange for notes,34 the net
result being the same internally as if the gold taken from the
Caja had been exported by the Banco de la Nacion in the
first place. Second, in accordance with legislation passed at
the outbreak of the warbut never previously used, the gov-
ernment authorized the Banco de la Nacion to effect redis-
counts at the Caja up to a sum not exceeding 200 million
paper pesos. This power was not immediately used, nor was
it needed to soften internal pressures resulting from a vigor-
ous defense of the gold standard, for no such defense was
made. As soon as it became evident that the banks could no
longer furnish adequate amounts of gold to support the ex-
changes, and that further withdrawals would have to be made
from the Caja, the Caja was closed. At the first moment when
it began to assume reality in Argentine affairs the gold stand-
ard was abandoned.
The motives that led to this suspension of the gold stand-
34TheEconomist (Nov. 9, 1930,p.870) mentions such a deposit of io mil-
lion pesos in gold.
Laws promulgated in August and October 1914providedthat the Caja
might, subject to government authorization, issue and deliver to the Banco de
Ia Nacion notes in exchange for commercial paper, provided the gold cover
for the fiduciary issue did not fall below 40percent(ibid., Dec. 21,1929,
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ard without any attempt to defend it are not to be found in
any theoretical views as to the advantages of currency depre—
ciation for a country in the position of Argentina such as
those which later guid.ed Australia in planning her middle of
the road policy. Nor was this action prompted by a deficiency
in gold reserves as a proportion of notes and deposits. The
mathematical adequacy of Argentine reserves, indeed, was
a continual theme of commentators and correspondents in
The Economist at this time.3° The unwillingness to defendi
the gold standard is rather to be explained by the large
amount of government floating debt held by the banks. This
could not, in the then state of government finances be con-
tracted. At times during i 930 the government was actually
falling into arrears in salaries and routine expenditures. Con-
sequently the bank deposits created by the purchase of gov-
ernment debt, representing one-third of total bank credit
outstanding, could not be eliminated from the banking sys-
tem. Hence a severe contraction in the note circulation,
working out its effects through bank reserves, would have
produced a concentration of credit restriction upon other
borrowers. In the words of Dr. Peters, in this "squeezing
process" private borrowers would have been "completely ex-
cluded" from access to bank credit.37 For a reason not alto-
gether creditable, therefore, Argentina did not inaugurate
the first year of the world depression by a real effort to deflate
her whole economy in defense of the gold standard. Since
credit could not be contracted because for fiscal reasons the
means of payment remained large, prices did not fall and the
exchanges declined.
As shown in Table 6g and Chart thisdecline was unin-
terrupted during 1930, except for a brief improvement in
the spring, partly seasonal and partly due to special factors.
361n the Buenos Aires correspondence published in its issue of March i,1930
(p. 452),theclosing of the Caja was said to be an act considered "dangerous
and retrograde" in Europe and America, taken by a government "ignorant of
rudimentary economic
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The fundamental forces at work were declining world prices
for agricultural products and changes in the physical volume
of Argentina's exportable output. In 1930 the effects of fall-
ing prices were aggravated by a partial failure of the wheat
crop. Foreign currencies were in poor supply in the market
and the peso was chronically weak. The financial results of
the harvest were bad, even disastrous, in 1930, and the conse-
quent reduced purchasing power was soon reflected in a fall-
ing Argentine expenditure for imports.38 The proceeds of ex-
ports, however, were falling earlier and faster than expendi-
ture for imports and a new exchange equilibrium was not
reached. Like Australia Argentina was finding difficulty in
paying for imports and providing for the service of her for-
eign debt. Argentina, however, was not as completely cut off
from access to new capital imports as Australia and, in addi-
tion, was able, like Australia, to provide a certain amount of
remittance in the form of gold.
Direct American investment of capital in Argentine enter-
prises continued for some time after the onset of the depres-
sion.89 Talk of large new long term loans from abroad was the
88 Cf. ibid., chart opp. p. 69, in which a rapid decline in the value of im-
ports in 'gold pesos'(i.e., in Argentine currency, not 'in gold')is shown for
both 1930 and
Dr. Peters' comments on the British reaction to these direct American in-
vestments are an instructive elaboration of a theme first introduced into these
studies in our discussion of the Victory of the Principle that the Proceeds of
Foreign Loans should be Spent at Home (Ch. 7) .Dr.Peters writes (or.cit.,
p.154):
"There was a curious reaction to this importation of United States capital,
accompanied as it was by an increased volume of inter-American trade. In-
vestments often took the form of purchasing British enterprises long estab-
lisbed in the field; even control of the railways was at one time threatened.
At this stage the Briton's patriotism was touched, and with a superb disre-
gard for all the laissez-faire philosophy as to capital movements, industriously
inculcated into Argentine minds for more than a century, road after road
passed resolutions either disqualifying or limiting the holdings of those
neither British nor Argentine. The chief objection to United States owner-
ship, apparently, lay in the fact that supplies, which had previously been
uniformly obtained from British sources, would probably be purchased by
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stapleof the market during 1930 and even in 1931, and,
though the essential conditions for such loans were lacking,
the exchange was often strengthened because these hopes led
importers and others to postpone remittance abroad in the
expectation of better rates. Short term foreign borrowing,
largely associated with the temporary revival of foreign lend-
ing in New York in the first half of 1930, was also substantial.
The main features of this borrowing were a $50 million gov-
ernment six month loan placed in New York in April, a
million six month loan placed in London by Baring Brothers
in June, and a $i6 million loan placed by the municipality
of Buenos Aires in New York about the same time. These
short term advances caused serious problems of renewal and
repayment, but they raised capital imports for the fiscal year
1929—30 (October-September) to 190 million gold pesos. In
the following year the amount fell to only 50 million.40
In addition to the support given by new loans in 1930, the
peso was strengthened by a series of special gold transactions,
some involving the extension of new short term credit in
London, which revealed in a striking way the essential con-
flict between the two horns of the Argentine dilemma—how
to support the exchange on the one hand and how to avoid
domestic deflation on the other. On December 23 £5 million
53/4percent one year Argentine treasury bills were dis-
counted in London. The bills were non-renewable and were
repayable at the option of the bankers by shipment of gold
specie. The proceeds were held in London and the Banco de
la Nacion was authorized to exchange them for gold and de-
posit this gold with the Caja de Conversion against the issue
of an equivalent in paper pesos.4' There was ample precedent
for such a procedure, for in pre-war days South American
countriesfrequentlysoldtreasurybillsin London to
4°lbid., p. 153.
Bank of London and South America, Monthly Review, March 1930, p.
cf. The Economist, March i, 1930, p. 452. The exact details of this transaction
were not, apparently, clear even to the Bank of London and South America
which refers to the "none too dear statements published."888 EXPERIMENTATION
strengthen their reserves temporarily. It amounted to the
establishment for the time being of a sort of "conversion
fund" in London.42 In January 1930 a decree wasissued
authorizing the deposit of gold with the Argentine legations
abroad against the issue of notes in Argentina, an arrange-
ment that could be used as a means of financing Argentine
trade at a cheaper rate of interest than could be obtained at
home.43
The gold funds established in these two ways in London
could be diverted from their original purposes and used to
support the exchange through their release to importers or
other remitters to London, including the government, against
the payment of the equivalent in Argentine notes to the
Caja. In the case of gold acquired by the discount of treasury
bills this was, of course, subject to the lenders' not exercising
too powerful a lien against the actual gold. Such methods of
supporting the exchange were the same in their effects in
Argentina as if the Caja were opened, except that the amount,
timing, and purposes of the gold shipments were subject to
government control.
The officIal closure of the Caja on December i6, 1929 had
42TheBuenos Aires correspondent of The Economist, in describing the dis-
count of these treasury bills, said that the Banco de Ia Nacion looked upon
them as "gold on deposit with the Conversion Office against which it [might]
withdraw paper to an approximate amount of 6o million paper pesos(the
first installment of an authorized extraction of $200million)."Ibid.
Immediate use of this facility seems to have been made, for the statements
of the Caja as of January 30,1930 showan increase in the paper note issue
of 27millionpaper pesos against gold brought to the London and Washing-
ton legations (Bank of London and South America, cit., March 1930,
p.136). Also the Buenos Aires correspondent of The Economist in a letter
dated June 7, 1930said:"Possibly owing to the difference between rates
ruling here and those prevailing in Europe and in the United States, a cer-
tain amount of business is being financed outside this country and the fact
that during May £300,000wasdeposited to the order of the Argentine Em-
bassy in London the equivalent, some Argentine paper, being taken
from the Conversion office here—seems to bear out this conclusion." The
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been followed by a sharp and semi-speculative decline in the
peso. The seasonal improvement in the spring of 1930was
very slight because of the partial failure of the wheat crop.
Gold was therefore released from the legations. As early as
May 6, 1930theBuenos Aires correspondent of The Econo-
mist spoke of "a growing stringency" in the Argentine money
market "due to the fact that gold deposited in the Argentine
Legations abroad is being released by payments of the equiva-
lent in paper currency to the Conversion Office—a course
which ipso facto removes that amount of currency from
circulation."Notwithstanding the new loans and this re-
lease of gold, the exchange was weak during the summer. In
July, when shipments of the small available supplies of maize
and wheat were held up by unseasonable weather, the peso
fell sharply, but improving prospects for the next harvest,
together with news of damage to the American crop and
hopes of still further loans, strengthened it in August.
At this juncture the course of events was interrupted by
a political revolution in Argentina that drove President
Irigoyen from power. A Provisional Government came into
office under General Uriburu and at once embarked upon
fiscal reforms and a program of balancing the budget. The
American loan falling due on October iwassuccessfully re-
newed and the political overturn served to strengthen rather
than weaken the exchange. The financial reforms, however,
did not result in deflationary credit contraction. An internal
loan offered by the new government was unsuccessful. Only
one-fourth was actually sold and the bulk had to be floated
by credit extended by the Banco de la Nacion.45 Thus Argen-
tina arrived, against her will, at a practical counterpart of the
inflationary side of the Australian middle of the road policy.
The financing of planned government deficits in Australia
by direct advances from the Commonwealth Bank was not,
June 14,1930, p. 1332. Peters, cit., pp. 157—8.890 EXPERIMENTATION
in its practical results, very different from the financing of
unplanned deficits in Argentina by the purchase of unsalable
government bonds by the Banco de Ia Nacion.
The September improvement in the exchange did not
endure. The peso was weak in October, largely owing to up-
heavals in Brazil. In November anxiety over the condition
of the crops, extraordinarily low prices for grain, and a poor
wool market combined to drive it still lower. Prospects for
the renewal of short term foreign loans soon to fall due were
not bright. Consequently, the policy of gold shipments was
carried still further. The Banco de la Nacion was authorized,
upon payment of an equivalent sum to the Caja, to export
gold from Argentina to meet the service of her foreign debt
and gold began to move out for this purpose at the end of
October.46 In addition, in January 1931 an arrangement was
put into effect whereby the Banco de la Nacion could re-
plenish its "conversion fund" abroad by drawing on gold
in the Caja, as that fund was utilized to support the exchange.
This arrangement was described by The Economist (June 17,
1930, p.io8):
"On Wednesday (January 14,1931)itwas announced that the
Banco de la Nacion has been authorized to issue drafts against its
conversion fund of 30,000,000goldpesos now deposited abroad in
its name, and to obtain in exchange for these drafts gold from the
conversion office which it can retain or ship abroad as may be re-
quired by the state of the foreign exchange market. This is
equivalent to the creation of a revolving credit. in specie, up to
the limit of 30,000,000goldpesos; in other words it provides a
46 Itwassaid at the time of the placing of the $50 million loan in New York
and the £5 million loan in London that the bankers had obtained practically
a direct daim on Argentine gold reserves(ibid., p. 157). Concerning their
repayment and refunding in 1931, Dr. Peters writes: "In 1931 both bankers
refused renewals and the government was not able to raise the money in the
Buenos Aires banks. A compromise was effected in both cases; half of each
loan was renewed, and the other half paid partly in gold and partly by
subscription from the banks and trust companies of Argentina. At each
recurring maturity a part has been repaid and a part refunded." Ibid.,
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means whereby that amount of gold held by the conversion office
can be set free to support the exchange in case of need."
These devices, plus the use of gold in the legations abroad,
were the Argentine equivalent of the centralization of con-
trol over gold exports and the pooling of exchange reserves
in London by Australia.
In spite of this support the peso continued to fall until
February 1931.Theharvest passed into the hands of ex-
porters at very low prices. The depreciation of the exchange
and the financing of the government by the banks were be-
ginning to be reflected in increasing deposits, and money was
exceptionally easy in Argentina until the time came for the
actual export of the major crops. These were exceptionally
heavy, and alarm began to be expressed concerning the fi-
nancing of their movement in the face of a continued con-
traction of the circulation in order to provide gold for export.
In Table 70 the changes in notes in circulation and bank
deposits in Argentina, the course of Argentine prices, and
the changes in the amount and value of Argentine export
trade from 1928 to 1931,presentedby Dr. Peters in various
parts of the final chapter in his monograph, are brought to-
gether. Annual average exchange rates of the peso on New
York expressed as a percentage of par have been added. These
form essential parts of the powerful argument developed by
him to show that Argentina had reason to be grateful for her
currency system of peculiar and antiquated pattern and even
to the deficiencies of her government in the conduct of the
public finances during the early years of the depression. Her
exports were maintained at a high level. Even the sharp con-
traction, due to the partial failure of the wheat harvest of
1930, left the exports for that year as high as the 1920—26
average, and the 1931exportswere practically equal to the
record volume of 1927. By exchange depreciation the fall in
the proceeds of these exports in Argentine pesos was pre-
vented from being so disastrous as to break down the entire892 EXPERIMENTATION
financial system of the country.47 The export industry by no
means escaped heavy burdens and loss of income during these
years, but the decline in the proceeds of exports in 1930 was
only in proportion to the decline in the physical volume, and
the large loss in income was mainly due to natural causes.
With a much larger output in 1931 the realized exchange
depreciation was, in contrast, far from offsetting the effects
of the decline in world prices, and the financial yield of the
large crop was but little better than that of the smaller one.
Still a portion of the burdens that would have fallen upon
TABLE 70
Selected Argentine Financial and Trade Statistics, 1928-1931
1928 1929 1930 1931
Argentinemeans of payment
(millions of paper pesos)
Money in hands of public 530.4 782.8 773.0 736.2
Deposits in current account 1,317.6i,i88.61,176.0 951.6
Wholesale prices 2(1926=ioo)
Argentina 98.5 96.4 92.2 8g.o
United States 96.7 95.3 86.4 73.0
Argentine exports
Thousands of tons 17,029 16,703 11,027 18,477
Millions of Argentine gold pesos1,055 954 614 641
Millions of U.S. dollars 1,017 908 514 427
Argentineexchange on New York
as percentage of par 98.587 86.534 69.153
'H.E. Peters, Foreign Debt of the Argentine Republic, p. '73.
2Ibid.,p. 164. p. 152.
Calculated from Table 69, completed for last quarter of 1931 as follows:Sept.
61.873; Oct. 53.894; Nov. 60.987; Dec. 60.655.
the exporters had the exchange been stronger was distributed
among other groups. Imports were heavily reduced and the
burden of external indebtedness increased, but the example
of Australia in forcing a reduction of interest and wage in-
come was not followed. In spite of low prices for exports,
especially in 1931, the general price level in Argentina was,
In harmony with Dr. Copland's view concerning Australia, Dr. Peters
reached the condusion that this would have been the inevitable result of the
maintenance of exchange parity by Argentina (Peters, op. cit., p. 163).THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 893
as compared to other countries, kept relatively stable. Infla-
tion did not depreciate the peso in terms of goods, nor did
'parity with gold' undermine the basis of the country's in-
ternal economic balance. Argentina escaped the terrors of
the 'money doctors,' maintained her credit and, by muddling
through, achieved her own middle of the road internal eco-
nomic policy.
When Great Britain abandoned the gold standard in Sep-
tember 1931, this chapter in Argentine economic and cur-
rency history was ended. After a sharp relapse in October the
peso was brought under rigorous exchange control by which
it was pegged to the American dollar at a discount of about
40 per cent.
URUGUAY
As shown in Table 69 and Chart 54, the course of the Uru-
guayan exchange was in its general direction, and even in the
details of its fluctuations, closely associated with the behavior
of the Argentine peso. The rate first declined substantially
below parity in March 1929 under the combined influence
of a seasonal decline in exports and of the fall in prices,
especially of wool, hides, and cereals. No measures were
taken to stem the depreciation, such as the support given the
Argentine peso by gold exports. In July the exchange rose,
owing to speculative factors, but during the export season
it did not show any strength. In December, when the general
downward movement had been in progress about nine
months, the formal act of abandoning the gold standard was
accomplished in harmony with the action of Argentina.48
From this time on until the summer of 1931, the fluctuations
in the Uruguayan exchange were, with few exceptions, those
of the Argentine peso. This was not wholly due to similar
economic conditions in the two countries, for in Uruguay
the force of the depression was mitigated by the greater rela-
48Departmentof Overseas Trade (United Kingdom), Economic Conditions in
Uruguay, 1930;andLeague of Nations, Gold Delegation, Final Report, p. 9.894 EXPERIMENTATION
tive importance in her economy of cattle raising.49 A relation
somewhat similar to that prevailing between Australia and
New Zealand existed between the two countries in 1930 and
the spring of However, both currencies rose sharply
in March 1930, when Uruguay received a $17 million loan
in New York. In the early summer of 1931, when the Argen-
tine peso was once more being supported by gold exports, the
Uruguayan exchange continued to fall. In July 1931 it stood
at a discount of 48 per cent in New York as compared to a
discount of the Argentine peso of 28 per cent. Thereafter the
common movement was resumed, both currencies reaching
their lowest level in October 1931. When the Argentine peso
was finally stabilized at a discount of about 40 per cent in
New York, it was soon joined by the Uruguayan peso at a
discount of about 54 per cent.5'
Brazil
The Brazilian milreis suffered a series of shocks far more
severe and sudden than those experienced by either of these
Cf. Table 66, showing the relative decline of the world price of wool (40
percent) ,wheat(22percent), and frozen meat (9 per cent)in 1930.In
1930thecattle raising industry in Uruguay was in a "flourishing state" (The
Economist, Dec. 20,1930, p.1166).
50hisaddress at the annual meeting of the Bank of London and South
America on Dec. i6, 1930,BeaumontPease said: "Uruguayan exchange rates
have had a tendency of late years to follow the trend of those of her neighbor
Argentina, even when economic factors hardly seem to justify the movement"
(ibid., p. 1186).
Meanwhile, the Paraguayan peso had moved with the Argentine peso, be-
ing really part of the Argentine currency system. In the June to December
1930issuesof the Bank of London and South America Monthly Review the
following note concerning the Paraguayan currency appears:
"Transactions with foreign countries are usually made on the basis of the
'peso oro' (Argentine gold dollar), or in the currency of the country with
which the transaction is made. There are no official exchange quotations for
foreign currencies in Asuncion but the rates are received daily by telegraph
from Buenos Aires, and bills are liquidated on the basis of these rates and
are payable in Argentine paper or Paraguayan paper at the rates of $z Argen-
tine paper to $0.44Argentinegold and $42.61 Paraguayan paper to the
$i.oo gold."THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 895
currencies from 1929 to 1931,owingto the extreme
ence of the Brazilian economy upon a single commodity and
to the greater degree of political instability in the country.
In October 1929, at the time of the crash in the New York
Stock Exchange, the whole Brazilian economy was thrown
into a severe crisis by the collapse of the Coffee Defense
System. In the face of three successive large crops the Coffee
Defense Institute of the State of Sao Paulo had succeeded
maintainingthe price of coffee at artificially high levels, but
only at the cost of accumulating very large stocks. When the
break came prices were cut in half. To meet this crisis a £2
millionseven month credit was obtained from London
bankers long associated with Brazilian underwriting, and
the Banco do Brasil, acting under instructions from the
dent of the Republic, pursued an active policy of making
advances to growers and holders of coffee and of discounting
freely for the banks.52 The amount of coffee permitted by the
control to enter Santos was increased and exports rose sharply.
The fall in price, however, was so rapid that their value
declined and the milreis began to depreciate.
At this moment of crisis it became evident that the con-
nection between the Brazilian currency and the international
gold standard established by the de facto stabilization at
the end of 1926 was even more purely ornamental and lack-
ing in substance than that of Argentina. The 1926 stabiliza-
tion had provided Brazil with three forms of note circulation,
existing, in the words of the Annual Report of the Banco do
Brasil for 1930 "within watertight compartments"—the issues
of the Treasury, the Caixa do Estabilizaçao, and the Banco
do Brasil. The Caixa, or Stabilization Office, issued notes
against gold and was intended to give gold in exchange for
notes upon the model of the Argentine Caja. During i 927—28
Brazil had been an importer of gold, largely as a result of
foreign borrowing. The exchange had been easily supported
52Bancodo Brasil, Annual Report for 1929(FederalReserve Bulletin, July
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during these years and for the first three quarters of 1929 by
the intervention of the Banco do Brasil in the market, and
gold was at no time withdrawn from the Stabilization Office.
Consequently in October 1929 the Caixa and the Banco do
Brasil were in a strong position to defend the gold standard
bad they so desired. The gold held by the two agencies was
about £30 million sterling and the foreign exchange of the
Banco do Brasil was about £6.5 million sterling.53 Yet no
such defense was at first attempted. The Rio de Janeiro cor-
respondent of The Economist indeed stated that official inti-
mations had been given that withdrawal of gold from the
Caixa would be considered unpatriotic and pointed out that
access to this gold had been rendered difficult because a very
large proportion of the outstanding gold notes of the Caixa
had been accumulated by the Banco do Brasil.54 No gold was
exported in the last months of 1929, and the Banco do Brasil
even ceased its own intervention in the market in November
and December. At the close of the year the milreis stood at
a 5 per cent discount.
In January 1930 this policy of preserving gold and foreign
exchange reserves for the sake of appearances, and to give
an outward show of strength to Brazilian finance, was aban-
doned because of the increasing weakness of the exchange.
The Banco do Brasil began to ship gold to New York and,
encouraged by this example, other banks followed suit. These
shipments were substantial enough to restore the milreis al-
most to parity in April and May. The milreis was further
strengthened, and the internal financial position improved
by the placing in May of a large Coffee Realization Loan in
New York, London, and on the continent by the State of Sao
Paulo. This loan was amply secured and bore a high return.
Its repayment was to be effected by shipments spread over
The Federal Reserve Bulletin for December 1929gavethe figure as $150
millionof gold held by the two agencies in October, while the item 'Cor-
respondents Abroad' of the Banco do Brasil was 326 million milreis.
TheEconomist, Feb. '5,930, p. 355.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 8g7
ten years of the coffee stocks held by the control authorities.
In spite of these attractions and although it was in part a
refunding of the short term advances previously made by
the issuing bankers according to the established British
dition, the loan was placed with difficulty and the London
share of £8 million was largely left with the underwriters,
It was one of the very few issues that was able to break
through the unofficial embargo on foreign loans at that time
very rigidly in force in London.
The proceeds of this loan, when they became available,
proved wholly inadequate to prevent further declines in the
milreis. Following the presidential elections of March 1930
politicalunrest in Brazil had become acute. The
was pursuing, on the whole, an inflationary policy, going
heavily into debt to the Banco do Brasil. From May through
July gold shipments were practically suspended, and though
they were resumed under the urgent necessity of meeting
foreign obligations in August and September, the milreis
experienced a second and greater depreciation. On October
3 actual revolution broke out in several important States, and
official quotations for the milreis, which then stood at abotat
a 15 per cent discount, were suspended for nearly two months.
During the revolution, on October i1,the government took
over the liability of the Banco do Brasil for its own note issue
and its redemption and conversion funds, together with a
portion of the Bank's gold reserves.55 In return the govern-
ment received cancellation of its debt to the Bank and a de-
posit credit which was at once utilized to meet its urgent
needs.
When, on October 24, the revolutionary party was success-
ful in the capital and a new regime under President Vargas
came into power, Brazil had practically completed a
tion to what was in effect, if not in form, a single government
note issue and a pure paper standard. Very large shipments
It wasentitledto do so under agreements entered into in Bancodo
Brasil, Annual Report for 1930.8g8 EXPERIMENTATION
of gold had been made during the revolution itself, and these
shipments were continued under the new government until
the gold reserves of the Caixa and the Banco do Brasil were
exhausted. At the same time the foreign exchange holdings
of the Banco do Brasil fell from the equivalent of 36 million
American dollars to under 5 million. In spite of the use of
gold and foreign exchange reserves the milreis continued
to depreciate as soon at quotations were resumed, and it was
abundantly clear at the close of i 930 that a thoroughgoing
reform for Brazilian finance was necessary. In this emergency
the Brazilian government invited Sir Otto Niemeyer, just
returned from Australia, to come to Brazil in his familiar
role of money doctor.56
The first official notice of the results of his mission was
given in July 1931,whenit was announced that plans for
administrative reforms in the handling of government funds
had been submitted to the President. Further proposals for
a new central bank were foreshadowed. Shortly thereafter
Sir Otto's Report was published. In it he applied to Brazil
all the major principles of post-war currency stabilization—
56The course of events as described in the text may be read on the face of
the figures of the Brazilian note circulation as given in Sir Otto Nieineyer's
Report to the Brazilian Government, July 1931, Annex IX. For selected
months during 1927—31 they were:
NOTES
Stabili-Bank ofActive BANKOP BRAZIL
Treas-Bank ofzation Brazil circu- GOLD DISCOUNTS &
ury Brazil Officeholdingslation £Ooo,000 ADVANCE8 (thou-
(thousands of contos) sands of contos)
1•927
March 1,977 592 2,393 10.0 94!
June 1,977 592 10 276 2,303 10.2 1,077
Dcc. 1,977 592 436 270 9,735 20.7 984
1929
March 1,952 592 851 2,707 30.9 1,074
Sept. 1,952 592 857 709 2,691 31.! 1,240
Dcc. 1,951 848 6go 2,702 30.9 1,395
March 1,951 592 651 643 2,551 26.0 1,368
Aug. 1,951 592 i68 415 2,296 14.1 1,34
Sept. 1,951 592 132 338 2,338 13.3 1,37
Nov. 2,543 170 129 265 2,577 4.1 1,255
Dcc. 2,543 170 129 323 2,519 1,262
'98'
May 2,543 170 129 394 2,448 t,526THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 899
balancing the budget, settlement of past debts, an independ-
ent central bank, stabilization of the currency, and the
attraction of foreign capital. To these were added a recom-
mendation that the federal government should exercise
control over the foreign borrowings of the states and munici-
palities, a step analagous to the establishment of the Loan
Council in Australia, and recommendations against further
government responsibility for coffee control and in favor of
a greater diversification of Brazilian production. But, in ad-
dressing this advice to a country with an exchange standing
at a discount of about 37 per cent in New York and London,57
he did not repeat his admonitions to the Australian authori-
ties against all depreciation of the exchange, but advocated
the choice of a new rate of stabilization near the current mar-
ket rates.
Conditions in the world's central money markets were ex-
tremely adverse for the attraction of foreign resources to re-
plenish the foreign exchange reserves of the Banco do Brasil
or of a new central bank, and the path of internal monetary
reform was far from smooth. While the preliminary steps in
the new program were being taken the milreis continued its
decline. In September 1931 it stood at a discount of over
50 per cent in New York, but after a preliminary stabilization
from October 1931 to March 1932 at a discount of 48 per
cent, it joined the group of dollar countries in the summer
of 1932 at approximately the discount prevailing at the time
of the Niemeyer Report.
Other Depreciated Currencies
Of the other South American countries that had previously
returned to the gold standard Venezuela alone experienced
a depreciating exchange in 1930 and the first part of 1931.
The Venezuelan exchange is therefore included in Table 69
and Chart 54. Exchange depreciation occurred later and was
The milreis improved rather sharply in June 'ga';cf.Table 6g.900 EXPERIMENTATION
more moderate than in Argentina and Brazil largely because
Venezuela's chief export product, petroleum, was among the
world commodities that declined least in price in 1930
(Table 66). Exchange depreciation began in the summer of
1930 and gold exports were prohibited. The three principal
reasons for the fall in the exchange were the decline in the
price of coffee, the curtailment of oil production with a con-
sequent loss of revenue to the government in taxes levied on
foreign companies, and the decrease in the number of foreign
employees in the oil fields. These all cut down the demand
for Venezuelan exchange, but at the same time imports were
not greatly reduced. Toward the end of 1931 an acute short-
age of foreign bills was experienced, and the banks entered
agreement to peg the exchange and to ration the
of foreign currencies that came into the market.58




Exchange Rates of Spain and
Peru on New Tor/c, 1929—
September 1931
Monthly Averages as Per-
centages of Par
depreciating during this period. Because Peru and Spain
were members of the small group of countries still struggling
to return to gold in 1929. their position in the gold standard
system will be briefly touched upon later, but in order to
complete the picture of the breaches in the international gold
standard as a system of exchange rates during the last years
of the Experimentation period, these exchanges have been
included in Table 6g and are presented separately in
Chart 55.
Department of Overseas Trade (United Kingdom), Economic Conditions
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The International Shifting of Economic Burdens
With the possible exception of Spain, the depreciation of the
exchanges of these various countries had the effect of shifting
economic burdens from certain groups of dominant impor-
tance in the life of the community and subject in exceptional
degree to the pressure of falling prices to other groups.59 As
a whole these currency depreciations involved also an inter-
national shifting of economic burdens. The fundamental
cause of the great decline in raw material prices was a lack of
economic balance on a world scale. Relative to demand there
was over-production of many staples sold in world markets.
The economic remedy was a restriction of supply on a world
scale pending the growth of effective demand adequate to
absorb the total world output at remunerative prices. Cur-
rency depreciation, by relieving the export industry of certain
countries from the worst pressures of falling prices, retarded
the pace of reduction in output in those countries. It has
been noted in the case of Australia, Argentina, and Brazil
that export volume increased with currency depreciation.
Therefore the pressure for reductions in the supply of similar
products grown in other countries was doubly severe. The
power of raw material producers in these competing coun-
tries to purchase the products of industry was reduced further
than it would otherwise have been because a disproportionate
part of the total burden of the world deflation in raw ma-
terial industry was shifted to them by exchange depreciation
elsewhere. The pressure in these countries for production
control and government aid to farmers by government pur-
chase and storage was to that extent increased, while in
countries with large agricultural production, but not nor-
mally exporters on a large scale, pressure for high agricul-
tural production became intense. In addition, the internal
shifting of burdens in the countries with depreciated cx-
59Theexceptionally careful analysis of this process in Australia by Dr. Cop-
land is a model that can, mutatis mutandi, be applied to all.902 EXPERIMENTATION
changes \•vas reflected in a reduction of their imports, which
imposed an additional loss of markets upon the industrial
producers of the world, and finally the position of the in-
vestors and savers in the creditor countries was endangered
by the burdens placed by exchange depreciation upon their
debtors. Exchange depreciation by periphery countries there-
fore served to diffuse the real losses of the depression inter-
nationally as .well as internally. The 'sea of economic forces'
was compelling the world to seek a new economic balance.
For the world as a whole there was no escape from the losses
incident to structural maladjustment growing out of war
and to the carrying forward of unsolved economic problems
by inflationary finance. The difficulties of the raw material
producers would in any event have had severe repercussions
throughout the world economy. Exchange depreciation at
the periphery simply effected a somewhat different interna-
tional distribution of these losses.
1n the single centered pre-war international gold standard
system the beginnings of serious disturbance in the under-
lying balance of the world's exchanges of goods and services
were reflected in the credit worthiness of prospective bor-
•rowers in London. Unwise and reckless lending was often
partly responsible for the changed situation, and recognition
of the change was doubtless often unduly delayed. But when
the situation became clear, the direction and amount of the
international flow of credit was altered, and in the main,
'gold standard adjustments' were forced upon debtor coun-
tries before their economic difficulties had become so acute
as to endanger the basis of their economic life. There was
truth in the saying that before the war gold standard adjust-
ments took place in debtor countries and were enforced by
the dominant influence of British finance. Only in excep-
tional cases, when they were extremely severe, were they
shifted in part to other countries by temporary abandonment
of the gold standard and exchange depreciation.
Our entire analysis of the post-war experiment of attempt-
ing to operate an international gold standard with a decen-THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 903
tralized financial system in an unbalanced world economy
supplies the reasons why the temptation to embrace this
avenue of escape was present in an unprecedented number of
countries simultaneously, and with unprecedented strength,
in the early years of the depression. Yet in the very nature of
the case it could not, either before the war or after, be a
remedy open to all countries. It was clearly not appropriate
to countries dependent largely upon imports for the conduct
of their essential industries, and, as already stated, for any
single periphery country its success depended upon the con-
tinued existence of a large group of stable exchange rate
countries. Since it was essentially a device for shifting rather
than for avoiding losses it could not be of universal applica-
tion.
Signs of Strain Elsewhere
The list of severely depreciated exchanges in 1929, 1930, and
the first part of 1931 is short, but the international gold
standard facade was subject to serious stress in many other
countries. In some, traditional practices long associated with
gold standard orthodoxy were abandoned, in others the or-
thodox defenses in time of crisis were used with success, and
in still others the gold standard was defended along lines
made familiar during the war. Without attempting to dif-.
ferentiate abstractly between them according to the form of
their adherence to the gold standard, the signs of strain ob-
servable in a few of the more important of these countries
will be briefly mentioned. In conjunction with the preceding
comments on countries that frankly abandoned the gold
standard, this will establish, by illustration, the full scope of
the meaning we have assigned to the phrase, the Disintegra-
tion of the Gold Standard System at the Periphery.
Canada
The foreign exchange problems of Canada during the early
years of the depression were fundamentally different from
those of all other raw material producing debtor countries904 EXPERIMENTATION
because of her continued access to American capital markets.
Until the summer of 1931 Canada's ability to borrow abroad
provided support to her exchange and rendered the task of
maintaining the gold standard relatively easy. Yet after Janu-
ary 1929 Canada was not in any true sense a gold standard
country, partly because of certain features of her intricate
relationship to American finance and partly because of the
particular set of monetary and banking arrangements pre-
vailing when she returned to gold.
At the outbreak of the World War Canada left the gold
standard and provided herself with the means of internal
credit expansion under the terms of the Finance Act of 1914.
This Act provided that the government might, by proclama-
tion, suspend the redemption of Dominion notes in gold
and might advance Dominion notes to the banks upon pledge
of satisfactory collateral. For the first time Canadian banks
were put in a position where they could increase their cash
reserves from internal sources other than Canada's own pro-
duction of gold. The Finance Act of 1923 provided that after
three years the right of the Minister of Finance to refuse
redemption of Dominion notes in gold was to lapse, and by
the expiration of this right by limitation on July 1, 1926
Canada returned to the gold standard. The Finance Act of
1923 also made the right of the Department of Finance to
issue notes to the banks permanent and further defined the
type of security they might pledge.6°
Canada, therefore, returned to the gold standard with two
types of note issue, indistinguishable in form but very dif-
ferent in nature. A part of the Dominion note issue was
governed by the pre-war regulations and, except for a certain
fiduciary element, the Department of Finance was required
to hold a ioo per cent gold reserve against it. Another part
was issued to the banks through the pledge of securities
known in Canadian parlance as 'rediscounting.' Against such
60C.A. Curtis, 'The Canadian Monetary Situation,' Journal of Political Econ-
Otfly,June1932,Vol.40,p. This section draws heavily on this source.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 905
notes no gold reserve had to be held. All Dominion notes,
however issued, were redeemable in gold at the Department
of Finance, and in addition the notes obtained through re-
discounting could be retired through the repayment by the
banks of the advances made to them; that is, the notes could
be presented and the pledged security released. 'For these
advances a rate of interest was charged by the Department
of Finance but no attempt was made to use this rate as an
instrument of credit control.°'
In 1928, owing chiefly to the higher level of interest rates
in the United States and the large movement of Canadian
funds to America to share in the speculative boom, Cana-
dian gold exports substantially exceeded new gold produc-
tion in the Dominion.62 This unusual gold drain which
persisted, subject to seasonal variations, throughout the year,
was heavily reinforced by an unusually large seasonal loss at
the very end of 1928 and during January 1929. Under
Canada's new monetary system this gold export had two
consequences which would not have been possible before the
war. First, there was no contraction of the credit base. The
exported gold was, it is true, obtained by the withdrawal of
notes from the cash reserves of the banks and their presenta-
tion for redemption at the Department of Finance, but the
banks at once made good the contraction of their own re-
serves by obtaining new notes from the Department by re-
discounts. The banks even added to their reserves by this
method sufficiently to provide the basis for an expansion in
the credit superstructure to finance Canadian participation
in the speculative boom. Second, by reducing the gold hold-
ings of the Department of Finance to about one-half of their
1926 level, the gold exports resulted in an actual deficit in
the legally required Department gold reserves of the order
61 Ibid., p. 326.
62Federal Reserve Bulletin, Jan. 1930, p. 4. It is pointed out that Canadian
exports of gold were usually larger than her imports by an amount approx-
imating Canada's own output of about $40 million.906 EXPERIMENTATION
of $25 million.63 No matter how large the gold export, such
a result would not have been possible under the pre-war
system. As Professor Curtis says, the Dominion note was then
practically a gold
Faced with this situation the Department of Finance, with-
out any legal steps having been taken, quietly suspended the
redeemability of the Dominion note in gold, and with the
cooperation of the banks, this became an effective form of
gold export embargo. Gold exports ceased in January 1929.
During the first three quarters of 1929 Canada experienced
a continued drain of funds to New York, and in addition was
suffering the economic effects of falling wheat prices. The
harvest was light and passed in large part into the hands of
various wheat pools and other strong holders who withheld
considerable portions of it from export in the hope of higher
prices. For 1929 Canada had, as a result, an excess of mer-
chandise imports of $91millionas compared with a merchan-
dise export surplus of $152 million in 1928. Deprived of the
support of gold exports the Canadian exchange, which
throughout 1928 had remained at or within the gold points,
went below gold export point to New York. In February the
Canadian dollar was weak, New York funds moving from
about 1/4 to 1/2 per cent premium, and from March to June
the premium was just under i per cent. There was some
improvement in July, but the essential weakness of the Ca-
nadian dollar prevented the usual seasonal inflow of gold in
the autumn. With the culmination of the American boom
the premium on New York funds reached a level of just over
1percent. Immediately after the New York Stock Exchange
crash Canada withdrew funds employed in the New York
63 For a calculation of this deficit as of November1929 cf. The Economist,
Jan. i8, 1930, p. 1,6. Since a gold export embargo prevailed throughout 1929,
this probably represents approximately the position at the beginning of the
year.
84 Op. cit., p. 315. Some of the notes issued through rediscounts must have
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market on a large scale, as evidenced by a decline in the 'call
loans abroad' of the Canadian banks. This did not, however,
at once strengthen the Canadian exchange, for there was an
offsetting and stronger movement of funds other way
because of the liquidation of American owned securities by
holders who had Wall Street obligations to meet. This was
compressed into a very short period—late October and early
November. At this time the dollar was very strong, the New
York premium reaching 3 per cent on October 30. By the end
of the year it had again fallen to i per cent, and by late spring
1930 the premium had disappeared.65 Though the merchan-
dise balance of trade continued to be heavily adverse, the
Canadian exchange was still supported by substantial capital
imports from the United States. A normal seasonal inflow of
gold took place in the summer which, in conjunction with a
substantial repayment of rediscounts by the banks, made
good the deficit in the legal gold reserves of the Department
of Finance.66 Canada seemed to have returned to the goid
standard after a temporary deviation from
It was not a temporary deviation, however, for in January
1931, and again from June to September, the Canadian ex-
change stood at a discount, which, while moderate, was still
sufficient to have called forth gold exports had the gold ex-
port embargo not continued in practical effect. In the sum-
mer and autumn of 1931, with the development of the crisis
in Europe and the general deepening of the depression,
Canada began to have difficulty in borrowing in New York,
65 The figures in the text are taken from the daily quotations published in
The Gazette, Montreal.
66 In other words the process by which this deficit was created was exactly
reversed; cf. Curtis,cit., charts, pp. 323, 325.
6? Cf. B. H. Beckhart, 'Canada's Experience with the Temporary Suspension
of the Gold Standard,' The Annalist, April 25, 1930, p. 907. Professor Curtis
points to this artide and to the fact that The Statist on October 5, re-
moved Canada from its gold exchange index to show that Canada's abandon-
ment of the gold standard was recognized outside the country, although
adherence to it was stoutly affirmed in Canada. Op. cit., p. 321.908 EXPERIMENTATION
and American funds employed and invested in Canada began
to be withdrawn. The great importance of these capital items
in the Canadian balance of payments was strongly empha-
sized at this time, for the exchange continued to be weak
in spite of a substantial reduction in the merchandise import
surplus which fell frbm $103millionin 1930 to $13million
in 1931. When England abandoned the gold standard in
September 1931,Canada'sborrowing in New York was made
even more difficult and funds were withdrawn from Canada
on a larger scale. These capital movements became an all
important influence upon the exchange. For the first time the
Canadian dollar went to a discount of really substantial pro-
portions in New York. The pretense of adherence to the gold
standard had to be frankly abandoned, and an official em-
bargo on gold exports was proclaimed on October 19,1931.
Canada'sexperience affords an excellent example of the in-
fluence of institutional arrangements upon the outward as-
pect of the gold standard. Had Canada been possessed of a
highly flexible central banking system capable of 'economiz-
ing gold' and conducting offsetting discount and open market
operations, she could undoubtedly have avoided recourse to
a gold export embargo. Gold could have been exported in
sufficient amounts to correct the small discount in the rate
that prevailed from time to time between January 1929 and
September i931 withoutimposing credit contraction upon the
Canadian banks. It would have been possible to say that the
gold standard in Canada had been preserved "in its full in-
tegrity" (cf. Ch. 2, note i).Yetthis would not have been due,
any more, than was actually the case, to the setting in motion
of corrective forces. The amenities would have been more
perfectly preserved, but the economic policy of Canada, her
position in the world's system of exchange rates, and her fi-
nancial adjustment under the first impact of the world de-
pression would still have been as they actually were, deter-
mined by far more fundamental forces than the form of her
adherence to gold.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 909
Chile
Unlike the exchanges of Australia and New Zealand, Argen-
tiria and Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru and Spain, the
Chilean exchange did not depreciate prior to England's aban-
donment of the gold standard. In September 1931theaverage
rate of the Chilean peso on New York was i 2.04 Cents, just
under its parity of 12.17 cents. Chile, unlike Canada, was a
country with a central bank of the most modern type. The
Banco Central de Chile, established in accordance with the
recommendations of the Kemmerer Commission, had begun
operations in January 1926, and through its instrumentality
Chile energetically defended her position as a gold exchange
standard country. It was not without a note of triumph that
F. W. Fetter, who had accompanied the Kemmerer Commis-
sion to Chile, was able to write in the summer of 1931: "In
1930 and 1931, amidst wide-spread currency depreciation in
South America, Chile, thanks to an ample gold reserve 65and
the willingness of the authorities of the central bank to use
this reserve for redemption purposes, has stayed on the gold
standard." 69Thecharacter of this defense of the gold standard
and its costs, however, give ample cause for reflection con-
cerning the appropriateness of such a defense for a country in
the position of Chile, and ample justification for the inclusion
of her experience under the general caption, Disintegration of
the Gold Standard System at the Periphery.
During the prosperity that followed Chile's return to goid
the new central bank intervened from time to time in the
foreign exchange market to prevent the peso from going "too
near" the gold export point, and obtained the means for do-
Theforeign exchange reserves of the central bank were regularly referred
to in Chile as "gold reserves"; the Banco Central de Chile said in its
Report for 193o: "The Bank continued its policy of keeping in its own
vaults only a small part of its gold reserves, and of depositing the greater part
with some of the largest and most important banks in London and New
York" (Federal Reserve Bulletin, Nov. 3931,p.624).
69Monetary Inflation in Chile (Princeton University Press, p. 182.910 EXPERIMENTATION
ingsoand for strengthening its 'gold reserve' by purchasing
from the government foreign exchange obtained by foreign
borrowings.7° In 1928 these borrowings became the basis of a
long term public works program which introduced peculiar
difficulties into the Chilean situation, described by The Econ-
omist (Aug. 29, 1931, p. 398):
"In 1928 the Government inaugurated a plan of public works
which was carefully prepared and based on the development of its
natural resources as well as on the capacity to meet the annual
service requirements on the loans contracted to finance the plan.
An average annual increase of revenue of 5 per cent. was allowed
for, and the Chilean Minister of Finance estimated that ordinary
expenditure would not increase by more than 2 per cent. per
annum. With this margin it was considered safe for the Govern-
ment to borrow in order to carry Out the construction programme.
The advent of the world slump, however, upset the whole scheme,
and the Government made matters worse by borrowing (largely
from American houses) on short-term through 1930 and into 1931
to finance this public works programme in the hope that it would
be able to resume its long-term borrowing before the end of
1931."
This recourse of the government to the short term inter-
national money markets took place at a time when the gen-
eral economic position of Chile was becoming extremely
depressed. About 82 per cent of Chilean exports consisted of
copper and nitrate. Between 1929 and 1930 the price of cop-
per fell one-fourth (Table 66), and by 1930 Chile was facing
a nitrate crisis comparable in severity to that of 1921. This
crisis was responsible for a complete centralization of control
over Chilean nitrate, deeply involved the national budget,
severely strained the international price maintenance agree-
ments existing in this commodity, and threatened to bring
on a price war. During 1929 stocks had been accumulating
in Chile far in excess of normal requirements. The Nitrate
Producers Association consequently brought about a cur-
70BancoCentral de Chile, Annual Report for 1928 (Federal Reserve Bulletin,
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tailmentof production in 1930 of about a million tons,
demand was falling so rapidly that stocks were not reduced.71
During this crisis, upon the initiative of American financiali
interests, the Nitrate Producers Association was transformedi
into a single syndicate for prices and sales, the Compania de
Salitre de Chile, known as Cosach, controllingper cent
of Chilean production. To further this scheme the Chilean.
government transferred large nitrate deposits to the new
pany, agreed to make certain annual cash payments to it,
partly to provide service for its foreign obligations, and re•
moved the substantial export duty on nitrate. In return it
took a 50 per cent interest in the company's capital stock. The
price fixing agreements with European nitrogen producers in
force in 1929 were renewed for 1930, and under these
trols nitrate prices did not fall substantially. Exports, how-
ever, did fall heavily, greatly aggravating Chile's foreign ex-
change problems, and stocks accumulated on a very large
scale.
Price maintenance in the nitrate industry was serious'y
threatened early in i 931 when, in retaliation for a prohibitive
import duty on Chilean nitrate imposed by Germany, Cosach
refused to renew its international marketing agreements and
threatened to sell its products when and how it chose. That
this was not an empty threat is shown by the iper cent de..
dine in nitrate prices in Chile from 1930 to 1931. In addition,
the financing of Cosach by contemplated foreign loans was
seriously impeded by the adverse conditions in the central
money markets, which were now practically closed to the
Chilean government.
While the affairs of the nitrate industry were in these straits,
the decline in the price of agricultural products was arousing
discontent among farmers and on January i, 1931 Chile em-
barked upon the policy of assisting agricultural exports by
Ti Banco Central de Chile, Annual Report for 1930 (ibid., Nov. '93', p.624).
As agriculture is the best customer of the nitrate industry, the decline in
demand was unavoidable.912 EXPERIMENTATION
the payment of bounties through the agency of an Agricul-
turall Export Board.
Under these circumstances the government's short term
borrowings abroad were far from sufficient to prevent the
peso from going to gold export point, and the Banco Central
de Chile began to lose foreign exchange. "From January i,
1930, to July io, 1931, the total 'gold holdings' of the Bank
fell from 446,351,253 pesos (about $54,300,000) tO 221,050,-
651 pesos (about $26,900,000), a reduction of over 50%." 72
Atthe same time the government had accumulated an exter-
nal floating debt which, on April i, 1931, was $59,914,000.
This floating debt, together with the difficulties of meeting
fixed charges of about $40 million per annum on long term
external debt, at a time when the merchandise trade balance
was becoming actually adverse, clearly brought both Chil-
ean public credit abroad and the Chilean gold standard to
the verge of breakdown. In July 1931 Chile passed into a
regime of exchange control under the guidance of the Com-
mittee for the Control of International Exchange Operations;
service on the Chilean public debt was no longer remitted
abroad but was deposited in a special account with the Banco
Central de Chile.
At this point in Chilean currency history mounting eco-
nomic distress within the country finally culminated in a
political revolution which, on July 26, 1931, brought a new
government into power. This new government completed the
Chilean default by declaring a complete moratorium on her
foreign debt in August, and announced that it would attempt
to restore the balance of international payments by exchange
control, customs tariffs, and other similar measures. The mo-
tives leading to the moratorium on Chile's foreign debt are
described by Mr. Fetter as follows:
"Chile's recent action in July and August, 1931, in declaring a
moratorium on her foreign debts, seems to have been inspired in
72Fetter,op. cit., p. 182;cE. Table 67. Actual gold wasnotexported and
consequently became an increasing proportion o[ total reserves.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
part by the feeling that in view of the great decline in the prices
of her leading exports, exchange to meet the service on her large
foreign debt, much of which had been recklessly incurred during
recent years to finance ambitious programs of internal improve-
ments, could be secured only by a drastic policy of deflation that
might have serious economic consequences, or by the use of the
gold reserve of the central bank and the consequent endangering
of the gold standard."
The defense of the gold standard by such means invites seri-
ous reflection as to what may have been the purpose for which
the gold standard existed in Chile. This purpose could not
have been to set in motion corrective forces that would es-
tablish within the country a new economic balance, for fur-
ther drastic deflation was clearly not desired. Chile refused,
and probably was actually unable to allow, such corrective
forces to operate within her borders beyond a certain point.
This point fell far short of the achievement of a new economic
equilibrium which is at bottom the aim and justification of
the international gold standard as an institution designed to
facilitate trade and commerce. While Chile rejected the ulti-
mate gold standard remedies for her economic sickness, she
rejected also a depreciated exchange as a means of obtaining
a new economic balance. She attempted to achieve the eco-
nomic benefits of a depreciated exchange by other means, by
export bounties and by restriction of imports by direct meth-
ods rather than through price, while at the same time pre-
serving the outward shell of the gold standard. The purpose
of the gold standard in Chile could not have been to help ia
the maintenance of public credit, for when a direct choice was
presented between maintaining public credit and keeping the
gold standard, public credit was sacrificed. The conclusion is
unavoidable that Chile clung to a symbol of financial and
economic 'soundness,' integrity, and strength at the sacrifice
of the things
78Ibid.,pp.184—5, note.914 EXPERIMENTATION
The Agricultural Countries of Eastern Europe
During the earlier years of the depression there was a real pos-
sibility that the economic difficulties of the countries just re-
viewed might be increased by a movement toward European
economic solidarity. This movement was of particular interest
to the agricultural countries of Eastern Europe which also
stood upon the periphery of the international gold standard
system. Their geographical advantages enabled them in 1929
and 1930 to increase their exports of cereals and animal foods
to Central and Western Europe at the expense of more dis-
tant sources of supply. They were eager to add to the advan-
tages of their geographical location the benefits of preferential
tariff treatment in Europe, and made sustained efforts toward
this end, which are well described by the World Economic
Survey, 1931/2(p.284):
"Successive conferences of the agricultural countries of Eastern
Europe were held at Warsaw (August 1930),Bucharest(October
1930),Belgrade(November 1930),andWarsaw (November
1930).Theeight countries represented at these conferences were
concerned primarily with the depressed condition of agriculture
and particularly of cereal-growing. They contemplated the in-
stitution of national controls for the sale and export of these
products, but also asked preferential treatment in regard to them
from the importing countries of Western Europe. Such preferen-
tial treatment, in certain cases, would have cut across the most-
favoured-nation clauses of existing treaties, but was strongly ad-
vocated as a temporary measure affecting only a comparatively
small volume of produce on the ground that agriculture was the
fundamental economic basis of the States concerned."
These proposals were considered by the Economic Com-
mittee of the League of Nations in connection with its con-
tinued efforts to salvage some of the hopes and projects of the
World Economic Conference of 1927, but were rejected in
November 1930.Earlyin 1931theywere again put forward
in connection with the ambitious projects initiated by M.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 915
Briandfor the economic appeasement of Europe. The
ther course of the effort to solve the agricultural problem
EasternEurope by international negotiation under these aug-
pices is described by the World Economic Survey, 1931/2
(p.286):
the Commission of Enquiry for European Union ...
a preliminary meeting in January 1931, and ...calleda meet-•
ing at Paris, in the succeeding month, of the cereal exporting and
importing countries of Europe, the chief result of which was
the importing countries declared themselves ready to reserve an
import quota for wheat produced in Europe and to consider
similar action in the case of maize and barley, while deferring for
a time consideration of rye and oats. A committee was also set up
to consider the problem of disposing of the surplus from future
harvests. Later meetings of the Commission of Enquiry were oc
cupied largely with the discussion of a pact of economic non
aggression proposed by the Soviet Union, but the Eastern Euro-
pean countries have maintained their request for
treatment of their cereals,
In 1931,however,the whole problem was submerged in the
financial difficulties and particularly the controls of foreign ex-
changes necessitated by the severity of the crisis. Discussions con-
tinued both in the Economic Committee of the League and in
the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. A draft project
for an International Agricultural Credit Association was signed
by sixteen States in May 1931, but has not been brought into
existence. Various proposals for the alleviation of unemployment
and for the facilitating of long-term investments have been
mooted. Committees have considered the market situation of spe-
cial products such as hops, tobacco, etc. But the shadow of the
depression has been over all such proposals, financial provision
has been wanting, and international economic co-operation has
proved while national Governments have been faced
with economic insecurity within their own borders."
The hopes of the predominantly agricultural countries of
Eastern Europe for substantial benefits from projects of Eu-
ropean economic solidarity and international cooperation in916 EXPERIMENTATION
extending agricultural credit were thus unfulfilled. Cut off
from regular access to the ordinary sources of long term for-
eign credit, they found their adherence to the international
gold standard increasingly difficult. Yet there were few de-
fections from that standard among them before September
1931. In the main their exchanges were kept stable by reduc-
ing imports, foreign borrowings of a very special character,
and the use of central bank reserves.
In Table 71 the net changes in gold and foreign exchange
reserves of the six Eastern European agricultural countries
TABLE 71
Central Banks of Agricultural Eastern European Countries and of Austria,
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves, J'Tet Changes, 1929 —Mid-i93r (mil-
lions of Swiss francs)
1929 1930 FirstHalf of '93: to Mid-,93,
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign
CX- cx- cx- ex-
Goldchange TotalGold change TotalGold change TotalGold change Total
Poland +46 —109—63 —8o—66 —146 +3 37-34 212 243
Austria o—41 —41 +33+105+138 0—198—198+33 134—101
Hungary —34—13—47 —' I1 12 46 52—98 —8i—76 —157
Yugoslavia +4+37+41 +4—148 —144+42—35+7+50 —146—96
Roumania +29+209 +238 +3 155—152 +17+3+i8+7'+89
Bulgaria +2 6z 59 +2 13—11 +2 —11 9 +6—85 79
Greece +6—8i—75 —9+i —8 —'—36—37 —ii6 —120
SOURCE:Table 67
included in Table 67 and of Austria are set out separately.
The movement of reserves in each of the six predominantly
agricultural countries is a compound of three elements:(i)
an underlying weakness in the exchange leading to a loss in
total reserves; (2) a policy of strengthening gold reserves at
the expense of foreign exchange reserves in order to produce
a greater outward semblance of strength; (3) a stemming of
the tide of losses in reserve by some form of foreign borrow-
ing.
These three factors may be briefly illustrated from the ex-
perience of Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia, and Hungary.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 917
POLAND
During 1929theprices of Polish agricultural products on the
farm suffered rapid and disastrous decline, which was not
flected in Polish prices in general. The heavily indebted
cultural population was placed under the severest kind
pressure to meet obligations incurred at exceptionally high
interest rates. In order to do so it was forced to sacrifice
products at low prices and even to increase output. In the
spring of 1930along deferred economic agreement with Ger-.
many was signed, but the hoped for alleviation of the agricul-.
tural distress did not follow, for the agreement was never
ratified by Germany. The agricultural depression continued.
throughout the whole period and left its imprint upon the
foreign trade of the country. The pressure to increase output
in 1929isreflected in actually increased exports, while the de-
cline in agricultural purchasing power is reflected in reduced
imports. In 1928 when Poland was still freely importing capi-
tal a heavy adverse merchandise balance was possible without
serious danger to the gold standard. Even in that year, how-
ever, the Bank of Poland was losing foreign exchange reserves.
In 1929themerchandise import surplus was greatly reduced,
and in 1930 and the first half of 1931wasreplaced by a steadily
increasing export surplus. During these years exports were
relatively well maintained but imports continued to contract
very greatly, not only because of the reduced internal pur-
chasing power but also because capital import was no longer
being received in the form of goods; This change in the mer-
chandise balance of trade was not, however, large enough, in
the absence of substantial new borrowing, to provide for Po-
lish invisible debits without pressure on the exchange. Conse-
quently the Bank of Poland continued to lose reserves steadily.
In common with other countries of Eastern Europe, and
indeed of many other parts of the world, Poland was reluc-
tant to allow the extent of the reserve losses to be dramatized
to the public through spectacular losses of gold. She was sub-918 EXPERIMENTATION
ject, like other countries, to a psychological gold export
embargo and from the end of 1928, and even before, until
September '930 the Bank of Poland pursued a policy of pur-
chasing gold, thereby accentuating the loss of foreign ex-
change reserves. The latter declined from 527 million zloty
on December 31, 1928 to 418 million at the end of 1929 and
241 million on June 30, 1930. By September 20, 1930 only
176 million zloty remained and a change of policy became
necessary. A substantial amount of gold (142 million zloty)
was therefore sold and foreign exchange purchased, and the
discount rate of the Bank of Poland was raised from 6½ to
71/2 per cent and the lombard rate from 71/2 to 8½ per cent.
At the moment when these measures were taken Poland
was in serious danger of a flight of capital abroad and a flight
from the zloty at home. A substantial premium for dollar and
sterling currency over the check rate had already appeared,
but the action of the central bank and prospects of new for-
eign borrowing relieved the situation. In November the Pu-
sudskj dictatorship was confirmed in power by an 'election,'
and immediately after, negotiations for a new Kreuger Loan
were completed. The Polish match monopoly of the Swedish
Match Company was extended in return for a new loan of
$32.5 million. Though the first installment of this loan was
not remitted to Poland for six months, part of the proceeds
wete set aside to meet previously incurred foreign debts, and
the Polish exchange was strengthened. At the same time ne-
gotiations were pushed for a large French loan for the con-
struction of a railway from Upper Silesia to Gdynia. This
loan, however, was primarily of military and political impor-
tance. It was finally placed upon the market in May 1931, but
the proceeds being paid largely by the delivery of steel rails
it did not greatly help the exchange.
When the financial crisis in Europe became acute Poland
was in a relatively favorable position as a gold exchange stand-
ard country. Her merchandise balance of trade was by then
sufficiently favorable to provide for the payment of her fi-THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 919
nancialobligations abroad, though not to take care of a mod-
erate outward movement of private capital which was in prog-
ress. Consequently, the Bank of Poland had continued to lose
foreign exchange reserves in the first part of 1931, but just at
the critical period, May 1931, the proceeds of the Kreuger
Loan became available. When President Hoover proposed a
one year moratorium on international political debts in June
1930, the Polish balance of payments position was further
strengthened,74 and even more important, further access to
the French money market seemed assured.
ROU MANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA
The influence of foreign loans upon the movement of central
bank reserves is far more clearly written upon the face of the
figures in Table 71 in the case of Roumania and Yugoslavia
than in the case of Poland. Both countries were aided in meet-
ing their basically similar economic problems by the cir-
cumstance that their return to gold was still unfinished busi-
ness at the end of 1928. Both countries reached the beginning
of the depression with currencies that had for some time been
stabilized de facto only, and both received large stabilization
loans during the depression. Both were able also to attract
private capital from abroad for employment in their industry
and in internal development. In Yugoslavia the attraction of
private capital to industry was important in 1929 and the
stabilization loan in 1931, while in Roumania the stabilization
loan was important in i 929 and the attraction of capital for
internal development followed in 1931.
The Roumanian stabilization was the last successful opera-
tion of this kind in the long series characteristic of the post-
war restoration of the gold standard. The de jure stabilization
of the leu, which had been stabilized de facto since March
1927, was carried out in February 1929 with the aid of credits
to the Bank of Roumania amounting to $25 million extended
Poland was relieved of payments for plebiscite costs and relief debts (The
Economist, Reparation and War Debts Supplement, Jan. 23,1932, p.7).920 EXPERIMENTATION
by a consortium of icentral banks, including the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, and with the aid of a loan of
$101 million placed by private bankers for the Roumanian
governmentJ5 The strengthening of the foreign exchange re-
serves of the Bank of Roumania in 1929 was a direct conse-
quence of these fresh foreign resources. During that year the
Bank intervened in the market to make foreign exchange
available to the government to meet obligations abroad and
to prevent the leu from reaching gold export point.76 During
1930 Roumania continued to receive large foreign remit-
tances from the proceeds of the stabilization loans and part of
these were set aside in special government funds to meet for-
eign obligations. They therefore did not appear fully in the
balance sheet of the Bank of Roumania. At the same time de-
clining imports were moving the Roumanian merchandise
balance of trade toward an increasing export surplus. Never-
theless the underlying weakness of the leu may be read in the
loss of foreign exchange reserves by the Bank in 1930. As in
the case of Poland, a Roumanian psychological gold export
embargo continued in force and actual gold was not exported,
yet at the close of the year serious doubts were entertained
concerning the permanence of the Roumanian stabilization.
Early in 1931 these doubts were temporarily set at rest by the
placing of a loan in the French market by the Roumanian
Monopoly Institute. This loan, which was guaranteed by the
government and was partly for military purposes, checked
the loss of reserves by the Bank of Roumania, as shown in
Table 71.
In contrast to Roumania, Yugoslavia was able to attract
foreign capital in 1929 in the form of large French and Amer-
ican investment in her mines, and Swedish, Swiss, Hungarian,
75Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1929, p. ioi.
76 Bank of Roumania, Annual Report for 1929(Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Sept. 1930, p. 551). These operations are mentioned in this report in a passage
that has as its main purport the assertion that the forces oF supply and de-
mand were allowed to operate without any interference in the Roumanian
exchange market. The logic of this passage has escaped the writer.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 921
and Belgian investment in her industry. Combined with an
excellent harvest which produced a favorable merchandise
trade balance, this enabled the central bank to strengthen its
reserves in 1929. In 1930, however, the situation developed
along the lines already indicated in the case of Poland and
Roumania. The expectation of a de jure currency stabiliza-
tion, however, remained a factor psychologically favorable to
the dinar. On May 8,i this expectation was realized. The
de jure stabilization differed from the others which had pre-
ceded it in that it was carried out under French auspices with-
out British or American participation. A stabilization loan of
1,025 million French francs was placed by a continental bank-
ing syndicate led by the Union Parisienne,77 and the fall in
the reserves of the Yugoslav central bank was checked. In
addition, the Bank was able to give a semblance of additional
strength to the gold standard as a domestic institution in Yu-
goslavia by the now familiar operation of revaluing its gold
assets in dinars.
HUNGARY
The importance of access to long term credit in France in the
defense of the gold standard in Eastern Europe is illustrated
by the experience of Hungary, which did not have this ad-
vantage as fully as the other countries. During the entire two
and a half years from 1929 to the middle of theHungar-
ian central bank was losing reserves, but this loss was less in
1930 than in 1929 and the first half of 1931. The reasons were
stated in the 1930 Report of the National Bank of Hungary:
"Owing to a considerable improvement in the foreign trade
balance and a continued large scale offer of foreign short-term
credits, Hungary's international payments were more nearly in
balance than in previous years. This situation is reflected in the
gold and foreign exchange reserve of the National Bank, which
showed unusually slight fluctuations during the year."
The Economist, June 6, 1931, p.
78 Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1931, p. 268.922 EXPERIMENTATION
These favorable circumstances were reversed early in 1931.
Under the Hague Agreements of 1930 a new international
long term loan for Hungary had been promised to complete
the financial reconstruction of the country begun under the
auspices of the League of Nations with the flotation of the
International Loan of 1924. The condition of the central
money markets made this impossible, and negotiations for
placing abroad £5 million in treasury bills to meet immediate
budget needs could not be completed before Hungary be-
came involved in a major financial crisis.79 Following the
failure of the Credit Anstalt in Vienna, foreign credits were,
rapidly withdrawn from Hungary, and in July a temporary
closure of the banks and the stock exchange was forced. In
that month Hungary passed into a regime of foreign exchange
control.
With the exception of Hungary none of the agricultural
countries of Eastern Europe instituted legal measures of
foreign exchange control before September 1931.80Inspite of
a considerable amount of window dressing and the political
elements involved in the foreign loans that helped to support
the exchanges of Poland, Roumania, and Yugoslavia, the
Eastern European sector of the periphery of the international
gold standard was defended in general by orthodox means.
For various reasons the possibility of shifting their economic
burdens internationally and redistributing them internally
by a policy of moderate and controlled exchange depreciation
on the Australian model was not open to these countries. The
psychological prerequisites of such a policy were wholly ab-
sent. The budget problems of the various governments were
bound up with continued credits from sources that would
have regarded such a policy as unsound.' The
whole financial and economic background was one of a barely
completed struggle to return to normal and to escape the
evils of a fluctuating exchange. The effort of these countries
Thesebills were finally placed, chiefly in France in August 1931.
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toshift part of their burdens to their agricultural competitors
by preferential tariffs was unavailing. They were, on the
contrary, forced to bear somewhat more than their full share
of the real costs of the depression. The resulting economic
prostration undermined the basis of ordinary banking credits
extended to them, and the restriction of their imports severely
injured industries in other countries looking to them as
markets. These two international repercussions of Eastern
European troubles were concentrated in their fullest force
upon the pre-war center of their economic life, Vienna.
Austria
While the quality and safety of many advances made by
Vienna banks to Eastern European customers were rapidly
deteriorating, the Austrian economy was itself suffering se-
verely from the depression. A general stagnation of business,
in contrast to a predominantly agricultural crisis, was the
basic characteristic of the Austrian position, which is de-
scribed clearly in the Annual Report of the National Bank
of Austria for 1930 (Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1931,
p. 262)
"An artificially created state such as Austria, not yet securely
established along economic lines, could not fail to be seriously
affected by the crisis. The fact that certain consequences of the
crisis are less pronounced in Austria than elsewhere should de-
ceive no one. For example, it is true that the percentage increase
in unemployment during 1930 was less in Austria than in many
other countries such as England and Germany, but this was be-
cause the level of industrial employment in Austria had already
declined in preceding years, and therefore the number of un-
employed was at that time relatively greater. While economic re-
ports on the past year show, in a number of other countries, a
sharp decline in stock-exchange quotations and suspensions of
payment by great credit institutions, Austria has been spared
such experiences because the Vienna stock exchange had not yet
recovered from the collapse of 1924—25, and the Austrian banking
system had already undergone a sharp contraction between 1925924 EXPERIMENTATION
and 1929.Itis also easy to explain why business losses resulting
from a fall in the price of raw materials should have assumed
smaller proportions than elsewhere in a country like Austria,
where production of raw materials—except for lumber—is of
little importance and where business enterprises are unable for
lack of capital to maintain large stocks. In fact, the price decline
and the decrease in the volume of foreign trade have not been
altogether unfavorable to this country, which is dependent on
large imports of raw materials and in which a predominant place
is held by those industries which turn out finished products.
On the other hand, the price decline had an unfavorable effect on
certain Austrian exports, such as lumber and paper. Austrian
exports of finished products, however, exert a decisive influence
in the matter of values, and the decline in prices of these products
was by no means so great as in those of raw materials. Invisible
exports, however, which form an important element in the
balance of payments, showed a rather sharp decline."
During 1929 the high interest rates prevailing in the finan-
cial centers, and, after the New York Stock Exchange break,
the increasing decline in the opportunities for profitable em-
ployment in Austria, led to an outflow of short term foreign
funds. This was, however, not sufficient to alter the substan-
tial dependence of the Austrian banks on the remainder. To-
gether with the shutting down of the inflow of long term
foreign capital it weakened the Austrian exchange and led to
a decline in the foreign exchange reserves of the National
Bank. The most conspicuous feature of the decline in long
term capital import was the delay in placing a large govern-
ment loan that had been under negotiation since 1927 and
was to have been employed for railway development and
postal administration. These projects were, in anticipation,
partly financed by short term domestic credits obtained by
the government. From both a foreign exchange and a budget
point of view the flotation of this loan was vital for Austria
in 1930.Inthe spring of that year the last political obstacles
were removed by the Hague Agreements, and the first tranche
of the loan was floated in the international markets in July.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 925
The loan was for $6i million instead of a planned amount of
$102 million, and a second tranche was expected to complete
the government program. For the time being, however, the
first tranche was sufficient to enable the National Bank to add
to its reserves as shown in our table and to allow the govern-
ment to repay the short term debts incurred in anticipation
of it.
In 1931thewhole posture of Austrian, and indeed of Euro-
pean, affairs was radically altered. At the close of 1930 the ac-
counts of the Credit Anstalt showed a deficit of 140 million
schillings, and the directors appealed to the National Bank
and to the government for help. This was the culmination of
a situation that had long been maturing, and was closely
associated with the great political issue of Austro-German
Anschluss. The Credit Anstalt was primarily a holding com-
pany for the industrial undertakings of the Rothschild inter-
ests which had been built up before the war when the Austro-
Hungarian Empire was one customs union. The destruction
of this large free trade area after the war limited the sales
opportunities of these enterprises, but as long as inflation
prevailed they were able to maintain their profits. As early as
1927, however, the future of the Credit Anstalt had been un-
favorably discussed and in 1928 the Austrian government had
been warned that it would ultimately have to take over the
institution. With the deepening of the great depression, Aus-
tria brought pressure upon Germany to proceed with plans
for a Customs Union as an essential step to save the Credit
Anstalt, and the premature announcement of these plans pre-
ceded by only a few months the actual outbreak of the crisis.
A program for the reorganization of the Credit Anstalt
was announced simultaneously with the public disclosure
that it was in difficulties. This did not preserve public confi-
dence, however, or prevent a panic. Runs started on the
Credit Anstalt which was forced to discount heavily with the
National Bank. Foreigners lost faith in the safety of their
funds in Austria and a flight of capital began. Within the926 EXPERIMENTATION
next few months the National Bank lost most of its large
•stock of foreign exchange. In Austria this crisis led to the
negotiation of standstill agreements with foreign creditors,
and in October, to the inauguration of foreign exchange con-
trol. In Europe it was the signal for a financial crisis which
finally broke up the central nucleus of the international gold
standard and opened the period of Disintegration. In this
crisis the action of the center countries was not united, and
their attempts at cooperation in meeting it were greatly com-
plicated by the Anschluss proposal. This proposal, as well as
the economic difficulties of the Eastern European agricultural
countries and the immediate repercussions of the Credit
Anstalt failure were all intimately related to the fate of the
international gold standard in Germany.CHAPTER 25
The Transformation of the Gold Standard in Germany
The adherence of Germany to the international gold standard
had been consolidated between 1924 and 1928 in a way that
gave an outward appearance of strength, solidity, and nor-
mality to the German currency. Yet the foundations on whiich
the German gold standard system rested were not strong,
solid, or 'normal.' They were, indeed, the result of a very
special application of the post-war principles of stabilization
which concealed, rather than repaired, essential weaknesses.'
Beginning in 1929 these foundations were so undermined
that by July 1931thewhole structure had to be shored up
by the scaffolding of exchange control.
The Acid Test of the Stabilization Principle of attracting
Foreign Capital as applied to Germany
When the creditor powers and Germany agreed at Geneva
in September 1928 to seek a 'final' settlement of reparation.
the German budget was being met with difficulty. German
business, however, was enjoying a prosperity that seemed so
firmly based that the operation of the 'prosperity index'
under the Dawes Plan threatened to add to the approaching
maximum annuity to be paid under that Plan. This seemed
likely to intensify the budget problem and possibly to cause
a breakdown in transfers, Hence there was a community of
interest on the part of government and business in favor of
a definite reparation settlement which reinforced the desire
of all Germans to see the end of foreign financial and eco-
nomic controls in Germany and an early evacuation of the
1Cf.Ch. i6, passim, and Ch. 21,AnUnsolved Reparation Problem.
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Rhineland. Business was eager to avoid the difficulties that
might accompany a reparation crisis and the government was
anxious for relief in its budget problem. Provided that the
permanent schedule of payments seemed within Germany's
capacity to pay, as seen from the German point of view,
Germany was on the whole willing to reach a final settlement,
even at the cost of the sacrifice of transfer protection. By the
time the Young Plan came before the Reichstag for accept-
ance the whole situation had changed and Germany had
entered into that period of chronic emergency which was
the chief characteristic of the last months of Experimentation.
Early in 1929 it began to be apparent that the prosperity
of German business during 1927—28 had been largely derived
from four sources which were not permanent, but inherently
temporary: orders for reparation in kind; orders for technical
reconstruction; Russian orders financed by government guar-
anteed credit; and orders arising from a government pro-
moted housing boom. Reparation payments in kind were
declining even under the Dawes Plan, and in the discussions
of the New Plan it was proposed first to reduce them still
further and then to eliminate them completely. The govern-
ment credit upon which Russian orders were based could
not be extended indefinitely, and the housing boom was ap-
proaching its end. Finally it was becoming clear that the
process of rationalization had been carried too far. It had in-
creased social costs by creating technological unemployment.
It had in some cases increased costs of production by em-
ploying expensive foreign capital and forming combines of
unwieldy size, and it had, in general, created productive
capacity beyond the limits of available markets. This situa-
tion added to the severity of the general forces of cyclical
depression in Germany. The resulting restriction in indus-
trial activity turned the attention of German industry more
and more to production for export.
The search for export markets was intensified by the
realization that at last there was a probability that reparationTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 929
transferswould have to be made in goods. When in 1929
German long term foreign borrowing fell to one-fifth of the
1928 volume, the government and the business community
began to look favorably on policies designed to promote
exports and check imports. Force was put behind these
policies when real reparation transfers began to exert a de—
flationary effect upon the whole German economy, and when
rigorously applied, this involved a reduction in the German
standard of living.2
The development of a merchandise export surplus by Ger-
many was favored by a decline in domestic demand for in-
dustrial products, and also by the reduced cost of imports
due to the world decline in raw material prices. More than
this, however, was required to provide for the transfer
reparation without further large foreign borrowings. In the
words of Dr. Bruening,3 whose government had to face the
problem in 1930, what was required was a thoroughgoing
reorganization of German industry to serve more largely the
export market, and an attempt on the part of Germany to
become self-sufficient in agriculture, except for fodder. To
reduce imports without injuring production for export meant
the cutting down of agricultural imports, and this necessity
intensified the whole movement for extreme agricultural pro-
tection in Germany. This movement had its roots in the arci-
ficial forcing of agricultural output during the war, and had
already been stimulated by the world decline in agricultural
prices. The appearance of a real reparation transfer problem,
therefore, had as byproducts an intensification of German
competition for export markets for industrial products at a
time of declining world trade, and a formidable addition to
the difficulties of agricultural producers the world over, and
of the Eastern European agricultural countries in particular.
As long as the gap in the balance of payments left by dc-
2Cf.Ch. i6, The Four Major Principles of Post-War Stabilization as applied
to Germany, especially the quotation there given from J. W. Angell.
In the course of his Lowell Institute Lectures in Boston in the winter of 1937.930 EXPERIMENTATION
dining capital imports was not completely filled by an excess
of merchandise exports, continued reparation payments were
bound to exercise a profoundly deflationary effect upon Ger-
many. This was of a character several times referred to in
these studies. Reparation payments, from a balance of pay-
ments point of view, were imports. These imports had to be
paid for, not by German banks as principals, but by their cus-
tomers. As stated in Chapter 4, payment for such imports
reduces bank deposits. Since gold exports and the reduction
of bank holdings of foreign exchange do not build up bank
deposits as do exports made by customers of banks, the re-
duction in deposits resulting from reparation payments was
bound to be fixed in the German banking system as long as
the currency had to be defended by the use of bank reserves.
This was a source of direct deflationary pressure quite apart
from the indirect one arising from the effect of dwindling
reserves upon banking policy. The full impact of these serious
economic problems was not felt in Germany all at once, but
the gravity of the situation became gradually clear during the
discussion of the Young Plan by the experts, and the political
negotiations that followed its publication. At the same time
two other serious weaknesses in the German position were
being revealed.
The first was the danger inherent in the dependence of
the German banks upon short term foreign capital, since
their own capital was inadequate. Immediately after the in-
flation it had been scarcely more than the value of their
buildings, and additions since that time had not been suf-
ficient to ensure real independence. This situation gave rise
to a dilemma. Additions to the volume of capital imports
were needed for a long time to come to develop the German
economy to the point where reparation transfers in goods
could finally be made without serious danger to its stability,
but reductions in the existing amount of imported capital,
as German capital was formed to take its place, were neces-
sary to preserve the solvency of the German banking systemTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 931
againstexternal At the end of 1928 45 per cent of
German bank deposits were foreign deposits.4 Against these
short term foreign liabilities the German banks had acquired
long term assets in the form of advances to, and investment
in, German enterprise, including many of the combines
created during the rationalization period. Short term foreign
credits had been mediated to the whole German economy by
an abuse of the fundamental banking principle of borrowing
short and lending long.5 In addition, the German banks had
outstanding large lines of acceptance credit obtained chiefly
in London, which had been employed in part for long term
purposes in Germany.6 They had, to a dangerous extent, be-
come intermediaries between short term foreign lenders and
long term domestic borrowers. The failure to remedy this
situation in 1927 by extensive refunding of short term credits
was one of the most serious post-war financial mistakes. When
a moment of deadlock was reached in the negotiation of the
Young Plan in the spring of 1929, the German banks were
suddenly faced with a demand for payment of these short
term foreign obligations, but could not readily call in their
long term German assets. They therefore attempted to bor-
row from the Reichsbank in order to obtain the foreign ex-
change needed to meet the withdrawal of foreign deposits.
This process is clearly described by The Economist (Banking
Supplement, Oct. 12, 1929, p. i6)
"The most important effect of [the sudden withdrawal of foreign
funds from Germany in April 1929] was to bring about a reduc-
tion of the total of 'Creditors' or deposits, which had risen con-
tinuously—apart from a slight setback in June 1928, for nearly
two years. This reduction, amounting during April to nearly 400
millions,was almost entirely due to foreign withdrawals. Instead
of meeting these out of their first line reserves of foreign cur-
rencies entered under the item 'Balances with Banks,' the banks
4 Madden and Nadler, op. cit.. p. S96.
Cf. Ch. i6, The Principle of Gold Economy.
6cf. Ch.The General Decline in the Quality of Bills.932 EXPERIMENTATION
rediscounted nearly 300 millions of bills and slightly reduced ad-
vances, thus maintaining their foreign balances almost intact.
This of course, tended to increase the pressure on the exchange,
since the Reichsbank was called on for most of the necessary
conversions, and had foreign withdrawals become much more
serious the banks would doubtless have been obliged to utilize
their own reserves to a much greater extent."
The bulk of the German assets of German banks, under the
head of 'debtors,' was not reduced at all in April 1929. It
was apparent that, quite apart from the effect upon the for-
eign exchanges and the gold standard, further wholesale
withdrawals of foreign deposits would first cut down the for-
eign exchange reserves of the banks and then force a testing
of the liquidity of their assets included under 'advances' and
'debtors.' Such an eventuality was a threat to the solvency
of the whole German banking system. As the economic po-
sition in Germany and in the world deteriorated further this
threat became greater. At the end of 1929 foreign deposits
were only 40 per cent of total German deposits and at the
end of 1930 they were only 35 per cent.7
The second weakness in the German position revealed at
this time was fiscal and political. Quite early in the depression
it became crystal clear that vitally necessary foreign funds
could not be retained unless Germany assumed the economic
burdens of a real reparation transfer. Under the circum-
stances she could not do this without aggravating her fiscal
difficulties and intensifying internal political troubles grow-
ing out of long continued pressure on the German standard
of life.
As early as the end of 1928 the budgets of the Reich and
the States were in an unsatisfactory position and at the close
of 1929 a genuine budget crisis had developed. The Reich
government was burdened with increases in salaries granted
to civil servants and with heavy costs for social insurance
benefits that had been among the fruits of the prosperity of
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1926—28.At the same time payments to assist agriculture and.
thecosts of the housing scheme were increasing. The Young
Plan as finally presented to the Reichstag for adoption offered
temporary budget relief by reducing the first year annuity
and offering a large foreign loan, but this was by no means a
complete substitute for urgently needed fiscal reforms. The
Plan solved the immediate reparation transfer problem, and
its adoption seemed likely to ward off the danger of further
large withdrawals of foreign funds and to assure the mainte-
nance of vitally necessary German credit abroad. On the
other hand it imposed for many years economic burdens
which German expert opinion had, by that time, come to
regard unanimously as beyond Germany's capacity to bear,
and which were opposed with violence by the rising voice
the radical parties in Germany. Finally, the freeing of Ger-
man soil from foreign occupation guaranteed under the
Young Plan was a realization of hopes especially dear to the
heart of the aged President von Hindenburg.
Out of these elements the acceptance of the Young Plan by
the German Reichstag was The advantages of
the Plan as it left the hands of the Experts may, following
Wheeler-Bennett and Latimer, be formulated as follows:
a) For the Creditors
i)It settled the problem.
2)It removed çhe whole process of payment and transfer
from the political sphere, making Germany alone responsible
for payment in foreign currencies rather than in reichsmarks.
3)It put the annuities in such a form that they could be com-
mercialized.
b) For Germany
1)It gave definite knowledge of the total due.
2)It reduced the next annuity million.
3)It eliminated the transport tax.
4)It eliminated the prosperity index which would have
raised the Dawes annuity £10 million.
Itmade two-thirds of the annuity subject to postponement
6)It promised help from the B.I.S. in financing German ex-934 EXPERIMENTATION
ports and in making the payments during the last years of the
Plan.
7)It ended the Reparation Commission and other forms of
control.
8)It assumed that there would be no further costs of occupa-
tion.8
The last assumption was borne out by the signing at the
First Hague Conference of an evacuation agreement, the last
agreement signed on behalf of Germany by Herr Stresemann.
This conference, however, as a result of a long struggle over
the British percentages in the total annuities and in the un-
conditional part of the annuities, made certain changes in
the Plan which added to the German payments. At the Second
Hague Conference in January 1930 the Plan, as amended,
was incorporated in a series of agreements for ratification by
the Powers, and these agreements contained stipulations and
assurances concerning German domestic legislation designed
to take the place of some elements in the foreign control of
German affairs given up in the Plan.
Ratification was obtained from the Reichstag by the Muel-
ler government against intense opposition from all the Na-
tionalist parties and against the general sentiment of business,
whose representative in the negotiation of the Plan, Herr
Vogler, had, indeed, refused to sign it. Dr. Schacht, though
he signed the Plan, issued a manifesto against it as modified
at The Hague, and against the government for failing to
undertake the necessary fiscal reforms to ensure that all its
benefits would not be swallowed up in the deficit. On the
latter issue he resigned his office as President of the Reichs-
bank. A favorable vote was finally secured in the Reichstag
on the specific moral pledge by the President of the Reich
that fiscal reforms would be immediately undertaken, in par-
ticular the reform of unemployment insurance, while on the
other hand the Parties agreed to provide liberally for a
8 W.Wheeler-Bennett and Hugh Latimer, Information on the Repara-
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programof assistance to the sorely tried agricultural interests
of eastern Germany, (the Osthilfe). It is doubtful whether a
single member of the Reichstag who voted for ratification
believed the Plan could be fulfilled. Great pressure was
brought to bear on the President to withhold his approval,
but on March 13thePlan became law by his signature.
With adoption of the Young Plan a period of chronic
emergency began in Germany during which the complex
elements in the situation described above finally combined.
in such a way as to force the imposition of exchange
trols and the negotiation of standstill agreements with
eign creditors. This transformation in the gold standard in
Germany may be traced by a brief examination of the forces
playing upon the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the
Reichsbank. This examination will serve also to bind to-
gether those parts of our analysis of the impact of world
pression on the whole international gold standard system in
which the relationship of Germany to other gold standard
countries has been touched upon.
The Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves of the
bank during the Negotiation and Adoption of the
Young Plan, September 1928 to March 1930
During the three months immediately following the decision
to seek a final reparation settlement, capital was flowing into
Germany and the Reichsbank was able to strengthen its re-
serves. It will be recalled that at this time, instead of strength-
ening its foreign exchange reserves, the Reichsbank allowed
gold to flow in, chiefly from Great Britain,9 on an orthodox
private arbitrage basis and that, as a consequence, the next
unfavorable conjuncture in the international position of
Germany was bound to be reflected in a reduction of Reichs-
bank gold reserves.'° Such a conjuncture began to develop
with the decline of American lending to Germany late in
Cf. Ch. ig, Bank Rate and the Defense of Sterling.
10Cf.Ch. i6, The Modification of the Principle of Gold Economy, 1928.936 EXPERIMENTATION
1928 and early in 1929, and the strong attraction even of
German domestic funds to New York for speculative em-
ployment there. It culminated in a mass withdrawal of for-
eign credits when a schedule of payments was presented to
Germany by the Committee of Experts and was rejected by
Dr. Schacht. These withdrawals included a very large recall
of French funds.11 The disclosure of the dangers to which
the German banking system was exposed by such withdrawals
was an effective form of pressure upon Germany to accept
the Young Plan. There are many indications that it was so
regarded in Germany. For example, the following statement
in the Reichsbank's Annual Report for 1929 is open to no
other interpretation:
"Inasmuch as Germany, as a result of her own lack of capital and
her heavy Reparation burdens, is dependent on the assistance of
foreign capital, grave difficulties arose when foreign aid ceased to
be available and foreign funds were withdrawn—in part deliber-
ately—or were no longer sent to Gennany for investment." 12
Thisuse of French balances as a weapon in the general
European struggle over the surplus of reparation above the
sums earmarked [or the United States attained its immediate
ends. It was effective in influencing Dr. Schacht to recom-
mend to the German government acceptance of the original
Young Plan, but from a longer run point of view it marked
the first stage in the loss of French international financial
power.
As a result of the flight of capital Germany experienced a
heavy drain of gold to New York, which, by arrangements
already described, was utilized to effect economically a simul-
taneous strengthening of the gold reserves of the Bank of
France and the central banks of other creditor powers. As
11TheEconomist, Banking Supplement, Oct. 12,1929, p.15,stated:"The
apparent deadlock reached by the conference of experts in Paris, and the
action of foreign banks (mainly French and Belgian) in making large with-
drawals of funds, brought about an exchange crisis [in Germany]."
12FederalReserve Bulletin, May 1930, p. 298 (our italics).THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 937
shown in Chart 56, the losses in Reichsbank reserves at this
time were almost wholly in gold.
Faced with a sudden demand for accommodation from the
commercial banks for the purchase of gold for export, the
Reichsbank raised its discount rate from 61/2to71/2 per cent
on April 25, 1929,butin order to make this rate effective it
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wasobliged to return to the policy of credit rationing which
it had used from April 1924 to December 1925. Had the
situation persisted, this policy would have forced the banks
either to bring foreign exchange to the Reichsbank or to
utilize their own foreign exchange reserves to effect remit-
tance abroad. With the final signature of the Young Plan
on June 7, 1929, however, credit rationing was no longer
necessary. A return flow of short term capital temporarily
solved both the foreign exchange and domestic credit prob-
lems. It continued during the last six months of 1929, but
was not paralleled by fresh imports of long term capital.
From June to December 1929 new long term issues placed
abroad amounted to less than 50 million reichsmarks. During
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the first four months of 1930 Germany was able to borrow
abroad on long term to the extent of 348 million reichsmarks,
the equivalent of her entire long term capital import of
1929, but there was no genuine revival of the foreign market
for German loans. In the spring of 1930, moreover, Germany
did not further increase her short term foreign indebtedness,
though she was able to retain the new short term funds at-
tracted in the last half of 1929.13 She could do so, however,
only at the cost of maintaining high interest rates in Ger-
many, as is brought out in the Annual Report of the Reichs-
bank for 1930 (Federal Reserve Bulletin, Aug. 1931,p. 452):
"The position of the Reichsbank improved considerably [in the
spring of 1930] so that it was able to follow the discount rate re-
ductions of the more important central banks, and gradually re-
duce the difference between the rates abroad and its own discount
rate. The bank, however, was obliged to proceed in this matter
with great caution because of the large volume of foreign short
term indebtedness, and was unwilling to risk the danger of an
excessive outflow of foreign funds by too great or too rapid dis-
count rate reductions".
This revived, though reduced, capital import coincided with
the growth of a substantial favorable balance of merchandise
trade as a result of the economic forces already described.14
18 Final Report of the Agent General for Reparation Payments (ibid., Nov.
1930, pp. 713—4).
14 German merchandise imports and exports (millions of reichsmarks) from
January 1929 to March were (ibid., p. 732):
1929 IMPORTS EXPORTS NET
Jan. 1,317 1,101 —216
Feb. 1,015 97! —44
March 1,023 982 —41
April 1,254 1,227 —27
May 1,131 1,172 +41
June 1,077 1,077 0
July 1,226 1,099 —127
Aug. 1,073 i,x8g +ii6
Sept. 1,038 1,200 +162
Oct. 1,107 1,247 +140
Nov. 1,161 1,154 —7
Dec. 1,020 1,063 +43
!930
Jan. 1,305 1,092 —213
Feb. 982 1,026 +44
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Consequently during the final struggle over the ratification
of the Young Plan in Germany the Reichsbank was able to
strengthen its reserves. On this occasion, the Spartan gold
standard principles enunciated by Dr. Schacht in 1926 were
not strictly adhered to. The foreign exchange reserves were
first built up in May 1929 while gold was still being lost
(Chart 56). Immediately after the signing of the plan in
June, however, Germany reappeared as a purchaser of gold in
London, was even able to draw gold from Argentina, and
continued to be a moderate buyer in London for the rest
of 1929. At the end of the year total reserves were ig8 million
reichsmarks less than at the end of 1928, but the foreign
exchange reserves were 249 million reichsmarks greater. The
change in the composition of the reserve was partly due to
the Reichsbank's wish, as indicated in its 1929 Report,
to force an increase in the discount rate in London by
cising its full power to take gold, and partly to its wish to
avoid shocks to confidence that might arise in the future
the sudden losses in the earlier part of the year were repeated.
The latter motive may be inferred from the changes in the
composition of the reserve during the next sixteen months
(Chart 56). The repercussions on the Reichsbank's position
and policy of the struggle over the Young Plan explain why,
in contrast to central banks of other debtor countries which,
in 1929, were giving up foreign exchange in preference to
gold, the Reichsbank lost gold and gained foreign exchange
during that year (Table 67). In February after the
successful conclusion of the Second Hague Conference, the
Reichsbank's gold purchases became substantial, and by the
end of March the losses in total reserve of the spring of 1929
were fully made up.
The Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Reichs-
bank during the Period of Chronic Emergency,
March1980 tO May 1931
The ratification of the Young Plan by the Reichstag was
followedby the overthrow of the Mueller government on940 EXPERIMENTATION
March 27, 1930,ostensiblyon the issue of postponing a solu-
tion of the unemployment insurance problem. A new govern-
ment of the center was formed under Dr. Bruening. It was
faced on taking office with an accumulated deficit of 1,284
million reichsmarks and an expected further deficit of 700
millionfor i930—3 i, andplunged immediately into a struggle
over financial reform. Early in April the new government
obtained Reichstag approval for measures of increased taxa-
tion and for an agricultural program designed to increase the
price of rye by the imposition of duties on fodder barley and
the prohibition of the import of corn. These measures bore
the marks of political compromise. The new taxes were not
sufficient to prevent the early threat of a renewed budget
deficit, and the agricultural program, while helping the rye
growers of eastern Germany, complicated the problems of the
farmers raising swine for export. During the next few months
the economic situation grew steadily worse. The government
devoted itself to the working out of an elaborate agricultural
program in the East, the promotion of the export trade, and
the solution of the budget problem by the reform of un-
employment insurance, reduction of government salaries, and
new taxes. These measures encountered violent opposition,
and on July i8 Dr. Bruening dissolved the Reichstag. This
he was able to do because foreign capital was once more
being withdrawn and the banks were consequently in a posi-
tion to help the government by taking up treasury bills. A
few days later he put his entire financial program into effect
by the promulgation of one all embracing decree, providing
for new taxation, reduction in government salaries, a scheme
for agricultural relief in the East, a reform of unemployment
and health insurance, and an extension of the powers of
government to deal with the abuses of cartel agreements.
This decree was put into effect subject to its ratification by
the new Reichstag to be elected in September.
During this period of acute political and economic diffi-
culty a steady and uninterrupted decline in share prices be-THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 94L
gan on the Berlin Bourse.'5 Its profound effect upon the
liquidity of the German banks is described in the Banking
Supplement of The Economist for May 1931:
"The extent of the losses which the German banks suffered in
1930cannot,of course, be gauged from their balance sheets, but
the very form in which their accounts are presented is evidence
that the chief part is played by the depreciation of securities, for
the big banks have with one accord introduced a new item: writ-
ing down of securities. Profits were appropriated for this purpose
to the extent of 21.3millionmarks by the Deutsche-Disconto
Bank, io millions by the Danatbank, 6 millions by the Dresdner
Bank, and 4.6 millions by the Commerzbank: It is unlikely that
these represent the full extent of the losses, for the banks must
have suffered far heavier losses through their close connection
with the Stock Exchange. They had to increase their security
holdings during 1930,owingto the necessity of making purchases
in order to support the market, for the German banks are so
closely connected with many industrial undertakings that they
cannot be indifferent to the movement of their shares. Besides,
apart from the less tangible effects of a fall in Stock Exchange
prices, many of their loans are secured against shares so that a
depreciation in share values may involve them in losses on their
debts."
If the technical position is considered by itself, the moment
had clearlyarrivedini 930 foreffectivemeasuresto
strengthen the German banking system, but such measures
would have raised the cry of inflation and prevented the
deflationary policies necessary to get the Young Loan dis-
tributed and the Rhineland evacuated.'6
While the internal Situation ifl Germany was developing
in this way, the provisions of the Young Plan were being put
into effect. The Bank for International Settlements was
organized and on May ia trust agreement for the adminis-
tration of the new reparation arrangements was signed by
Cf. New York Stock Exchange Bulletin, June 1935, p.i, chart showing
International Common Stock Prices, 1928—35.
16 These statements are based on interviews with German authorities.942 EXPERIMENTATION
the Bank and the creditor governments. On that day the
B.I.S. took over the funds of the Agent General for Repara-
tion Payments and the Reparation Office in Berlin was closed.
Two days later the ABC Reparation Bonds issued under
the Dawes Plan were burned. On May 17, 1930, also, Ger-
many passed for the first time legally onto the gold exchange
standard. The provisions of Article 3' of the Bank Law
obligating the Reichsbank to redeem its notes in gold or
foreign exchange were put into effect in accordance with a
written pledge given to Owen D. Young, Chairman of the
Committee of Experts by Dr. Schacht in a letter dated June
6, 1929.17Theelaborate system of foreign supervision over
the Reichsbank designed to enforce those provisions of the
Dawes Plan which bound the Reich to the gold standard18
were abolished. The Reich, however, did not regain full
sovereignty in this all important respect, for it still remained
bound to retain the gold standard at the existing parity.
Under the Second Hague Agreement of January 20, 1930
the sections of the German Coinage Act of 1924 and of the
Reichsbank Law of 1924 that put Germany on the gold
standard were to remain unchanged except with the consent
of the Bank for International Settlements, or failing that, by
action of the Arbitral Tribunal established by the Young
Plan.19 Various other sections of the Bank Law ivere fixed
or amended by these Agreements, in particular Article 25
which limited direct advances by the Reichsbank to the
Reich to 100 million reichsmarks and provided that the
Reich must be out of debt to the Reichsbank on July 15of
each year, and also limited the direct advances of the Reichs-
17 Report of the Committee of Experts on Cmd. p.50.
18Cf. Ch. 12, The Place of the Dawes Plan in Gold Standard History.
19 Final Act of the Hague Conference and Agreement with Germany, Annex V
and Va; Agreements concluded at the Hague Conference, January 1930,
Cmd. 3484, pp. 43—4. This Agreement bound the Reich not to change Artides
22 and 3' of the Bank Law and Article 5 of the Coinage Law of 1924. These
Articles may be referred to in Reparation Commission, Official Documents,
XIV, i88, 191, 209.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 943
bank to the Reichspost and the Reich railways to 200
reichsmarks in all. The government continued to find itseli
severely hampered in the conduct of its emergency financial
measures by these limitations. On June io agreement
reached on the issue of the international loan contemplated
under the Plan, and on June 12 the Young Loan was placedi
on the international markets. On June 30 the Rhineland
evacuated.
DuringthesemonthstheReichsbank continuedto
strengthen its gold reserves chiefly by private arbitrage opera-
tions which brought gold from London. The reichsmark
was basically upheld by the continued growth of the com-
modity export and was further strengthened by the
successful flotation of the Young Loan itself. Of the proceeds
of this loan, amounting in all to $302 million, $ioo million
were paid to the German government for use in Germany.
The balance was paid over to the various creditor govern-
ments, affording real support for the mark by reducing the
transfer burden, and bringing budget relief. On the eve of
a definitive solution of the reparation problem by the force
majeure of economic and political events which were to sweep
aside all the refined calculations of experts and
alike, the first and only step in the commercialization of
reparation was taken, and as a consequence in June 1930 the
foreign exchange reserves of the Reichsbank were built up
and its total reserves stood at the highest point reached since
the stabilization of 1924.
The position of the however, was strong only
in appearance. Germany was facing continuing difficulties in
retaining short term foreign capital. The Reichsbank, fully
aware of this, was reluctant to follow the downward course
20Germanmerchandise imports and exports(millions of reichsmarks)for
were(Schmidt, cit., p.111).:
1929 1930 1931
Imports 13,676 10,617 6,955
Exports 13,632 12,175 9,733
Net —44 +1,558 +2,778944 EXPERIMENTATION
of rates elsewhere, as is shown in Chart 57 and Table 72 in
which changes in its rate are compared with those in the
Bank of England rate. In view of the stagnant condition of
German business, it could not maintain rates high enough
to exert a strong pull over foreign funds without losing con-
tact with its own market. On the day of the burning of the
TABLE 72
Reichsbank and Bank of England
Changes in Discount Rates, 1929-1931
REICHSBANK BANK OF ENGLAND
1929 1929
Jan.12 7to64 Feb. 7 44 to54
April 25 64 "74 Sept. 26 54 "64
Nov. 2 74"7 Oct. 31 64 "6
Nov. 2! 6"54




54 Feb. 6 5"44
March 25 54 "5 March 4 44 "4
May 20 5"44 March 20 4"34




June 13 5"7 July 23 24 "34
July 15 7"10 July 30 34 "44




SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board, Annual Reports; Statistical Abstract of U.K.,
1932,p.213
ABC bonds the Reichsbank rate reached 41/2 per cent and
on June 20 it was reduced to 4 per cent. A differential of i
per cent as compared to England at this level was not enough
to attract foreign funds, or even to retain them in the face
of lack of demand in Germany and nervousness induced by
the critical struggles over the Bruening financial reforms. In
July German banks began to pay back foreign advances for
which they had .no use. There were withdrawals of foreignTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 945
funds and some flight of capital. The Reichsbank hadtc
come to the support of the exchange and suffered substantia•
losses in foreign exchange reserves. The psychological ad-
vantages of the gold exchange standard at this juncture clearly
outweighed those of the gold bullion standard. In August,
however, the reserves of the Reichsbankwere again replen-
ished. It is probable that the receipt of the proceeds a













German Match Monopoly to the Swedish Match Company,
was of vital importance at this time.21
The unexpected and large electoral gains of the Naziparty
in the September Reichstag elections profoundly shookthe
thoroughly unstable financial balanceupon which the Ger-
man gold standard then rested. It was the signal for a second
mass withdrawal of foreign credits from Germany, once again
predominantly French. There was also general foreign selling
of German securities and a flight of German capital, butthe
foreign acceptance lines of German banks, whichwere largely
British, were not reduced in 1930.22 The crisis of September
had secondary consequences also, for notice of withdrawal
of a large amount of three month foreign creditswas given.
21 The Match Monopoly Agreementwas ratified by the Reichstag in January
1930, but was subject to the putting into effect of the Young Plan. Thepro.
ceeds consequently did not reach Germany until thesummer of 1930. The
Economist, Feb. i, 1930, p. 278.
22 Madden and Nadler, op. cit.,p.946 EXPERIMENTATION
The first impact of the crisis was met by both domestic and
foreign measures. The Bruening government was able suc-
cessfully to float an internal loan, and elaborated further its
internal economic program which now included a direct
effort to reduce wages and the cost of living somewhat after
the manner of the Australian middle of the road policy. The
far more elaborate nature of German economic life, however,
made the total program infinitely more complex. Agricul-
tural protection was being pushed to still further extremes,
well illustrated by the fact that in November 1930theGer-
man duty on wheat was twice the world price, and the gov-
ernment was assuming great financial burdens under the
Osthilfe program and for work creation projects. Domestic
reforms, however drastic, could not meet the immediate for-
eign exchange crisis and the Bruening government arranged
and obtained Reichstag approval for a $125milliontwo year
foreign credit through Lee Higginson and Company.
The immediate crisis ended when the government received
the support of the new Reichstag at its first meeting in Octo-
ber and adjourned that body until December 3. Fresh with-
drawals of foreign credits ceased, and new credits were
offered, especially from Switzerland.23 Early in December
the government again obtained Reichstag approval but only
by the narrow margin of 38 votes. In January 1931the
secondary effects of the September crisis were felt, foreign
support had again to be sought, and in February a second
Lee Higginson credit was obtained. The Reichsbank was able
gradually to increase its reserve until June, but this was
chiefly because of the import of gold from Russia shipped to
Germany as a commodity in payment of Russian debts. Be-
tween January and July 247 million reichsmarks ($58 mil-
lion) of Russian gold were received. Meanwhile, the Bruen-
ing government put the next step of its economic program,
including price and wage reduction measures, into effect by
23 E. L. Dulles, The Bank for International Settlements at Work (Macmillan,
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decree. Both internally and internationally German affairs
were passing from a state of chronic emergency to one of
acute crisis. With the approach of this new crisis, the whole
gold standard problem was once more complicated by the
revival of political economics.
Revival of Political Economics
The international cooperation in support of the reichsmark
at the time of the September 1930crisisreally inaugurated
a new period in German currency history, both because of
its nature and the circumstances under which it was carried
out. The crisis offered to the Bank for International Settle-
ments its first opportunity to help weather a foreign exchange
crisis. The Bank made a direct contribution by increasing
to the limit of its ability the investment of its own funds in
Germany, but this could not, because of their special nature,
be a substantial amount.24 The Bank also contributed in-
directly by encouraging the negotiation of the first Lee Hig-
ginson credit in which it could not participate directly
because its statutes prohibited loans to governments. Gen-
eral international participation in this credit was invited, but
only the United States, Sweden, and the Netherlands par-
ticipated. Even the urgency of the need could not force this
credit through the embargo placed on new foreign lending
in London in defense of the pound. Switzerland did not
participate on account of a Rhine port dispute with Germany
and France did not participate "for political reasons." 25 The
elections of September disclosed the strength of the opposi-
tion in Germany to the whole idea of further reparation
payments, and were followed by declarations of many kinds
against the Young Plan, including a series of strongly adverse
speeches by Dr. Schacht. All the political emotions that had
complicated the German exchange problems of 1920—23 were
once more aroused. In Germany it was generally accepted
24 Cf. ibid., p. 112, for the details bearing on this point.
25 Ibid., p. "s, note.948 EXPERIMENTATION
that the Young Plan was doomed while it is doubtful whether
a single French statesman, except perhaps Briand, shared
this conviction. The Governor of,the Bank of England and
the British Treasury as well as the chief political figures in
Great Britain greatly underestimated the depth of the Ger-
man economic crisis. The struggle between political conflict
and economic cooperation was fully revived. The agencies
for economic cooperation were more elaborate and tecimi-
cally more efficient, but the note of political conflict was,
under the surface, as bitter as in the early 'twenties. The
withdrawals of foreign funds in January 1931 appeared to
German eyes as a French effort to neutralize the good effects
of the first Lee Higginson credit, just as the withdrawals of
April 1929 had been regarded as pressure to enforce accept-
ance of the Young Plan. Suggestions from Germany for a
moratorium under the Young Plan appeared to French eyes
as merely another German attempt to avoid payment of just
obligations but recently reduced by further 'French conces-
sions. These suggestions, put forward early in i 931,werenot
pressed until some months later, since, for technical reasons,
a moratorium would not have brought immediate relief to
the German budget, or immediate support to the reichs-
mark. This made it possible in February 1931toarrange the
second Lee Higginson credit with French participation. In
March, however, secret negotiations for an Austro-German
Customs Union with possible later inclusion of Czechoslo-
vakia, the scope of which was intended to be revealed only
gradually, became known, and the full program had to be
announced. The injection of this fundamental political issue
into the situation at this time provided the worst possible
political soil in which to cultivate the plant of further inter-
national financial collaboration. The effectiveness of this co-
operation during the last months of Experimentation was in
one sense promoted, but in another and broader sense re-
tarded, by these great political enmities. When viewed on
the narrow stage of Eastern European economic lIfe, for cx-THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 949
ample, the French financial support given to Poland, Yugo-
slavia, and Roumania at critical moments in was an
example of constructive international financial collaboration.
When viewed upon the broad stage of European political
life it was a form of political conflict.26 Far more serious in
their bearing upon the fate of the international gold standard
were the hesitations and lack of unity introduced into inter-
national action in connection with the Austrian and German
currency problems themselves.
26 For a discussion of the political implications of these loans, cf. John W.
Wheeler-Bennett's chapter entitled 'M. Laval in Wonderland' in The Wreck
of Reparations (London, Allen & Unwin, Mr. Wheeler-Bennett mar-
shals eleven cases of the political use of French financial power from 1929to
1931.
ICHAPTER 26
The Position of Italy and the Smaller
Continental Creditor Countries
To complete our broad outline of the impact of world-wide
deflationary forces upon the international gold standard in
countries outside the central nucleus, a few words are neces-
sary concerning Italy and the smaller continental creditor
countries.
Italy
The position of Italy as a gold standard country at the be-
ginning of the world depression, the methods by which she
had attained that position, the way in which she defended
it were all in some respects peculiar to herself. In 1927, largely
for the sake of prestige, Italy had stabilized the lira on an
overvalued basis, and had subjected her domestic economy to
severe deflationary pressure in order to adjust it to the new
rates. From August 1926 to December 1927 Italian prices had
fallen over 27 per cent—the greatest decline in any country
except Denmark and Norway during the period of gradually
falling prices immediately preceding the rapid declines of the
world depression (Table 62). During the same period Italy
had added to her central banking reserves of foreign exchange
on such a scale that in December 1927 they were far greater
than those of any other central bank in the world except the
Bank of France (Table 59 B). These results she had accom-
plished with the aid of increasingly powerful state influence
in economic matters, using, among other means, control over
private international capital movements and foreign exchange
control.
Having reached an apparently impregnable position, Italy
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ifl1928 completed the details of her monetary reform and
stabilization measures. On February 26, 1928 two Royal
Decrees were issued which put her on a form of gold exchange
standard. The Bank of Italy was placed under obligation to
give gold in exchange for its notes at the rate of 7.919113
gramsfor every ioo lire, or bills drawn on countries in which
bank notes were convertible into gold at a rate of exchange
not exceeding an arbitrarily fixed gold export point of 19.10
lireto the American dollar, at the option of the Bank. The
Bank of Italy was not obliged to give notes for gold coin or
bills drawn on gold standard countries, but the duty was laid
upon it to enter the exchange market and buy and sell gold
or gold bills so as to prevent the exchange rate from rising
above 19.10 lire to the dollar or falling below 18.90 to the dol-
lar. Both upper and lower gold points were thus de facto fixed
by decree. Though the Bank could not be forced to increase
the Italian note circulation through the exchange by the pub-
lic of gold or gold bills for notes as of right, it could be forced
to do so indirectly whenever it was necessary to issue notes in
order to buy gold or exchange to check an undue rise in the
value of the lira; that is, to keep the rate on New York from
falling below i8.go lire to the dollar. The Bank, however, was
protected in its operations by the continuation of existing
controls over private dealings in the exchanges. In June 1928
the relations between the Bank of Italy and the state were
given final legal form, including the restriction of temporary
lending by the Bank to the state to 450millionlire ($23 mil-
lion).Forreasons already given the use of the treasury bill as
a short term instrument of finance giving the government in-
direct access to the credit of the central bank had been elimi-
nated in Italy(cf. Ch. butthat did not mean that the
Italian government had deprived itself of means of increasing
its floating debt if it so desired. The bulk of the floating debt,
small in 1928, was in the form of 'debtor current accounts,'
an item that could be readily increased in a fascist state.
'Bank of Italy, Annual Report for 1929(FederalReserve Bulletin, July
1930,p.43').952 EXPERIMENTATION
In June 1928, also, the Bank of Italy, as previously noted,
was given the right to convert its foreign exchange reserves
into gold. For a moment Italy, together with France, seemed
to exemplify the potential international dangers of the use, in
a decentralized gold standard system, of the gold exchange
standard as a half-way house. Under the impact of the depres-
sion, however, the large potential demand of Italy for gold
crumbled away, while that of France continued to be a domi-
nant influence in gold standard history. An instructive con-
trast was established between the international significance of
large central banking foreign exchange reserves held by a
creditor country with a strong underlying pull on the ex-
changes and large central banking foreign exchange reserves
held by a country in the position of Italy.
The general scheme of international political payments left
Italy free from any transfer problem comparable to that of
Germany. Nor was she, like the periphery countries, depend-
ent largely upon the export of a few staple commodities sub-
ject to violent price declines. In contrast to the position of
such countries the terms of trade moved only slightly against
Italy in 1929 and actually improved in 1930 and 1931.2Yet
after 1928 she found herself in the position of having to de-
fend the lira by the use of her newly acquired central banking
reserves because she had neither a strong basic nor a strong
surface pull over the exchanges. Italian central bank reserves
began to fall substantially, in 1928. In 1929 and 1930 Italy
was first among European countries in loss of total reserves,
and from 1929 to June 1931 her losses were exceeded only by
those of Germany in Europe and of Argentina, Brazil, and
Japan outside Europe. Aside from the great French conver-
sions of foreign exchange into gold in 1929, the Italian loss
of foreign exchange reserves was the greatest in the world
from January 1929 through June 1931(Table 67). Italy,
2WorldEconomic Survey, 1931/2,p.162, chart.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 953
however, did not lose gold during these years. In common
with some other European central banks, e.g. the Bank of Po-
land, the Bank of Italy carried out conversions of foreign ex-
change reserves into gold while total reserves were falling.
These were on a small scale and were supplemented by re-
patriations of gold held in England since the war, made pos-
sible under the Anglo-Italian war debt agreements.
The Italian reserve losses of 1928 were the result of a trade
deficit which the Bank of Italy in its annual report attributed
to a combination of exceptionally heavy imports to make up
for deficiencies in Italian harvests and to replenish stocks
of raw materials depleted during the deflation of the preced-
ing year, a reduced flow of emigrant remittances owing to the
cutting down of emigration and the ending of speculative
possibilities by the stabilization of the lira, some export of
Italian capital, and increasing foreign debt service payments.
It is clear that the remnants of the stabilization process of
1927 still complicated the foreign exchange problem proper
in 1928, but within Italy deflationary pressure was relaxed.
Prices remained at the level of the end of 1927 until Italy's
recession high was reached in March 1929. One of those brief
periods of normal conditions which during the post-war pe-
riod from time to time flashed in the world's economic skies
like summer lightning was begun in Italy toward the end of
1928, only to be ended almost immediately by a new deflation.
Italian prices fell 8 per cent from March to December 1929;
during 1930 they fell a further 20 per cent, and during
9per cent. These declines, especially in 1930, were
more rapid than those experienced by most countries outside
the group of periphery countries which sought refuge in ex-
change depreciation.8 This helped Italy in her efforts to main-
tain her export trade. At the same time she was able to reduce
the cost of her imports by the change in her terms of trade
Italian prices in 1930and1931,e.g.,fellfasterthan German, Dutch East
Indies, United States, French, Be'gian, and British prices (ibid., p. 119,chart)954 EXPERIMENTATION
and to cut down their volume by her own efforts to promote
seif-sufliciency in agriculture. Consequently, after 1928 the
excess of Italian merchandise imports over exports was
steadily reduced. In 1929 this was accomplished by a large
decline in cereal imports while both exports and other im-
ports were increasing by an approximately equal amount.
In 1930 and 1931, when both exports and imports were de-
clining, imports fell faster than exports.4 Notwithstanding
the help given by these changes in her merchandise trade,
Italy continued to be in need of capital imports from a bal-
ance of payments point of view. The restrictions on foreign
exchange dealings and private capital movements put into
effect as part of the stabilization process still remained in
force through 1929, and though their application was greatly
relaxed in practice, they acted as a deterrent to the inflow of
capital. It was partly to remove this deterrent, as well as to
complete the final steps in the return to gold, that in March
1930 the National Institute of Exchange was abolished, and
the prohibition on the export of Italian securities payable in
gold or gold currencies was With this encouragement,
in spite of the general contraction of international lending,
Italy probably still remained a net importer of capital in
1929 and 1930.6
Thedefense of the gold standard in Italy during the first
years of the world depression by a liberal use of central bank
Italian merchandise imports and exports(millions of U.S. dollars)for
1929—31were:
1929 1930 1931
Imports 1,140 912 612
Exports 8oz 637 528
Net —339 —275 —84
League of Nations, Memorandum on Trade and Balances of Payments, 1931—
1932: Vol.I, Review of World Trade, 1931—1932(Geneva,1932),p.24.
5Bankof Italy, Annual Report for 1929(FederalReserve Bulletin, July
1930,p.431).
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reserves to tide over a period when the balance of payments
was being 'corrected' does not justify, except by a very extreme
definition of gold standard orthodoxy, the inclusion of Italy's
experience under the caption, Disintegration of the Gold
Standard System. On the other hand it does not illustrate the
operation of corrective forces upon strictly pre-war lines. Be-
hind the decline in Italian prices was a strong deflationary
pressure from the central bank,7 but this thoroughly orthodox
procedure was supplemented by the direct action character-
istic of the authoritarian state which during 1930 was in some
essential respects brought to maturity in Italy. In January
1930, a time of serious industrial troubles, a bill was passed
by the House of Deputies enlarging the powers of the Italian
Corporations, and in June the capstone of the corporative
state was laid by the formation of the National Council of
Corporations with powers to legislate on prices, wages, and
production. Early in i930Mussolini was already demanding
economy in municipal and corporate finance, and when a
national budget deficit for i 930 threatened, fiscal considera-
tions of an urgent character reinforced the general policy of
economy and retrenchment. In the autumn of 1930 the whole
force of the fascist political and economic organization was
put behind a campaign for lower government salaries, lower
rents, and lower wages. This side of Italian economic policy
was commented on by the World Economic Survey, 1931/2
(p. as follows:
"The first important country to embark on a radical scheme of
deflation was Italy. In November 1930, salaries and allowances
were cut 12 per cent. At the same time an extensive campaign of
propaganda was aimed at a general wage reduction of approxi-
mately io per cent. It has been claimed that the corporate plan
of organization of Italy enabled the government more easily to
7 The correspondent of The Economist, writing from Turin on March
spoke of this deflationist policy as being "brutally persisted in" (The
Economist, March 29, 19g0, p. 707). He also suggested the accumulation of
"hidden" foreign exchange reserves by the banks.956 EXPERIMENTATION
break through the resistance of individual industries and interests
in carrying out its programme of breaking the rigid structure of
price and wage costs."
At the same time special care was being taken, as in Germany,
to protect agriculture in harmony with the principle of self-
sufficiency. In the international dispersion of wheat prices,
which was substituted for the world price during the de-
pression, Italian wheat prices remained among the highest
in the world.8
During the first part of 1931 there were no further striking
developments in economic policy in Italy bearing directly on
her relation to the international gold standard system. It is
a fact of general significance in world gold standard history,
however, that Italy entered the final months of the Experi-
mentation period with substitutes for the traditional correc-
tive forces already forged and even partly in effect. Her
machinery for exchange control had but recently been dis-
mantled and could be quickly and effectively restored, and
the concept was fully established that customary and con-
tractual prices must not be allowed to produce during defla-
tion, or indeed at any time, a dispersion of prices not desired
by the state.
The Smaller Continental Creditor Countries
The impact of the world depression upon the debtor coun-
tries forced them to seek a new balance in their international
relations. It obliged them to promote, whether by currency
depreciation or otherwise, a favorable balance of merchandise
trade, to exploit to the limit such special means of access to
long term international credit as they possessed, to use to the
utmost and even seriously to abuse short term foreign credits,
and to draw on their central banking reserves. For the creditor
countries of the world this meant loss of markets, demands
for credit heavily charged with risk, and increases in reserves
during a period of declining economic activity.
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At the outset of the depression Belgium, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden shared the common
characteristic of having a strong pull over the exchanges
which put their central banks in a position to add to their to-
tal reserves, but with that their similarity ends. Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland retained their pull over the ex-
changes longer than Czechoslovakia or Sweden, but their
problems were far from identical. The position of the Nether-
lands was complicated by her active and substantial partici-
pation in the transactions of a central money market and by
her colonial interests, while Switzerland was increasingly em-
barrassed by the use of her currency as a haven of refuge for
foreign capital. Toward the latter part off the period the prob-
lems of Czechoslovakia and Sweden became more and more
like those of most debtor countries, while Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, and Switzerland were increasingly concerned with the
question of undesired expansion of domestic credit due to the
attraction of reserves. These differences within the group of
smaller continental creditor countries may be briefly brought
out by noting the major influences playing upon the central
banking reserves of each of the five countries.
Czechoslovakia
At the beginning of the depression the Czechoslovakian cur-
rency was still stabilized de facto but not de jure. The foreign
exchange restrictions that had been in force as part of this de
facto stabilization were removed on December 28, 1928, and
during 1929 the final legislative steps were taken to make
Czechoslovakia a full-fledged gold exchange standard country.
They were pushed with special vigor in order to allow the
National Bank of Czechoslovakia to take its place upon the
Board of the Bank of International Settlements which was
open only to the representatives of gold standard
Though prices were declining during 1929, Czechoslovakia
National Bank of Czechoslovakia, Annual Report for 1929(FederalReserve
Bulletin, Aug. 1930,pp. 5o6—7).958 EXPERIMENTATION
was able to increase her favorable balance of merchandise
trade. She was not severely hit by the forces of depression un-
til the second half of i the end of the period during which
inter-European trade was relatively well maintained, and
though both exports and imports declined substantially in
1931, she continued to maintain a favorable trade balance.1°
Relatively high money rates prevailed in her markets until
the middle of 1930 and there were no large scale withdrawals
of foreign funds until the first half of 1931. Since Czechoslo-
vakia was not a heavy debtor on capital account, there was no
serious problem of defending the crown. In 1931, however,
foreign withdrawals did present such a problem on a moderate
scale and, as shown in Table 67, the central bank was called
on to give up reserves. The situation is well described in the
Annual Report of the National Bank for 1931 (Federal Re-
serve Bulletin, July 1932, p. 434):
"The world-wide economic crisis was felt in Czechoslovakia some-
what later than in neighboring countries, and the economic
structure showed considerable powers of resistance. Not until the
last quarter of 1930 was there any marked falling off in business,
which was followed in the spring of 1931 by favorable develop-
ments in the money market, some stabilization of the economic
position, and more than seasonal improvement in certain lines.
This improvement was checked, however, by the international
credit crisis after the suspension of the gold standard in England.
Nevertheless, the economic, monetary, and financial position of
Czechoslovakia suffered less than that of its neighbors largely as a
result of its former monetary and financial policy. Czechoslovakia,
even during the rapid expansion of the past five years, resorted in
only moderate amount to foreign short-term credit or long-term
loans, so that when the liquidation of international credits began
in May and June, the balances of Czechoslovak banks abroad were
10Czechoslovakianmerchandise imports and exports (millions of U.S. dollars)
for 1929—31were(Review of World Trade, 1931—1932,p.24)
1929 1930 1931
Imports 590 464 347
Exports 6o6 517 388
Net +x6 +53THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 959
largerthan their foreign obligations and the volume of foreign
short-term credits to industry was inconsiderable. Czechoslovakia,
therefore, had no need to take emergency measures either at the
time of the Austrian crisis or during the German crisi's in July,
although short-term deposits were withdrawn in considerable
amounts over a comparatively short period. As, however, the in-
ternational position, especially in the neighboring countries, con-
tinued to get worse, Czechoslovakia found its resources diminished
both through the withdrawals of funds and through inability to
repatriate from Germany either bankers', industrial, or individual
balances. After September 2 i, owing to uncertainty respecting
international credits, Czechoslovakia also had to resort to de-
fensive measures. On September 22 the bank raised its rate, and
on October 2 placed restrictions on foreign exchange transac-
tions, which, owing to the deterioration of conditions in the
neighboring countries, had gradually to be made more severe.
Otherwise, there was no need for exceptional measures such as
were put into effect in several other countries. It was not, for
example, necessary to close the stock exchange or declare a
moratorium."
Sweden
LikeCzechoslovakia, Sweden in 1929 had a small favorable
merchandise trade balance, but with the deepening of the de-
pression was less successful in maintaining exports relative to
imports. Largely owing totheimportance of timber and iron
ore in her export trade, the trade balance in 1930 and 1931
became progressively adverse. In addition, Sweden was very
dependent upon her income from freights which suffered
severely in i 931Swedenthroughout received a small net
Theseitems in her balance of payments for 1929—31were(millions of
U.S. dollars):
1929 1930 1931
Imports 478 445 358
Exports 486 415 28o
Net +8 —30 —78
Freight Receipts 54 50 37
For exports and imports: Review of World Trade, 1931—1932,p.24;for
freight: Midland Bank Review, Oct.-Nov. 1932,p.2.Kronorfigures converted
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income from capital investment abroad, but this could not
offset the declines in the merchandise balance and in freights.
These items, rather than capital movements, produced a
deficit in the Swedish balance of payments and caused losses
in her central banking reserves in i931.
Belgium
To a larger extent than Sweden and Czechoslovakia, Belgium
was throughout the period sensitive to events in the great in-
ternational centers. In 1929hermoney market was seriously
affected by the withdrawal of funds for speculative uses in
New York; nevertheless the National Bank was able to add to
its gold reserves, chiefly by imports from New York. These
were actually effected in large part by the triangular trans-
actions with the Reichsbank at the time of the crisis in the
Young Plan negotiations, already described. The underlying
strength of the belga which made this possible and the techni-
cal procedure by which it was accomplished are described by
the National Bank in its Annual Report for 1929:
12
"Thebank ... hasnever tried to acquire gold, as is sometimes
thought. It has merely taken up the volume of gold exchange
which has come into the country in excess of the needs of the
market. It has done this systematically at a rate corresponding to
the gold import point or slightly lower. Being in possession of
these foreign bills, and finding that the market was not re-
purchasing them, the bank converted them into gold....Itmay
be said, therefore, that the greater part of the additional circula-
tion was issued against ioo per cent in gold values.
This influx of foreign exchange came from the surplus in our
balance of payments, which throughout the year was influenced
by a large volume of exports sold at favorable prices. The loans
floated abroad and the purchase of Belgian securities by foreign
investors aided this movement, but to a less extent than during
previous years. Likewise the participation of foreign markets in
capital increases, which have been numerous in Belgium during
12 ReserveBulletin, May 1930,pp.294—5;cf.Ch. 20,TheForeign
Exchange Portfolio of the Bank of France in 1929.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 96L
1929,wereby no means negligible. Nevertheless, a certain balance
has been struck through the purchase of foreign securities by
own nationals."
The retention of the initiative in gold purchases in the
hands of the National Bank was a feature of Belgian policy
throughout the period. It enabled the Bank to reduce its
foreign exchange reserves to a supplementary role and to
make its gold purchases in such a way as not to disturb the
international money markets. These two policies were not
always compatible, as is indicated in Table 67 by the large
growth in foreign exchange holdings in 1930. In that year
the Belgian excess of merchandise imports over exports was
slightly increased,13 but this was far more than offset by the
fact that Belgian private industry found it profitable, in view
of the low interest rates abroad, to borrow outside
Consequently the Belgian exchange remained at a premium
over most gold standard currencies and the central bank re-
mained in a position to increase its reserves. This presented
two problems, one domestic, for it involved an increase in the
note circulation not justified by domestic economic activity,
and one international, for it raised the question whether or
not to convert incoming foreign exchange into gold, and if
converted, where to buy the gold. During 1930 London was
the cheapest market, and in April, July, and December Bel-
gium appeared as a successful bidder for gold there. Through-
out the year, however, the Bank was, in its own words, "care-
ful to make its gold purchases abroad without disturbing the
13Belgianmerchandise imports and exports(millions of U.S. dollars)for
1929—31were(Review of World Trade, 1931—1932,p.24):
1929 1930 1931
Imports g88 86i 66o
Exports 884 725 643
Net —104 —136 —17
14NationalBank of Belgium, Annual Report for 1930(FederalReserve Bul-
letin, April 1931,p.207).TheBelgian government refused. to allow ad-
ministrative departments to borrow abroad arid removed the tax
lion in favor of foreign loans which had been part of the stabilization
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international money market." 15Thereis evidence of restraint
and inter-central bank cooperation in the increase in the for-
eign exchange reserves of the Bank in spite of its announced
policy of reducing the importance of this element in its total
reserves. In 1931, however, the policy of converting foreign
exchange reserves into gold was resumed and large purchases
were made in London in the first quarter. In June gold was
imported from Germany and with the spread of the confi-
dence crisis in July Belgium reappeared as an urgently com-
petitive bidder for gold in the London market.
The Netherlands
During 1929 and 1930 the guilder was subject to many of the
influences that affected the belga. The greater participation
of Dutch funds in the international capital movements of
these years, particularly in the active foreign lending of i 930,
culminating in substantial Dutch participation in the Young
Loan and in the first Lee Higginson credit to Germany, pre-
vented further large accumulation of reserves by the Nether-
lands Bank. This was welcomed by the Bank as an aid to its
internal credit administration, which included at this time
earnest but wholly unsuccessful efforts to put gold coin back
into circulation. The gold bullion standard, it began to ap-
pear, rested, in the Netherlands at least, not only upon cen-
tral banking practice and the enforcement of 'gold economy,'
but also upon the sanction of public habit and convenience.
The Netherlands Bank wished also to prevent large inter-
national movements in its gold reserves, and to this end it di-
rected its foreign exchange policy until June 1931. It was
successful only as far as gold movements between London and
Holland were concerned. From the beginning of 1929 to June
1931 all Dutch gold dealings of substantial proportions were
with the United States, France, Germany, and the Dutch East
Indies. In the first half of 1929 the guilder was sensitive to the
strong pull of the dollar and the franc. In February and
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March the Netherlands Bank's reserves, of both dollars and
sterling, were depleted, but in April they were replenished
and gold was imported from the United States indirectly
through the Reichsbank. In July gold export point on Paris
was reached and gold was shipped to France, and in August
gold export point on New York was approached and dollar
exchange reserves were again parted with "for the protection
of our stock of gold," as the Bank expressed it.16 The gold ex-
ports to France were made because the Netherlands Bank did
not have an adequate portfolio of French bills, and they led
the Bank to build up such a portfolio. When relieved of the
pressure from America at the end of 1929 the foreign ex-
change reserves were again replenished, and since the gold
losses had been made good by receipts from Germany and
purchases from Java the changes in the reserve position were
very slight. The guilder, however, continued to be weak in
Paris and in the first two months of 1930 and again in July
gold shipments had to be made to France. These were partly
offset by the purchase of gold from Germany after the Gei--
man foreign exchange crisis of September.
During the first four months of ii there were no very
substantial gold movements to and from the Netherlands.
Dutch trade was declining, but the Dutch import surplus was
declining also,11 and in the absence of large new capital ex-
ports the Netherlands Bank was able to pursue its foreign
exchange policy successfully. In June, with the outbreak of
the credit crisis in Germany, large gold imports were received
from that country, and with the spread of the confidence
crisis to England, the Netherlands appeared for the first time
16NetherlandsBank, Annual Report for1929(FederalReserve Bulletin,
Aug. 1930,p.504).
11 merchandiseimports and exports(millions of U.S. dollars)for
1929—31 were (Review of World Trade, 1931—1932,p.24)
1929 1930 1931
Imports i,io6 972 761
Exports 8oo 691 527
Net —306 —28! —234964 EXPERIMENTATION
during the depression as an urgent buyer of gold in London,
taking her place beside Belgium which had been an intermit-
tent, and Switzerland which had been a steady buyer there.
Switzerland
Of the five countries discussed in these paragraphs, Switzer-
land alone experienced an uninterrupted substantial growth
in its central banking reserves. Swiss export trade was se-
verely crippled by the depression and her merchandise im-
port surplus grew throughout the period.18 Swiss capital was
also lent or invested abroad quite freely during the earlier
part of the depression. Yet the Swiss franc was consistently
at a premium over almost all other gold standard currencies
because it was consistently used as a haven for frightened capi-
tal, particularly German capital. The problem of unnecessary
gold reserve accumulations at the central bank was therefore
acute and Switzerland was more anxious than any other gold
standard country to restore gold coins to circulation. The
legislative groundwork for the restoration of the full orthodox
gold standard was laid by legislation passed through its vari-
ous stages in 1929. This did away with the last traces of bimet-
allism in the Swiss system and provided for a return to a gold
circulation when other countries designated as important did
the same.'° This remained merely a gesture but serious efforts
were put forth to cope with the problem of excessive gold
reserves, as described by the Swiss National Bank in its An-
nual Report for 1930 (Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1931,
p. 204):
"The gold and foreign exchange policy of the National Bank,
18Swissmerchandise imports and exports(millions of U.S.dollars)for
1929—31were(Review of T1;'orld Trade, 1931—1932,p.24):
1929 1930 1931
Imports 516 488 427
Exports 401 337 258
Net —115 —151 —169
SwissNational Bank, Annual Report for 1929(FederalReserve Bulletin,
May 1930,p.305).THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 965
which throughout the year aimed to prevent the Swiss franc----
already at a premium everywhere—from advancing any further,
passed through various stages. When, in March and April, and
again in June and July, the Swiss franc again showed a tendency
to rise, the bank attempted to intervene by purchasing foreign
exchange. When once the gold import point was reached, the
bank declared itself ready to buy gold in accordance with its
established regulations, specifying, however, that each offer of
gold should be subject to a special decision.(It is well known,
of course, that the National Bank, unlike most banks of issue, is
not legally obligated to buy at a fixed price all gold that is offered
to it. It buys gold only according to its requirements; on the other
hand, free coinage of gold exists in Switzerland.) When the Bank
of England decided to deliver only bars of 'standard' gold—9162/3
fine—the National Bank, along with other banks of issue, decided
to accept only bars of fine gold; this resulted in lowering the gold
import point of the English pound in relation to Switzerland.
When, as a result of gold purchases aggregating 78,000,000
Swiss francs ($15,054,000) the metallic reserve of the National
Bank had reached 639,000,000 francs ($123,327,000), at the end
of August, and the notes in circulation were covered to 70 per
cent by gold, tenders of gold no longer had any interest for the
bank, which, therefore, ceased to accept them. This refusal, how-
ever, brought about an equally large inflow of foreign bills of ex-
change; the resulting decline in foreign exchanges enabled the
commercial banks to purchase gold and to have it minted. The
National Bank assisted this operation by postponing, in favor
of the private banks, the reminting into Swiss coin of its own
stock of gold coins of the other countries of the Latin Monetary
Union. But about the middle of October, when disturbances in
Germany had again created a strong demand for Swiss francs, the
bank, in order to check the further advance of the Swiss franc, was
compelled to accept foreign exchange in large amounts, part of
which was converted into gold deposits in London and New
York."
Her strong exchange position brought Switzerland into
the world's gold markets as a consistently effective bidder.
During the backflow of funds to Europe after the New York966 EXPERIMENTATION
Stock Exchange crisis of 1929 she was able to take gold from
New York, and was a steady buyer in London in 1930 and
early 1931. On the other hand a regular but moderate stream
of gold exports to Germany took place. This was not inter-
rupted by the September 1930 crisis which, as stated above,
was weathered by Germany partly with the aid of an inflow
of Swiss capital. With the outbreak of the confidence crisis
in June 1931 the flight of German capital so strengthened the
Swiss exchange that Switzerland began to take gold in Lon-
don, France, and Germany simultaneously.
A careful study of the monthly gold movements between
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium, and the United
States, Great Britain, France, and Germany discloses not only
the major forces playing upon the reserves of the smaller
creditor powers, but also the general relationships prevailing
between the currencies of the center countries. The relative
and persistent weakness of sterling, the persistent strength of
the French franc, and the intermediate position of the dollar
are clearly indicated. The German position is clearly reflected
also. Finally the beginnings of a retreat from the gold ex-
change standard and the end of protection enjoyed by the
Bank of England through the adoption of a devisen politik
rather than a purely passive orthodox gold standard policy
by the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium is clearly in-
dicated in the third quarter of 1931.Notonly did their
position as international creditors distinguish these countries
from the debtor countries in the world distribution of gold
and foreign exchange reserves during the first years of the
depression, but in the figures of their gold trade may be read
the story of internal strains within the central nucleus of the
world-wide international gold standard, system.CHAPTER 27
The Center Countries
In Table 67 it was shown that the three great creditor coun-
tries, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom,
participated in very unequal degree in the general movement
of gold from debtor to creditor countries. Notwithstanding
the change in the direction of flow and the appearance of
many cross currents, the fundamental pattern stamped upon
the world distribution of gold from 1925 to 1928 1stillper-
sisted. The London bullion market continued to fulfil the
task of distributing new South African gold, for the most part
to Europe and India. Prance continued to be an absorber
rather than a distributor of gold, buying in the cheapest mar-
ket, and the major movements of gold between Canada, the
Far East, South America, and the center countries continued
to be taken care of by the United States.
I The United States
Three phases may be distinguished in the international gold
flow in and out of the United States from October 1929 to
September i 931. The first was the four months from October
1929 to January 1930, during which the underlying pattern
of world gold distribution was obscured by the effects of the
return flow of funds from America to Europe after the New
York Stock Exchange crisis. The second was from February
to May 1931, during which an inflow from Canada, the
Far East, and South America was completely dominant. The
third was from June 1931 to September 1931, a period
1Cf.Ch. i8, The One-Way American Banking System in its Relation to the
International Distribution of Gold.
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marked by preparation for and actual withdrawals of gold,
mainly through earmarkings, by European countries in the
search for liquidity induced by the confidence crisis and in
anticipation of future trouble.
In Table 73 gold movements between the United States
and various groups of countries are shown for these three
periods and for the last quarter of 1931.Thedistinctive
TABLE 73
United States, Gold Exports and Imports by Groups of Countries
October 1929—December1931,selectedperiods
Net imports +, Net exports —(thousandsof dollars)
Oct. Feb. June— Oct.-
Jan. 1930 May1931 Sept.193% Dec.1931
Alicountries —66,i,6+451,432+161,411 —191,391
England —20,066 —268 +1,520 +5,267
France —73,73' —45,977 —24,074 —339,660
Belgium, Holland, Switzer-
land —10,007 +39 —4,541 —81,153
Argentina and Brazil +16,102+183,726 +44,381 +15,741
Mexico and Colombia +7,743 +44,307 +17,445 +3,152
Canada +11,556 +30,659 +36,641 +17,587
Japan and China +2,120+197,924 +39,192+174,518
British India —'3 +4 +8,o6o
All other countries +i8o 1+41,022 +50,843
2 +5,097
Compiledfrom Federal Reserve Bulletins, Dec. 1929, p. 778; Jan. 1930, p. 8; Feb.
1930,p.59; March 1932,p.x68
1Includesexports to Germany, $1,489,000; Poland, $5,010,000.
2Includesimports from Germany, $34,990,000.
characteristicsof the first two periods appear clearly. The
third does not stand out as distinctly because of the nature of
the transactions involved, but the movements then prepared
for dominated the gold flow of the last quarter of the year.
The Return Flow of Foreign Funds,
October 1929 to January 1930
The return flow of funds to Europe began before the final
break in the New York Stock Exchange and gradually weak-
ened the dollar in the world's exchange markets. In OctoberTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 969
the French franc went above gold export point and gold
moved from New York to Paris. In November shipments were
made to France, Switzerland, Germany, and Poland, and in
December to France, Germany, and England. The late ap-
pearance of England in this movement was partly due to on.e
of the brief excursions of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York into the realm of devisen politik on the European
model. During July, August, and September 1929, the New
York Reserve Bank had supported the pound by the purchase
of about $i8 million of sterling bills. Nevertheless, the ster-
ling-dollar rate on the third Tuesday of September was
4.8421/32, well below gold import point to New York from
London. Thereafter the dollar began to weaken steadily, and
during November the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
was able to dispose of its stock of sterling bills.2 This did not
effectively retard the upward movement of sterling, for on
the last Tuesday of December sterling was 4.88%2, well
above gold export point from New York to London. By Janu-
ary 1930, however, the first force of the return flow of funds
was spent and sterling returned to about mint parity in New
York. France alone was able to continue her withdrawals of
gold into January. At the same time the inward flow of gold
from South America and the East, which had been moderate
in the last quarter of 1929, was gathering strength. By the
end of January the export movement to Europe had run its
course and this inward flow became dominant.
From October 1929 to January 1930 the United States lost
$75 million in gold and $i8 million in central banking for-
eign exchange holdings. A decline in member bank reserves
from $2,322 million on October 4, 1929 to $2,260 million on
January 31, 1930 gives superficial ground for supposing the
gold losses in this instance to have had their 'normal' effect.
There was, however, no simple cause and effect relationship
involved. The gold losses were absorbed in a series of central
2 Cf. B. H. Beckhart, ed., New York Money Market (Columbia University
Press, 1932), III, 455—60, especially chart, p. 456.970 EXPERIMENTATION
banking operations carried out first to meet the highly ab-
normal situation created by the crisis of October and then to
assIst the banking system in meeting the usual seasonal re-
quirements of the year end.
During the first burst of active liquidation on the New
York Stock Exchange in October, bank deposits all over the
country had suddenly to be drawn upon to meet debts falling
due in New York, chiefly in the form of increased payments
required to protect call loans inadequately secured at the
violently lowered security prices. Holders of securities bought
with the aid of borrowed money who could not or did not
care to draw down bank deposits for this purpose had to sell
their securities and take their losses. This involved finding
purchasers who had either to draw down deposits in their
turn or find access to new bank credit. Like 'London in 1914,
NewYork as a central money market in which there was a
great concentration of liabilitieswas calling in its debts. 1f,
like London in 1914, New York had exercised its full powers
in this respect without extending new credits, the financial
machinery would have broken down as it did in 1914(cf.
Ch. i).TheNew York banks, however, had prepared them-
selves for such a crisis by not participating in the final credit
extensions which carried the boom into its last stages. They
were able therefore to make loans to purchasers of securities
and to buy securities themselves in order to avert the com-
plete demoralization in stock exchange prices that would have
been produced by allowing a self-generating liquidation to
proceed unchecked. Simultaneously the 'contingent liabili-
ties' of the banks, especially the New York banks, in the form
of 'loans for the account of others' became actual. One of the
first effects of the break in security prices was to end the era
of high interest rates which had attracted non-banking
lenders to the call market. These lenders concertedly called
Cf. discussion of the phrase 'concentration of funds' as applied to a central
money market in Ch. 7, The Concentration of Funds in New York; cf. also
Ch. i8, The Concentration of Liabilities in New York.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 97L
their loans and the New York banks were obliged to take
them over.4 To help the banks in assuming these new burdens
pending actual liquidation of loans on securities and the
deposits created by them, the Federal Reserve banks bought
government securities and discounted for the New York banks
on a liberal scale. The complicated nature of the double
process of contraction and expansion of bank credit involved
in the first adjustments after the break may be indicated by
an analysis of the figures of the 53 reporting New York City
member banks for the single week October 23—29, 1929. The
main changes in the combined balance sheet of these banks
during that week are given in millions of dollars in the ac-
companying tabulation.5
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Total loans +1,281Deposits +1,558
Loans for own A/c
to brokers +992 Due to the Federal Reserve







During the same week loans on securities to brokers and
dealers for out-of-town banks declined $728 million, and
loans for the account of others declined million. Since
loans for own account increased $992 million, the net reduc-
tion in loans to brokers was $1,095 million. To bring about;
this net reduction in brokers loans two partly offsetting opera-
tions were in progress:
i)the conversion of loans for the account of others into
loans for own account, an operation that increased both the
loans of the New York banks and their deposits;
For a technical discussion of the effect upon bank loans and deposits of the
rise and decline in loans for the account of others cf. B. M. Anderson, Jr.,
Brokers Loans and Bank Credit, Chase Economic Bulletin, Oct. 31,1928,
and H. L. Reed, The Federal Reserve System (McGraw-Hill, 1930), Ap.
The figures are taken from various tables in the Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Nov. 1929, pp. 751—2, 724.972 EXPERIMENTATION
2)actual liquidation of bank credit in the form of the re-
payment of brokers loans by the use of bank deposits; i.e.,
the deposits of new investors and of those called upon to
meet margin calls (such operations reduced both the loans
and the deposits of the New York banks). These two forces
combined in some proportion. The accompanying figures
show what the changes in the loans and deposits of these
banks would have been if the extreme assumption is made
that all the loans for out-of-town banks and for the account
of others were taken over by the New York banks.
LOANS DEPOSITS
(millions of dollars)
Increases due to assumption of loans for out-of-town
banks and others +2,087 +2,087
Reductions due to actual repayment of brokers loans—1,095 —1,095
Net increase in loans for own A/c of New York banks +992 +992
The increases in loans and deposits of New York banks,
which made it necessary to increase their reserve balances
immediately after the crash, were part of a net increase in
bank credit taking place in America total credit ex-
tended to brokers was being reduced. The expansion of bank
reserves incident to these first adjustments, however, was only
temporary, for the forces leading to bank credit liquidation
were stronger than those leading to bank credit expansion,
great as these were. No steady decline in bank reserves, how-
ever, followed. Open market purchases of securities were
continued, which facilitated the repayment of the rediscounts
made during the crisis. The year-end expansion of the cur-
rency was financed by Federal Reserve bank purchases of
acceptances and securities. In January the seasonal return
flow of currency was unusually large but the corresponding
reduction in Federal Reserve bank holdings of securities was
unusually small. These operations all combined to facilitate
an uninterrupted shift in Federal Reserve credit from the
discount to the open market shoulder. Though gold was
flowing out, the commercial banking system was once more
getting itself free of debt to the central banks with only aTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 973
very moderate loss in the cash basis of credit. With a declin-
ing demand for bank credit the country over, there was a
decline in loans and investments, but this was also moderate.
In Table 74 the influences playing upon the American credit
base and credit superstructure from October 1929to De-
cember 31,1929are shown. The use of year-end figures is
unsatisfactory because the seasonal increase in commercial
bank float for which no figure for all banks is available to the
writer disguises the underlying position. Had it not been for
this, the credit superstructure would undoubtedly have con-
tracted slightly. For this reason, and in order to include the
whole period of gold outflow to Europe, the figures for Janu-
ary 31 would have been preferable, but, as in all these tables,
the call dates nearest the desired month have had to be used.
Accumulation of Gold, February 1930 to May 1931
Bythe end of January 1930 the return flow of foreign funds
temporarily attracted by the stock exchange boom ceased to
influence the exchanges strongly, though for various reasons
foreign short term capital continued to be withdrawn from
America. The United States entered a period of steady gold
accumulation to which the gold losses of the periphery
tries already described, the new production of Colombia,
Canada, and Mexico, the gold losses of Japan incident to her
struggle to return to gold, and exports from China closely
connected with the fall in the price of silver, all contributed.
From February 1930toMay the only important Amen-
can gold transactions with Europe were with France. In Ju]y
and August the franc was seasonally strong on account of
French income tax payments, but at the same time the gold
export point from London to Paris was altered adversely to
France for technical reasons (cf. infra, pp. ioo8—io) ,whilethe
dollar was temporarily weak in London. For these reasons
French demand for gold, which had been persistent in the
London market, was in part diverted to New York, and sub-
stantial gold shipments were made to Paris. In April974 EXPERIMENTATION
TABLE 74






TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) ACCOUNTS
Decrease in Monetary Gold Stock —88
Decrease in Money in Circulation outside the Reserve
Banks, the Treasury, and All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +22
Increase in Cash in Vault of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) —68
Increase in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks +365
Increase in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks +70
Decrease in Bills Discounted at the Reserve Banks —298
Decrease in Other Deposits at the Reserve Banks + 14
Decrease in Unexpended Capital Funds of the Reserve
Banks +14
+485 —454
Increase in Member Bank Reserve Accounts due to these
Items +3' 1
Actual Decrease in Member Bank Reserve Accounts —43
1 Cf. Table39, note i.
when the franc was again seasonally weak, the United States
was able to draw back a part of these gold losses to France.
As a whole these French transactions made hardly a ripple
on the main inward movement.
The gold sent to the United States at this time came
partly because of her position as a center country in the inter-
national gold standard system. It was one element in a
world-wide adjustment between debtor and creditor countries.
This was not, as in pre-war days, predominantly an adjust-
ment in debtor countries softened by temporary financing byTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 975
TABLE 74
October 2,1929—December31,1929, aPeriod during which Gold was




DEPOSITS) OF ALL BANKS
REPORTING TO THE
TRANSACTION 2 (millions of dollars) COMPTROLLER
Decrease in Monetary Gold Stock —88
Decrease in Money in Circulation outside the Reserve
Banks, the Treasury, and All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +22
Increase in Commercial Bank Float (incomplete) +667 8
Increase in Net Indebtedness to Foreign Banks
(Member Banks only) —78
Decrease in Loans plus Investments (adj.) of All
Reporting Banks —442
Loans and Discounts (adj.) —326
Investments —i x6
Increase in Government Securities held by the
Reserve Banks +365
Increase in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks +70
Increase in Capital Funds of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) —126
+1,124 —734
Increase in Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting Banks
due to these Items +390
Actual Increase in Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting
Banks +109
2 In this table and in Table 75 the items Treasury Currency and Real Estate
owned by All Reporting Banks have been omitted, as the changes in them were
of negligible importance.
Cf. Table 39, note 2.
the creditors; for the United States as a large producer of agri-
cultural products for export was herself subject to many of
the economic problems of the periphery countries. Within
her own borders she exemplified in the highest degree the
fundamental economic deadlock of the world depression,
the maintenance of agricultural production in the face of de-
clining prices and the maintenance of industrial prices by
means of restricted production. From June 1929 to June 1931
the changes in agricultural output in the United States are
mainly to be accounted for by climatic conditions. Corn pro-
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duction was virtually unchanged, while the wheat, oat, and
cotton crops were all larger in 1931 than in 1929. Meanwhile,
industrial output had dropped 42 per cent and factory employ-
ment 27 per cent. As a direct consequence farm prices had
fallen 37.9 per cent at wholesale and 55 per cent on the farm
while non-agricultural prices had fallen only 21.2 per cent.
The absence of any general deflationary pressure from the
banks up to June 1931 helped to prolong this deadlock.8
Credit was available to assist the farmer in. his struggle to
maintain production and the industrialist to hold up prices.
The prolongation of the price deadlock, however, in a coun-
try in which no prosperity is possible without adequate agri-
cultural purchasing power, progressively undermined the
solvency of a large section of the banking system.
In order therefore to indicate fully the position of the
United States in the gold standard world at the time of the
confidence crisis of June 1931, the preceding gold inflow into
America has to be considered as an element not only in a
balance of payments problem, but also in a domestic banking
problem of great, indeed of unprecedented complexity. No
country under the pre-war international gold standard system
had ever been placed in the position then occupied by the
United States.
The American central banking policy that prevailed from
February 1930 to May was already fully developed at
the beginning of that period. It was to provide abundant
supplies of credit at cheap rates to stimulate business re-
covery. The discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York was first reduced from 6 to 5½percent on No-
vember i, 1929, and successive reductions brought it down
to a record low of 11/2 per cent established on May 8, 1931.
The government security purchases of the last months of
1929 were continued but on a smaller scale until the middle
of 1930. Their role in building up member bank reserves was
6For an excellent summary of the situation, cf. L. A. Rufener, Money and
Banking (Houghton, Miuflin, 1934),pp.620—7, 636.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 977
supplemented by gold imports and by a continued down-
ward trend of money in circulation. Under these circum-
stances member banks were able to reduce still further their
indebtedness to the Federal Reserve banks and at the same
time to increase their reserve balances on a small scale. The
role of gold once more, as in 192 1—22 and was to fix
permanently in the American credit base reserves created in
the first instance by Federal Reserve credit. The power of the
American banking system to build an increased credit struc-
ture on an increased credit base was, however, temporarily
exhausted. At a time when, in the striking and accurate phrase
of L. A. Rufener, business men and farmers were actively
engaged in "deflating each other," there was no substantial
demand for bank accommodation for commercial purposes.
Commercial loans declined on a great scale and deposits were
correspondingly drawn down. The banks, finding themselves
in possession of unutilized lending power represented by
surplus reserves, endeavored to find employment for their
funds by increasing their secondary reserves and their pur-
chases of securities, especially government securities.
B. H. Beckhart, in the fourth volume of his work on the
New York money market (pp. 161—2), has brought out the
general economic implications of this particular result of a
cheap money policy immediately following a crisis:
"In company with higher-tariff and price-valorization fallacies,
the cheap-money fallacy puts in its appearance regularly during
periods of business inactivity. Sight is generally lost of the fact
that cheap-money policies on the part of central banks may not
in themselves bring about that readjustment of retail and whole-
sale prices, wages and costs, on the basis of which any substantial
improvement in business must be founded. Little attention was
given to the effects of such policies on the quality of member
and nonmember bank portfolios, impaired at that time by frozen
real estate, security loans, and depreciated bonds. Whatever effect
Cf. Ch. to, The Preservation of the Credit Base and the Maintenance of the
Credit Superstructure, 1920—22,andCh. 22,TheAmerican Credit Base and
Credit Superstructure, June 1928 to October 1929.978 EXPERIMENTATION
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TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) ACCOUNTS
Increase in Monetary Gold Stock +672
Increase in Money in Circulation outside the Reserve
Banks, the Treasury, and All Reporting Banks
(estimated) —55
Decrease in Cash in Vault of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +g8 1
Increase in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks +157
Decrease in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks —287
Decrease in Bills Discounted at the Reserve Banks —483
Increase in Other Deposits at the Reserve Banks —64
Decrease in Unexpended Capital Funds of the Reserve
Banks +24
+95! —88g
Increase in Member Bank Reserve Accounts due to these
Items +62 1
ActualIncrease in Member Bank Reserve Accounts +2
1 Cf. Table 39, note i.
a cheap-money policy might exert on the business situation would
be transmitted through increased bond purchases on the part of
the banking community, which would place additional purchasing
power in the hands of the corporate and governmental borrowers.
From the point of view of the credit system, this result (the pur-
chase of bonds by banks, on the basis of expanding bank credit,
rather than on the basis of savings) could hardly be counted as
salutary. The purchase of such obligations, on the basis of bank
credit, would but further impair the liquidity of bank portfolios.
Should interest rates later rise or bond prices fall, this condition
would but tend to increase the dependence of the banking com-
munity on the Federal Reserve banks."THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 979
TABLE 75
December 31, 1929—June 30, 1931, a Period during which Gold was flowing




Increase in Monetary Gold Stock
Increase in Money in Circulation outside the
Reserve Banks, the Treasury, and All Reporting
Banks
Decrease in Commercial Bank Float 8
Decrease in Net Indebtedness to Foreign Banks
(Member Banks only)
Decrease in Loans plus Investments (adj.) of All
Reporting Banks
Loans and Discounts (adj.)
Investments
Increase in Government Securities held by the
Reserve Banks
Decrease in Bills Bought held by the Reserve
Banks
Decrease in Capital Funds of AU Reporting Banks
Decrease in Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting Banks
due to these Items
Actual Decrease in Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting
Banks
2 Cf. Table 74, note 2.
8 Cl. Table 39, note 2.
EFPECT ON DEPOSITS
(EXCL. INTERBANK DEPOSITS)















During the first half of 1931 the consequences of an easy
money policy were more and more clearly exemplified in
the banking system. Total deposits continued to decline, but
far less than loans and discounts. They were held up by large
increases in investments. At the same time the gradual de-
terioration in the quality of bank assets in the United States
led to an alarming increase in bank failures. In 1929 there
were 642 failures, in 1930, 1,345, and in 1931, 2,298. Hoard-
ing began on a large scale. The downward trend of money in
circulation was reversed, and the role of incoming gold in
the American banking system was changed. During the first
five months of i 931 it was just enough to offset the increase980 EXPERIMENTATION
in money in circulation. Except for well defined seasonal
needs Federal Reserve bank purchases of government securi-
ties had practically ceased in mid-1930, SO that in the first
half of 1931 there was no influence tending to increase mem-
ber bank reserve accounts. They ceased to rise. Amid ever
deepening depression and in spite of the appearance of hoard-
ing, the credit base remained practically unchanged.
The influences playing upon the credit base and credit
superstructure from December 31, 1929 to June 30, 1931 are
presented in Table 75. Tables 74 and 75 together disclose the
processes by which the American commercial banking system
came to the eve of the confidence crisis with reserves higher
than those existing at the peak of the inflation, with no sub-
stantial debt to the Federal Reserve banks and with large
unused lending power. They also show that gold movements
to and from the United States from October 1929 to May
1931 offered very imperfect illustrations of the textbook
maxim that under the gold standard, when gold flows out
credit is contracted, and when it flows in credit is expanded.
During the latter part of this period, however, gold inflows
did contribute powerfully to extreme ease of money in
America. They therefore helped to make investment abroad,
especially on short term at the relatively high returns still
available in debtor Countries, attractive to American banks.
The importance of export trade, especially to certain great
agricultural interests, gave such investment the sanction of
patriotic service, and the claims of international financial
cooperation in the face of dangers to the whole gold standard
system insistently pointed in the same direction. By helping
to place behind these broader motives of financial statesman-
ship the driving force of immediate self-interest, gold imports
exerted a strong indirect influence upon a series of adjust-
ments in the international balance of payments of the United
States to which they also made a direct contribution.
These adjustments were of the highest importance in the
whole history of the international gold standard. Their mainTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION g8i
features are indicated in Table 37 and Charts 30—5. Though
both exports and imports declined in value the United States
continued to have a very substantial export surplus on mer-
chandise account, amounting in 1930to$782 million. Cur-
rent invisibles showed on balance a debit of $i,oio million,
only slightly less than in 1929, so that in its ordinary inter-
change of goods and services the United States continued,
as it had been since 1923, to be a debtor for the year. This
debit of $228 million was far more than offset by a record
credit in interest, dividend and war debt account of $857
million and by an inward movement of capital other than
new issues. During 1930 Americans bought foreign securities
in the international security markets amounting to about
$360 million, but foreigners bought about $ioo million of
American securities and foreign securities previously accu-
mulated in America to the remarkable amount of over $8oo
million.8 These dealings in outstanding securities gave a net
credit of million,and with the interest and dividend
receipts constituted, as in earlier years, America's basic pull
over the exchanges (cf. Table 37).Aformidable credit bal-
ance of $1,184 million, a quarter of a billion dollars greater
than that of 1929, had therefore to be met in 1930bynew
foreign issues, short term capital exports, and gold imports.
I-lad there been no net import of capital through private trad-
ing in securities, the new foreign issues and short term capital
exports required to maintain the merchandise export surplus
at the level actually recorded without further gold imports
would have been of the order of $6oo million instead of about
$1,200million.With full realization of the intricate inter-
relations of all items in the balance of payments the figures
are presented in this way in order to stress the peculiar dif-
ficulties of the United States as an international financial
center. Having in the past lent under special circumstances
large sums to other creditor countries, and with a public less
S The Balance of International Payments of the United States in 1930, Trade
In formation Bulletin, 761,p.i ii.982 EXPERIMENTATION
accustomed to investing in foreign securities than those of
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and other European coun-
tries, she had difficulty in retaining her foreign investments
when they declined in price, and even in depression retained
a power to attract capital from abroad to her own securities.
Yet capital export on a large scale was necessary if the export
surplus to which the American economy had become ad-
justed was to be retained and an overwhelming attraction
for the world's gold was to be avoided. The revival of long
term lending in the first half of 1930 was therefore not only
of great importance to the American economy, but was also
part of a general defense of the international gold standard
system. It was supplemented by a steady and large outward
movement of short term capital of $484 million, of which
about one-third represented increased employment of Ameri-
can short term funds abroad and two-thirds reduced employ-
ment of foreign funds at short term in America.9 This move-
ment was partly due to the differential in interest rates cre-
ated by the leadership of the United States in the world move-
ment toward cheaper money and the hesitancy with which
Germany and other debtor countries followed that leadership.
It was due also to the use of American funds to strengthen
other currencies against the dollar, partly at foreign and
partly at American central bank initiative. The initiative of
foreign central banks is indicated by the decline of over $ioo
million in the contingent liability of the Federal Reserve
banks representing foreign central banking funds employed
in American acceptances under their guarantee. The initia-
tive of the Federal Reserve banks is shown by their purchase
of $35 million of sterling bills in October, November, and
December 1930 to support sterling exchange during a period
of seasonal weakness.1G During 1930 the United States, in her
own way, followed the British pre-war precedent of shifting
her international capital exports from long to short term
during a cyclical depression.
p.6o.
10Beckhart,op. cit., III, 459, and chart, p.456.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 983
During the first half of 1931 the adjustments in the various
items in the American balance of payments were carried
beyond the point where they can be described by any pre-war
analogies. The outward movement of long term capital was
converted into a net inward movement. The import of capi..
tal through direct investment and security trading, though
less than in 1930,exceededthe capital export through new
foreign issues. Though the export of short term capital con-
tinued to grow and to impart general strength to other cur-
rencies in terms of the dollar, it was, under these circum-
stances, neither sufficient in amount nor so distributed
geographically as to prevent a great reduction in the mer-
chandise export surplus of the country. In particular the
purchasing power of countries peculiarly dependent upon
new long term American loans was reduced. Exports fell in
value more rapidly than imports and a substantial part of the
basic pull given to the dollar by the inward flow of interest
and dividend payments and private capital movements was
offset by a growing debit balance on current transactions re-
sulting from the relatively well maintained volume of in-
visible imports and the reduced net merchandise exports.
The balance was struck by continued gold imports. The
figures for the full year of course, do not reflect this
situation, for during the latter part of the year the short term
capital export was greatly increased and the gold movement
reversed by the withdrawal of foreign funds after Great
Britain's abandonment of the gold standard. Preparations
were already in progress for these withdrawals from June to
September 1931.
Preparing for Trouble, June—September 1931
From June to September 1931 the United States was an active
participant in the efforts to stem by international financial
cooperation the final disintegration of the international gold
standard system as it existed during the Experimentation pe-
riod. The most dramatic of her contributions was the one year
moratorium on inter-governmental debts proposed by Presi-984 EXPERIMENTATION
dent Hoover in June after receiving urgent representations
concerning the acute difficulties imposed upon Germany by
real reparation transfers during a world depression. In addi-
tion the United States participated in a series of international
credits arranged to meet various urgent situations arising
from the confidence crisis which will be briefly enumerated in
Chapter 28. As a result of these credits the foreign bill port-
folio of the Federal Reserve banks, which had been reduced
to a nominal amount in January 1930, rose to previously Un-
attained proportions after June 1931.11Privatebanking credits
added to this emergency export of capital, and at the same
time the European exchanges were being further supported
by a mobilization of central banking funds in New York and
the export of gold through earmarking. In September this
was converted into an actual withdrawal of gold from the
United States. These earmarkings reflected a growing lack of
confidence in the American position itself. Withdrawal of
foreign assets held in the United States, motivated by fears
for their safety, and intercentral bank cooperation in the ex-
tension of American credits to foreigners served the same
technical ends as far as exchange rates were concerned until
September 1931. But the presence of both motives during the
final efforts to save the international gold standard system was
further evidence of the conflict between the general inter-
national and the particular national interest that made the
operation of a decentralized financial system far more difficult
than the operation of the gold standard before the war.
The gold withdrawals of October 1931, after Great Britain
had abandoned the gold standard, fall outside the Experi-
mentation period, but because of their organic connection
with the preparations of June to September the account given
of this whole episode in American financial history by Pro-
fessor Beckhart is quoted here:
Beckhart(op. cit., III, i6o, table) gives the monthly totals of this portfolio
from May to September as follows (thousands of dollars) :May, 1,074;
June, July, 34,37'; August, 145,215; September, 48,804.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 985
"The sharp reduction in the stock of gold in the United States
between September i6 and October 28, 1931, represented a run on
the American banking system. Various European nations had
lost confidence in the stability of the American financial organiza-
tion and anticipated the abandonment of the gold standard, and
those nations, France, Holland, Belgium, Sweden, and
land, which had balances or short-term investments in the New
York money market were withdrawing these in the form of gold.
The outflow of gold was presaged by the rise in foreign bank
deposits at the Federal Reserve banks and by the rapid decline in
the contingent liability on bills held by the Federal Reserve
banks for foreign account.
ALL FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
Contingent OF NEW YORK
Liability on Change in Gold
Bills Pur- Held UnderNet Gold
chased forForeign Earmarked Ac- Movements
Foreign Ac- Bank count for Weekfor Week
count Deposits Ending Ending
793!
June
17 379 5.7 —75.8 +9.8
24 368 20.0 —11.3 +8.7
July
1 335 35.6 —0.7 +30.2
8 302 39.9 None +5.6
15 290 56.2 +8.5 +0.!
22 298 58.5 +14.0 +4.2
29 254 100.4 +2.5 +2.!
Aug.
5 226 132.4 +13.7 +14.6
13 220 180.5 +5.0 +3.0
19 227 168.4 +2.0
26 230 182.9 None +1.2
Sept.
2 230 178.1 —3.5 +1.2
9 231 207.4 +5.0 +5.4
233 197.3 None +10.9
23 i8i 162.! +121.6 +i.6
30 100 95.! +153.8 —4.7
Oct.
7 8z 152.6 +28.0
14 41 231.4 +96.7 —ii6.8
21 68 160.9 +i8.i —93.8
28 83 157.6 —3.0 —6o.6g86 EXPERIMENTATION
Foreign bank deposits with the Federal Reserve banks fluctuate
ordinarily between 5 and 6 millions of dollars. These represent
simply working balances maintained by foreign central banks.
An understanding exists that any surplus above this amount is
invested immediately in American bankers' acceptances or in
United States securities for the account of the foreign central
bank. On June '7 the contingent liability on bills purchased for
foreign account was some 90millionsof dollars less than the year
previous. The reduction had been a gradual one and was in
consequence of the decline in rates of interest in the money mar-
ket. From that time until the first week in August, this amount
declined rapidly. The funds received by the central banks from
the sale of their acceptance holdings went to swell their deposits
with the Reserve banks, along with certain other funds which
the central banks had had invested in United States government
securities. The Federal Reserve banks took over these bills and
this amount together with other bills purchased prevented the
increase in foreign bank deposits from affecting the money mar-
ket. It was not until after September i6 that the withdrawal of
foreign funds from the New York money market assumed panic
proportions, and within four weeks of that date the contingent
liability on bills held for foreign account declined by 192mil-
lions of dollars. Central banks had the funds so invested set aside
in the form of earmarked gold, and in addition drew upon their
deposit accounts with the Federal Reserve banks to increase
further the amount of gold held under earmarked account.
Through October a large part of the gold earmarked was ex-
ported. Through September and October the mon.etary stock of
gold of the United States declined by 703millionsof dollars, or
by 14percent." (IV, 163—5)
The underlying trends in the adjustment of the American
balance of payments from 1929 to 1931werethus rudely in-
terrupted by the confidence crisis of the last half of '93'.
Their great permanent significance for the whole subsequent
history of the international gold standard should not on that
account be overlooked. This significance was the continuance
and growth of the basic pull of the dollar over the world's ex-
changes. The period of exceptionally large merchandise cx-THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 987
port surpluses was indeed brought to an end, but the special
circumstances leading to the remarkable decline in export
values were not of a permanent nature. The net debit arising
from current invisibles was likely to decline as exports de-
clined, and to revive again as exports increased, for some of its
components were sensitive to conditions favorable to exports
and some were functionally connected with export trade. A
transition to large and growing American import surpluses in
the trade and service items was clearly not to be accomplished
in a few years. The net inflow of payments for interest and
dividends on past debt, though subject to reduction, was
clearly not subject to rapid elimination. A net export surplus
from these items combined was to be expected as a continuing
feature of the American balance of payments, but there was
every indication that the capital items would not readily com-
bine to offset it. The forces leading to an inward movement
of capital through direct investment and the security markets
were very persistent and so also were those tending to dis-
courage the flotation of new foreign loans in America. A regu-
lar outflow of short term capital over a period of years was not
to be expected, for it is contrary to the nature of such move-
ments which are limited by the inducements offered for the
employment of American funds abroad and the actual amount
of mobile foreign funds in America. The short term move-
ment, moreover, was subject to rapid reversal with changes in
psychological attitudes and new economic and political trends.
It was, indeed, from 1929 to 1931 that the foundations were
being laid for the later reappearance of America as a great
magnet drawing to itself the world's gold (cf. Ch.
IIFrance
While the powers of the United States to attract gold were,
during the first years of the depression, still in process of
growth and development to full maturity, those of France
were at their zenith. French gold demand was one of the most
striking features of the whole period between the New York988 EXPERIMENTATION
Stock Exchange crash and the beginning of the confidence
crisis in Europe. Its amount and timing were the result of a
combination of three major forces:(t)the continued gen-
eral strength of the franc which enabled a 'correct' gold
standard attitude to bring gold to France; (2) the efforts made
to develop Paris more fully as an international financial cen-
ter; thedivergent attitudes of the French Treasury and
the Bank of France in the treatment of their foreign exchange
holdings.
The Continued Strength of the Franc and its
Changing Basis
The forces contributing to the strong pull of the franc over
the world's exchanges from 1929 to 1931 may be clearly seen
by taking Pierre Meynial's estimates of the French balance of
payments and combining and arranging them in the general
form used in these studies in presenting American balance of
payments figures. In M. Meynial's estimates for i 930 and i 931
'invisible capital movements'• is a balancing item, not very
homogeneous in character and containing the net error in-
volved in all the other items, so that such an arrangement of
his figures gives an appearance of exactitude that must be dis-
counted. For 1929 M. Meynial does not include any figure for
invisible capital movements, but leaves the statement un-
balanced by 5 milliard francs. In his discussion in the Revue
d'Economie Politique, however, he gives an estimate of the
net outward movement of short term capital for 1929 of i.8
to 2 milliard francs 12whichis used in our table. The figures
are all approximations, and the picture presented in Table
76 is to be taken as showing only what it professes to show, the
main outlines of the French balance of payments.
As in the case of the American balance of payments, the fig-
ures for 1931 reflect very strongly the movement of funds
during the confidence crisis of the second half of the year, and
12LaBalance des Comptes,' Revue d'Economie Politique, May—June
p. 482.TABLE 76
The French Balance of Payments Problem, 1929-1934
Paymentsfrom foreigners +, Payments to foreigners —
1929 1930 1935 1932 1933 1934
(milliardsof francs)
,Mdse.trade and current invisibles —0.4 —3.9 —6.4 —5.9 —4.7 —3.8
2 Payments on past financial obligations (gov. payments
and mt. on capital invested abroad) +5.2 +4.2 +3.3 +1.2 +1.7 +2.5
3 Net receipts from reparation and war debts +4.7 +4.9 * +2.6
A Basic pull over the exchanges (z + 2+ 3) +9.5 +5.2 —0.5 —4.7 —3.0 —5.3
4 Movement of long term capital other than new foreign
issues placed in France _3.2* —2.5 +6.4 +0.2 +0.5
5Invisible capital movements (short term and error)' _2.o* +6.8 +25.8 +2.0 —1.5 +2.3
BCapital movements cxci. new foreign issues placed in
France (4 + 5) —2.0 +3.6 -1-23.7 +8.4 —1.3 +2.8
C Adjustment required to be made by new foreign issues
and credits, official exchange transactions and gold move-
ments (A +B) +7.5 +8.8 +23.2 +3.7 —4.3 +1.5
6 New foreign issues placed in France —i.t —'.4 —7.3 —3.8 —1.3
7 Bank of France credit to foreign central bank —3.8
8 Net sales of foreign exchange by the treasury and bank
of France +5.' +4.1 +6.4 +17.8 +3.6
D New foreign issues and credits and official exchange
transactions (6 + 7 + 8) +4.0 +2.7 —4.7 +14.0 +2.3
E Adjustment required to be made by gold movements
(C +D) - +11.5 +11.5 +18.5 +17.7 —2.0 +1.5
9 Gold imports —8.5 —18.5 —17.7 +2.0 —1.5
Derived from figures of P. Meynial as presented by M. G. Meyers, Paris as a Financial Cenier, p.
* FromMeynial's annual articles in Revue d'Economie Politique.'Except for 5929Meynialtreats this item as a balancing figure.990 EXPERIMENTATION
it is admissible to assume that during the first half the tend-
encies disclosed in 1929 and 1930 were continued. These
tendencies were:
i)arapid decline in the basic pull of the franc over the ex-
changes due chiefly to a reduction in the net credit balance of
merchandise trade and current invisibles(with the Hoover
Moratorium of 1931thisbasic pull was eliminated)
2)agrowing inward movement of private capital which fully
offset this decline in the basic strength of the franc and produced
a steadily increasing credit balance to be offset by new foreign
loans and gold movements
3)a steady addition to this credit balance by official sales of
foreign exchange and a complete failure of new foreign loans to
fill the resulting gap in the balance of payments
4)a persistent gold import due less and less to permanent and
more and more to temporary causes.
In 1930,inspite of the adverse movement in the balance of
trade, France, by virtue of her international creditor position
both from past investment and in the system of post-war debt
and reparation payments, had a net credit balance of 5.2 mu-
hard francs in her international transactions before taking ac-
count of capital and cash items. Under the stimulus of attrac-
tive prices large amounts of French securities placed abroad
in earlier years were repatriated. In addition the government
repaid a Kreuger Loan of 2 milliard.'3 Had there been no
substantial inflow of short term funds into France this would
have gone far to offset the underlying strength of the franc.
But there was such an inflow. Foreign funds sought safety in
the comparative security of the French market. French banks
withdrew funds from Germany under circumstances already
described, and also from the creditor markets both because of
inadequate interest inducement for their employment there
and because they wished to strengthen their position at home
seasonally and in the face of various banking troubles. These
capital movements as a whole therefore added to rather than
diminished the basic pull of the franc, leaving a credit balance
of the order of 8.8 milhiard to be offset by new foreign loans
13Ibid., May—June 1931,pp. 516—8.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
or increases in French balances abroad, or, failing that, by gold
imports. New foreign loans were of only moderate propor-
tions, and official exchange transactions, far from accumulat-
ing fresh balances abroad, repatriated such balances on a large
scale. Consequently the gold requirement of France was still
further increased. These remarkable results were reached in
spite of a series of French policies designed to repel the inflow
of short term funds, to convert France from a silent into an
active partner in the gold standard nucleus, and to impose re-
straint upon the use of her latent powers to withdraw funds
from London and New York.
Writing in October 1930, Albert Aftalion stated that grad.
ually, as some of the international repercussions of the French
gold imports developed on a large scale, a fivefold policy was
initiated in France to check these imports:(i)to maintain
the Bank of France rate at a relatively low level; (2) to relax
the burden of taxation upon the income of, and the cost of
dealing in, foreign securities; todevelop a market for
foreign acceptances in Paris; toadmit to discount at the
Bank of France bills of only seven days' maturity in order to
discourage French banks from bringing gold to the Bank of
France to finance monthly requirements;(5)to have the
Treasury and the Bank of France refrain from selling their
holdings of foreign exchange.14
These policies make an imposing list, but they were in sum
very ineffective. At the time Professor Aftalion wrote they
had for the most part passed the peak of their effectiveness.
Notwithstanding the intervening great rise and fall of rates in
London and New York, the Bank of France had maintained
its relatively low rate of 3½percent for two years, from Jan-
uary 1928 to January 1930. On January 30, 1930 this rate was
reduced to 3 per cent while the Bank of England rate was still
5 per cent and that of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
41/2percent. The Bank of France did not, however, long re-
14 'The Causes and Effects of the Movements of Gold into France,' Selected
Documents of the Gold Delegation (Geneva, League of Nations, pp.
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tamits leadership in the downward mOvement of rates. Con-
cerning the January 1930 and subsequent reductions Mar-
garet Myers writes:
•.theBank of France reduced its rate on January 30th, 1930,
tO 3 per cent. It was motivated not only by the continuing inflow
of gold, but also by the desire to ease the market for proposed
Government borrowing. In May of the same year the rate was
again lowered, bringing it to 21/2 per cent., the lowest rate since
i8g8. In December 1930 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
brought its rate down to 2 per cent, an example which was fol-
lowed early in January, 1931, by the Bank of France, both
actuated by the desire to prevent further drains of gold from the
Bank of England.
When, however, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reduced
the rate in May, 1931, to 11/2 per cent., and the Bank of England
to 21/2 per cent., the Bank of France felt that the movement had
gone too far, and refused to fall into line, on the ground that a
further reduction of the discount rate in Paris would have pro-
duced too wide a margin between short-term and long-term rates,
and increased the already dangerous tendency to lend at long-
term, funds which had been borrowed for short periods." '5
Inthis the Bank of France may have been wiser than other
central banks, but it is nonetheless true that as a gold repel-
ling instrument the Bank of France rate became weaker as
the depression progressed. This was also true of other aspects
of the fivefold policy, in particular the effort to develop Paris
as an international center for short term financing and to re-
vive new foreign lending.
The Effort to develop Paris as a Market for Short Term
International Financing and to revive
French Foreign Lending
The combination of the special motive provided by the gold
movement to France with the same sort of national self-inter-
as a Financial Center (Columbia University Press, pp. 22—3.
This source is heavily drawn upon in the succeeding paragraphs.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 993
estthat had produced a strong movement to develop an ac•
ceptance market in America in 1914 led to a vigorous attempt
to revitalize the Paris acceptance market in 1929 and 1930.
The efforts made in earlier years to increase facilities for the
acceptance of bills, especially through the government sup-
portedBanque Nationale Française du Commerce Exterieur,
were supplemented in 1929 by the organization of the Banque
Française d'Acceptation. This new venture had the support of
both the government and the banks. In the face of declining
world trade and of price declines in many of the commodities
financed, its acceptances outstanding at the end of its first
year of business, December 31, 1930, were 565 million francs.
This offset an almost equal decline in the acceptances of other
banks and prevented a substantial net decline in total franc
acceptances from taking place, but it was the peak of the new
effort. In each succeeding year the total was reduced. The
Paris market was not brought to an equality even with that of
Amsterdam. From a balance of payments point of view, and
as a gold repelling measure, the efforts to develop the Paris
acceptance were of negligible importance. Several reasons
quite independent of the unfavorable economic conditions of
the time were responsible for this lack of success in translating
into French terms the typically English institution of a great
international bill market. There was no proper provision for
the fulfilment of the functions of the discount houses of
don, though this was attempted by the Compagnie Parisienne
de Réescompte. There was no well organized short term
money market to handle the floating supply of bills, and for-
eign sources of bills drawn on Paris were inadequately devel-
oped. Even more important, the traditional and customary
attitudes taken in England by all parties in the bill market
toward one another and toward the market as a whole were
not present in Paris. The Banque Française d'Acceptation, for
example, could not be perfectly sure that once it had sold
bills to the banks it might not be requested to take them back994 EXPERIMENTATION
again, a situation fatal to the firm foundation of a bill market.
In neither Paris nor New York could a money market institu-
tion indigenous to another soil be made to flourish by a cam-
paign of propaganda.
These unsuccessful efforts to make Paris a great money
market for financing international trade and so to reinvest
abroad foreign funds accumulating in France were supple-
mented by equally unsuccessful efforts to revive long term
French foreign investments. Concerning this Miss Myers com-
ments (pp. 140—1):
•.foreignissues were to be moderately encouraged by the re-
duction of the tax on dividends from 25 to i8 per cent. (in com-
parison with a i6 per cent. tax on French issues). At the same
time, certain technical improvements of the Bourse were to be
carried out, which would facilitate trading in foreign as well as
in domestic securities.
It is doubtful if such feeble efforts could have been successful in
any case, but they were completely useless in the face of the un-
willingness of the average investor to risk any more money
abroad, especially in bonds, and in view of the fact that the law
of 1916 [which required the consent of the Minister of Finance
before any foreign issue could be placed in Paris] was still in
force. The French investor was quite right in his judgment, as the
Americans learned later to their cost, but the result of the French
failure to lend out their surplus produced an accumulation of
gold in France which, perhaps fortunately, brought the world
crisis more quickly to a head."
Aside from French participation in the Young Loan and in
the various international credits extended during the confi-
dence crisis most foreign loans placed in the French market
were either refunding issues or the loans to political allies of
France. These were not long continued as French public
opinion became increasingly unfavorable to political loans
and the Chamber of Deputies took steps to limit the discre-
tion of .the Ministers in this matter. From a balance of
ments point of the revival of new foreign investments
was a feeble effort to stem the gold inflow.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 995
TheTreatment of Treasury and Bank of France
Foreign Exchange Holdings
Under the interpretation of the stabilization law which peir..
mitted it to hold and replace its stock of foreign exchange ac••
quired before June 1928, the Bank of 'France was able to
avoid any further aggravation of the foreign exchange prob-
lem through conversion of its own holdings of devisen. It
adhered loyally to this policy as a contribution to inter-central
bank cooperation, particularly with the Bank of England, un-
til the confidence crisis had developed alarmingly. From June













holdingsof the Bank of France did not change substantially.
This was not, however, true of the holdings of the Treasury or
of private banks.
As long as the Treasury was regularly in receipt of a surplus
of income over expenditures, it was able to follow the policy
described by Professor Aftalion and even to increase its for-
eign exchange holdings. These reached a peak of 11.2mu-
hard francs at the end of August 1930.16Withthe end of the
period of budget surpluses and the reappearance of budget
16Ibid., p.84; cf. Ch. 15,TheTechnical Heritage, for a discussion of the
acquisition of foreign exchange by the Treasury.
CHART 58
Ban/c of France, Gold Hold-
ings, Foreign Exchange, and
J"Tote Circulation, 1929-1935,
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deficits toward the end of i 930, however, the Treasury was
obliged to alter its policy and sell foreign exchange. In this
respect it acted independently of the Bank of France, but en-
deavored to soften the impact of its sales upon other markets.
Its policy is described by Miss Myers (op. cit., pp. 83—4):
"The Treasury was not insensible to the adverse effect of its ac-
tion upon the foreign exchanges ..., butthe budget surplus had
disappeared, and the funds had to be brought home from abroad
in order to meet domestic expenditures. In order to keep at least
a part of these sales out of the open market, it was arranged that
the Treasury should transfer foreign balances to French corpora-
tions which had foreign debts. The corporations gave to the
Treasury annuities running for the same length of time as the
original debt, at a higher rate of interest, in this way becoming
debtor to the Government instead of to a foreign creditor. The
Government thus found itself holding, instead of foreign short
funds, domestic long funds which could be discounted at the
Caisse des Depots et Consignations. It was estimated that seven
milliards of the Treasury's foreign funds could be disposed of
between 1930and1933,whichwould almost entirely avoid sales
in the open market. Actually only 1,332 millions were thus ex-
changed during 1930,anda still smaller amount during 1931.
Althoughthe scheme did not attain the' usefulness which had
been hoped for, it undoubtedly diminished the disturbance which
would otherwise have been caused by the Treasury's disposal of
its foreign currencies."
Such devices did not prevent Treasury sales of foreign ex-
change from adding greatly to French gold imports. Like
other parts of the fivefold program of gold repulsion, the
policy of refraining from official conversions of existing stocks
of foreign exchange became less effective as the depression
progressed.
The Treasury policy toward its own foreign exchange hold-
ings in 1930 also accentuated a seasonal characteristic im-
parted to the demand of the French banks for gold abroad by
the general nature of French fiscal operations. 'French revenue
flowed in most heavily in the last six months of the year andTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 997
during the first six months the government balances with the
Bank of France and government cash holdings were drawn
down. This was particularly true in the first half of 1930 when
the government was still actively reducing the public debt.'7
From January to May 1930 the gold inflow was interrupted,
for the government was both refraining from selling foreign
exchange and adding to the cash resources of the French
banks. But in the latter half of the year revenue was flowing
in, reducing the cash holdings of the banks, and the govern-
ment was selling foreign exchange. French demand for gold
abroad was therefore insistent. At the turn of the year 193o—
the reversal of this seasonal influence was obscured by the
fact that the French banks were still strengthening their cash
position by what The Economist has called "post-Oustric"
withdrawals of gold from London. Throughout 1931 they
continued to build up cash reserves by this and other means,
but the seasonal reduction in French gold demand reasserted
itself in April and May.
Fed thus from many sources, the stream of gold continued
to flow into France, but it encountered in the organization of
the French banking system the traditional great capacity for
gold absorption without inflationary results described in our
discussion of the technical heritage of the de jure stabilization
of 1928. Because of the lack of investment opportunities,
particularly the failure of foreign investment to revive, the
notes put into circulation by the gold imports and the reduc-
tion of government balances found their way largely into the
savings bank system. The funds of the Caisse de Dépôts were
increasing rapidly in 1930, as they had been for several years,
and the 'closed circuit' continued to operate in France.18
For these reasons the role of France in the international
gold standard system during the first years of the depression
was not that of a gold distributor but of a gold absorber. In
Cf. Hawtrey, The Art of Central Banking (Longmans, Green, 1932), p. 29.
18 For the relation of government expenditures to the increase in savings
bank deposits in France see Myers, op. cit., pp. 56—7, '79—80.998 EXPERIMENTATION
playing this role her powers were of a different order than
those of the United States. They were more spectacular, more
easily mobilized and put into action, and could more easily
be deployed in the political field, but, from a long run point
of view they were neither as strong nor as persistent as those
developing simultaneously in America. They were essentially
the powers of a country employing the gold exchange stand-
ard on a grand scale as a half-way house.
III Great Britain
The analysis of the Experiment of Sterling was
carried in previous sections up to the moment of the New
York Stock Exchange crisis. Thereafter economic pressures
converged upon Great Britain from all quarters of the globe.
These have now been considered at their various points of
origin, and the foundations for a description of the British
reaction to them have been carefully laid. Therefore the con-
tinuation of our analysis of the defense of sterling up to the
time when the confidence crisis spread from the continent to
Great Britain in July 1931isthe coping stone in the arch of
our description of the experiment of returning to gold as a
whole.
The Impact of the World Depression on the
British Balance of Payments
In Chapter 19theconclusion was reached that from 1925 to
1928 the weakening of Great Britain's basic pull over the ex-
changes, together with her efforts to maintain her position as
an international lender, made it necessary for her to attract
foreign balances and sell securities to foreigners in order to
counteract chronic weakness in the sterling exchange. This
situation existing in relatively prosperous times, combined
with the new position of the London bullion market in world
gold distribution, undermined the whole basis of the tech-
nique by which Great Britain had weathered major world de-
pressions in the past without any question being raised con-THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 999
cerning her ability to meet her obligations in gold. The
technique of strengthening sterling through a careful and
discriminating reduction in the net outward flow of capital by
shifting from the long to the short term '°depended
for its effectiveness on a sufficiently strong underlying position
to allow the resulting net inflow of payments to bring gold
to England. The problem of meeting a world depression afteT
long years of defending sterling by attracting foreign deposits
and investments, while the major burden of distributing gol.d
to South America and the Far East was borne by another
country, was new in British history. Its broad outlines are
written on the face of the estimates of the British balance
payments from January 1929 to September (Table78).
The figures for merchandise trade and current invisibles in
this table are those published by the Midland Bank in its
Review for November—December 1931.Theestimates for in-
visible current income, especially for the first nine months
of 1931 are, as stated by the Midland Bank, only approxima-
tions indicating "orders of magnitude," rather than exact fig-
ures. To them have been added figures showing part of the
private capital movement and gold exports. As an indication
of the short term capital movement a figure has been included
showing the reduction in the liability of the London market
to foreigners on certain short term international transactions
during 1929,1930,and the first four months of 1931.This
figure is derived from the estimates of the short term indebt-
edness of the London market (Table 77) made by the Mac-
millan Committee for reasons described in their Report (p.
112):
"In view of the large volume of foreign issues which have been
floated in recent years in London and of the common belief that,
in addition, British investors have made large purchases in the
United States, partly of foreign bonds initially issued in New
York and partly of American securities, whilst at the same time
19Cf.Ch. ig, The Pre-War Technique of Shifting from the Long Term to
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our surplus for new foreign lending has been diminished, it has
been surmised that Great Britain must have been financing some
part of her new foreign investment on long-term by means of an
increase, and perhaps a dangerous increase, in her short-term
liabilities to foreign centres. We have accordingly made it our
business to collect for the first time as full a summary as possible
both of foreign liquid resources in London and of British ac-
TABLE 77
London Money Market, Short Term Foreign Liabilities, 1927-1931
Macmillanfigures (millions of pounds)
END OF YEAR MARCH
19271928192919301931
Depositsand sterling bills held in London
on foreign account 41950345!435407
Sterling bills accepted on foreign account i 40201 176I 6i 153
Net liability of London 279302275274254
SOURCE Committee on Finance and Industry, Report (1931),Cmd.3897, p. 112
ceptances on foreign account.... Wecannot claim that our fig-
ures are complete and they could doubtless be improved with
further experience; but we believe that they may cover, in quan-
tity, nearly the whole field. The most important item about which
we have no information is the total of sterling bills held in their
own custody by foreign banks, and it may be that this item is a
more fluctuating one than the items for which we have obtained
figures. We were prepared to find that these totals might give
some support to the fears expressed above, but in fact they are
reassuring."
Those famous estimates, far from being reassuring, made a
large psychological contribution to the final development of
the confidence crisis in Great Britain by dramatizing the fact,
not properly understood by the general public, that London's
short term investments abroad were far smaller than foreign
short term claims in London. The net changes in these Lon-
don obligations, however, are included in Table 78 merely to
show that after 1929 sterling was weakened rather than
strengthened by the movement of short term funds. TheTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 1001
table is completed by including the Midland Bank figures for
new foreign capital applications, gold figures taken from the
Board of Trade Journal for 1929 and 1930 and from the
monthly figures published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin for
the first nine months of 1931, and a balancing figure repre-
senting other capital movements and error.
TABLE 78
The British Balance of Payments Problem,




Mdse. trade —381 —387 —282
Shipping earnings +130 +105 +6o
Commissions, etc. +65 +55 +35
Government receipts +24 +21 +10
Sundryother receipts +15 +15 +10
Incomefrom investments +270 +235 +100
Totalcredits on current account +504 +431 +215
Mdse.trade and current invisibles' (The Problem) +123 +44 —67
Reduction of short term liability (deposits and
sterling bills) to foreigners 2 —27 —I
Newcapital issues4 —ro8 —46
Other capital movements and error —17 +70 +112
Totalcapital movements and error —138 —39 +46
Goldb +15 —5 +2!
Gold,capital, and error (The Adjustment) —123 —44 +67
1MidlandBan/c Review, Nov.—Dec. 1931,p.2.
2Committeeon Finance and Industry, Report (1931), Cmd. 3897, p. 112.
figurefor 4 months only.
Midland Bank figures.
Statistical Abstract of U.K., 1931,p.389, for 1929and1930;FederalReserve Bulletin,
Nov. '93', p. 630, for first 9 months of 1931.
Themost striking feature of Table 78 is the decline and
disappearance of the surplus available for foreign investment
as a result of merchandise trade and current invisible income.
During 1929 and 1930 Great Britain had to keep the net Out-
ward movement of capital within very narrow bounds and to1002 EXPERIMENTATION
supplement her 'gold income' from various special sources in
order to prevent large drains from the Bank of England gold
reserves. In the first nine months of 1931 she was actually
faced with a deficit which had to be covered by borrowing or
drawing upon her past capital investments abroad.
The rigidity of the British system of industrial production
and the difficulty in reducing costs combined in a complex
way with the catastrophic fall in raw material prices to sap
the underlying pull of sterling over the exchanges and to
create acute financial problems connected with gold and cap-
ital movements. The decline in raw material prices reduced
the world's purchasing power for British goods and the
rigidity of her costs prevented Great Britain from competing
effectively in the shrinking market for exports. Consequently
British exports declined very sharply in volume. On the other
hand the decline in prices enabled Great Britain to import on
very favorable terms. There was a remarkable movement in
the terms of trade in her favor which made possible a slight
reduction in the large adverse merchandise trade balance in
spite of reduced exports and well sustained imports,2° but it
also contributed to unemployment. A serious attempt to com-
bat this by turning British productive powers to new types of
export commodities could have been successful only at the
cost of a reduction in real wages, as was pointed out by T. E.
Gregory in his Addendum to the Macmillan Committee Re-
port (p. 235)
"The gain through the alteration of the terms of trade in our
favour involves a transfer of labour into alternative
and, if it is to be absorbed in these occupations, labour may have
to accept a lower marginal wage, because in those other occupa-
tions, there has not been a shift of the terms of trade in favour
of the British seller."
20 The merchandise import surplus for the first nine months of 1931 was at
the annual rate of £376 million as compared with £387 million in and
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Such a shift, moreover, would have encountered the still
stantial inertia which had constituted one of the major
lems of British industry during the whole post-war
Against this could be placed as offsets a substantial reductior
in the cost to the nation of maintaining the unemployed and
a slight direct contribution to reducing the net import
plus. These doubtful blessings are described, for the first
quarter of 1931inthe body of the Macmillan Report
114):
"During the first quarter of this year [1931]thequantity of our
exports fell off by more than 30percent., whereas the reduction
in the quantity of our imports was only 6 per cent. Nevertheless,
as a result of the catastrophic fall of raw material prices, the
visible balance of trade has been actually less adverse to us than
in recent years, the net position in terms of money moving
millions in our favour, so that less of our surplus under other
heads(i.e., from foreign interest, shipping, etc.),is being re-
quired to-day to finance our imports than in 1930orin 1929.
Thesame point can be strikingly illustrated by what has hap-
pened in the case of the single commodity wheat. At the price
prevailing in December, 1930,theannual cost of our wheat im-
ports would be about £30millionsless than it was in 1929,and
£6o millions less than in 1925.Itis obvious what a large
tion this single item represents to the national cost of supporting
the present volume of unemployment. It is a great misfortune
both for us and for the raw material countries that we should
have a great volume of unemployment through their inability to
purchase from us as a result of the fall in the price of their prod-
uce. But merely from the point of view of our balance of trade
it is not to be overlooked that the latter fact not only balances the
former but may even outweigh it."
When the changes in the terms of trade are considered in
their relation, not narrowly to the merchandise balance, but
to the whole balance of payments, a far different picture is
presented. Indirectly the fall in prices was disastrous even
from a balance of payments point of view for it undermined1004 EXPERIMENTATION
the debt paying capacity of debtor countries and diminished
the inward flow of British income from foreign investments,
the decline in which was the main element in the adverse
movement of current invisible income shown in Table 78.
In 1929 this income was £504 million, in '93° £43' million
and, according to the approximations of the Midland Bank,
it was running during the first nine months of 1931 at the
rate of only £282 million per annum. Loss of income on capi-
tal invested abroad, the decline in income from shipping, to-
gether with the lack of any really substantial reduction in
the net merchandise import surplus, produced a fundamen-
tal and increasing weakness of sterling during the depression.
The terms of trade had, in fact, turned so greatly in favor of
Great Britain that all the direct advantages were swallowed
up in the loss of other income for which the change was re-
sponsible.
Under these circumstances Great Britain's effort to main-
tain her position as an international lender on long term had
to be curtailed in the manner already described in our dis-
cussion of the deflationary effects of the ending of competi-
tive international long term lending, and of the difficulties
of Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, Australia, and even
India in breaking through the resistance of the London mar-
ket to granting new long term accommodation. Even in the
field of short term credit, the Macmillan Committee figures
indicate that sterling bills accepted for foreign account stead-
ily declined. This however was fully accounted for by the
fall in the prices of many of the commodities financed.
There can be no doubt that on the continent at least, and
particularly in Germany, London pursued a bold policy in
continuing to keep a large volume of sterling acceptance
credit outstanding. The traditional sense of responsibility
toward good customers in difficulties was strong, and the fatal
consequences of wholesale withdrawals of accommodation
were clearly recognized by the City. Reliance upon 'the feel'
of the market rather than on a general economic analysis ofTHE IMPACT OF THE. DEPRESSION 1005
theposition was not abandoned as a guide to action. It was
not as clear then, as it has since become, that this was a source
of danger under the peculiar circumstances of the time. In
addition there was in the background as a driving force in the
extension of short term credits the new competition within
the London market and the inter-market competition
tweenLondon and New York. At the cost of accentuating
the already marked decline in the quality of bills held by
the London market, the traditional responsibility of keeping
open the short term credit resources of London in time
difficulty was not shirked.
The great gap left in British balance of payments figures
by the absence of any direct estimate of the internationa
movement of private securities and of many elements in the
total short term capital movement prevents any really
factory analysis of the whole position. The balancing figure
required in Table 78 to take account of these omissions and
of the undoubtedly large margin of error in the other esti-
mates, however, leaves no doubt of the continued vital im-
portance throughout 1929—3 i of the retention of foreign in-
vestments in sterling securities, of the employment of foreign
short term funds in London, and the need of supplementing
England's gold income from special sources.
The Role of Great Britain in World Gold Distribution
In our analysis of the changes in the London bullion market
after the return to gold as compared to the pre-war period
we stated that England's gold income no longer gave adequate
assurance that her international credit operations could be
carried on without apprehension concerning their effect upon
the sterling exchange, and that the protection of the British
gold standard was confided in large measure to the American
capital market. In the international movement of gold from
debtor to creditor countries that followed the decline of in-
ternational long term lending the bulk of the gold shipments
from South America and the Far East went, not to London,1006 EXPERIMENTATION
the world's greatest financial center, but to New York,21 to
help meet obligations incurred there after the war. The vital
significance of this was that when London shifted to New
York part of her responsibility for distributing gold through-
out the world, she shifted also part of her power to draw gold
from the rest of the world in time of crisis through inter-
national credit operations. This fact, combined with the
peculiar drawing powers of France over the world's gold, and
the exceptional strength of several European 'neutral' ex-
changes for reasons already briefly stated in Chapter 26, to-
gether with the underlying weakness of sterling, accounts for
the main features of the flow of gold through the London bul-
lion market from October 1929 to June 1931.
At the conclusion of our discussion of Bank rate and the
defense of sterling in Chapter 19 we stated that the raising
of the Bank of England rate to 61/2 per cent on September 26,
1929 stopped the drain of gold to the United States, but did
not stop the French drain. France continued to draw gold
from London as well as from New York from October 1929
to January 1930, and not until December 1929 did the un-
seasonable strength imparted to sterling by the return flow of
funds from New Yprk to Europe enable London to take gold
from New York as an arbitrage transaction. London during
these months continued to serve as a channel of remittance
from New York to the continent, thus affording further il-
lustrations of some of the technical points made in our ab-
stract discussion in Chapter iof the effects of transferring
international money market functions from London to New
York. The December imports from America, however, were
sufficient to offset the inconveniences of London's middleman
position and to give England a net gold import for that
month notwithstanding French demand. South African ship-
ments were substantial, indicating a decline in Indian pur-
21 E.g., South American gold shipments to New York in 1930 were about three
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chases in the bullion market.22 Gold was coming in from
South America, particularly fromArgentina until December
when the Caja de Conversion was closed. When the Argen-
tine shipments ceased, an import movement from Australi.a
began, owing to the acute financial difficulties described in
Chapter 24.
The gold inflow continued without interruption until
April 1930,butafter January it was due to a somewhat
ferent combination of Circumstances. In February the bulliom
market was relieved by the practical suspension of
demand, a seasonal factor strong enough to impress its stamp
upon the whole British gold movement from 1929 to 1931,23
In the same month, however, a steady though moderate de-
mand from Germany was suddenly swelled to large propor-
tions partly as a result of the successful conclusion of the
Hague negotiations.24 At this moment, however, large ship-
ments of gold were received in London from Spain. These
were, providentially, perfectly timed to offset, together with
the regular South African supplies, the German purchases
and to prevent a net gold export. During March and April
sterling was seasonally strong. The price of gold receded from
the Bank of England selling price. The real tightness of the
position is indicated, however, by the fact that only once,
on March 25, was the Bank of England able to purchase gold
at its statutory rate,25 though for several weeks the market
price hovered just above that rate (Chart 50) .Atthis moment
Belgium began to buy gold in London. The timing of these
22 The force of Indian demand in the London bullion market is expressed in
British gold export and import statistics largely through changes in the rate
of inflow from South Africa on account of the direct physical shipment from
Durban to India of South African gold bought in London.
23 Cf. supra, The Treatment of Treasury and Bank of France Foreign Ex-
change Holdings.
24 Cf. Ch. 25, The Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Reichsbank
during the Negotiation and Adoption of the Young Plan.
25 Samuel Montagu & Co., Annual Bullion Letter, 1931,p.5.ioo8 EXPERIMENTATION
purchases, was, in view of the announced policy of the Na-
tional Bank of Belgium toward the gold exchange standard,
evidence of inter-central bank cooperation between London
and Brussels (cf. Ch. 26), for they were made when French
demand had ceased, when German demand was once more
moderate and when large shipments were coming in from
Australia. Consequently, although in April exceptional In-
dian demands, due to very special circumstances (cf. Ch. 23),
cutdown the volume of available new gold from South
Africa, British gold imports were substantial.
After seven months the gold inflow was ended in May 1930
by a sudden revival of French demand. This was partly due
to the payment of the French share in the capital of the Bank
for International Settlements 28bythe use of sterling balances,
in itself evidence of the difference between London and
Paris as international financial centers. Chiefly, however, it
was due to the general factors set out in our discussion of the
role of France in world gold distribution. For the next three
months French demand dominated British gold movements
and, in combination with reduced South African shipments
and a falling off in receipts from Australia, caused substantial
gold exports. It also led to a technical controversy that had
the effect of raising the gold export point from London to
Paris, and therefore allowed the London price of gold to
fluctuate at over 84 s.11½d. per ounce for the rest of the
year (Chart 50).
The cause of this unusual behavior of the London price of
gold is described by Samuel Montagu and Company in their
weekly bullion letter for June i 1, 1930:
"An interesting position has arisen in the London gold market
owing to the fact that the Bank of England is now giving out bars
of standard fineness(about gi66/ioooo)instead of fine bars
(ranging from 9950/10000upwards)which buyers had been ac-
customed to receive from that institution. Under the Gold Stand-
ard Act of 1925 the Bank of England is entitled to sell bars of
26Ibid., 1930.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 1009
any fineness provided not lower than the standard of sovereigns
(9162/3/1000). For many months past the Bank's stock of fine
gold bars has been heavily depleted by withdrawals for the Con-
tinent, whilst the bulk of its receipts has been in the form of
sovereigns, as will be seen by the following figures:
From June 1,1929 toMay 31,1930
BARGOLD SOVEREIGNS
Received Withdrawn Received Withdrawn
from abroadfor export
£18,334,000£63,615,000 £39,651,000£452,000
It is therefore only natural that the Bank should decide to exer-
cise its legal right of selling bar gold of standard fineness only. As
the Bank of France does not accept bars of a lower fineness than
9950, a consequence of this change of practice is to lower the
Gold Export point to France by the cost of refining the standard
gold, and accordingly the rate fell rapidly yesterday from about
123.88 to 123.70 when the Bank's decision became known. It will
be readily understood that there was unusually keen demand for
the £476,000 of bar gold from South Africa in the open market
to-day, as this was the only fine gold available for France. All but
£30,000, which was required for India and the trade, was bought
by France at the fixed price of 85 S. o3/8 d. per fine ounce, a
premium ofd. for delivery of fine gold being established over
84 S. 111/2 d., which has been the maximum price for dealings in
the open market since the restoration of the Gold Standard in
1925."
This situation was in popular discussion often attributed to
a desire on the part of the Bank of England to shut off or
reduce the gold movement to France and was considered by
the orthodox as an impairment of the full beauties of the gold
standard. There seems, however, to be no good reason for
not accepting the above account of the matter at its face value.
With the increased cost of gold when taken from the Bank
of England French demand in London was for a while con-
fined to fine gold from South Africa and French gold imports
were diverted from London to New York, but in August1010 EXPERIMENTATION
1930 standard gold was being taken at the Bank of England
for shipment to France.27
Attention should be drawn to one additional aspect of this
episode. Because gold sent to France from England had to be
refined before it could be sold to the Eank of France, daily
shipments were limited by the capacity of the refiners.
Though the influence of this factor upon gold distribution
through London in i 930 was probably slight it has a general
interest for the study of the technical operation of the inter-
national gold standard. It was only one of several cases in gold
standard history in which physical limitations in the handling
of gold altered the suddenness and violence with which gold
movements, if unfettered by any material restrictions, might
take place, and which therefore have some bearing upon
theoretical discussions of purely accounting devices for gold
clearance. The existence of only one scale for the weighing
of imported gold in New York is another example, as is the
general limitation placed upon the amount of gold that can
be insured on any one ship. The role of such physical limi-
tations, though a minor one as a rule could, on occasion,
become important, as it did in connection with the defense
of the dollar against sudden French withdrawals in Septem-
ber and October 1931.28 In the face of a steady and persistent
demand such as that of France in London in 1930, it became
only a technical detail. Nevertheless Samuel Montagu and
Company in their Annual Bullion Letter, attributed
to it the long duration of French demand, and it is unques-
tionably true that the exceptionally large exports of January
1931 were partly owing to the fact that on January i6 the
Bank of France signified its willingness to accept standard
bars.
The price of gold remained above 84 S. 11½ d. in London
until January 1931 (Chart 50), a proof of the dominance of
27TheEconomist, Jan.1931, p.5.
28Cf.Ch. 32, Liquidation of French Dollar Balances and the Defense of the
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French demand. A premium on forward francs over spot
francs even allowed gold to be bought forward for France
before it reached London, and in August i 930 such purchases
began.29 Continental, especially Swiss and German demand,
was also insistent from the late spring of 1930 to the end of
the year. A special combination of circumstances during the
late summer and early autumn interrupted the net outward
flow, however. The changing situation in India was reflected
in increasingly large and steady shipments from South Africa
to London. Imports from South America, especially from
Argentina and Brazil, were substantial, and Australia con-
tinued to ship large amounts. Finally in October further ship-
ments began to come in from Spain. By the end of the year.
however, these additions to England's gold income proved
to be insufficient to offset continental demand, and over the
year end England lost gold heavily. In November a special
demand for gold by French banks anxious to assure their
liquidity following the Oustric scandals arose,3° and in De-
cember 1930 and January 1931 French demand carried all
before it. Under these circumstances the autumn purchases
of sterling bills by the Federal Reserve banks constituted
inter-central bank cooperation of strategic importance. The
New York exchange moved to a point within the range be-
tween market and Bank of England gold export points (Chart
50), but was not competitive at the Bank of England.
These year end shipments were the last net monthly gold
exports before the spread of the confidence crisis to England
in July 11. The changes in the attitude of the East toward
the precious metals were not only being expressed by con-
tinued large receipts from South Africa, but also by a growing
stream of imports from the Malay States. The latter more
than offset the moderate exports of gold from London to
India that had continued until the middle of 1930. Of far
more immediate importance was the reappearance of the
29SamuelMontagu & Co., Annual Bullion Letter, 1930.
80 Ibid.,1931.1012 EXPERIMENTATION
seasonal reduction in French demand. February 1931 was
the first month since August 1930 when there were no French
withdrawals of gold at the Bank of England,31 and after
March other exports to the continent also temporarily ceased.
Under the accumulating difficulties of her internal position
and under pressure of the secondary withdrawal of funds
from abroad following the crisis of September 1930, Ger-
many's demand for gold in London fell off at the beginning
of 1931, and disappeared entirely in March. In February and
March Belgian demand had temporarily reappeared, once
more being timed to coincide with seasonal in ster-
ling. Hence it did not prevent the London price of gold from
again receding from the Bank of England selling price (Chart
50). On March i6 the Bank of England was able to buy gold
in the market for the first time since March 25, 1930, paying
the fixed price of 84 s. iol/4 d., and on March 31 the London
price of gold reached 84 S. 93/4 d., the lowest in five years.82 Un-
der these relatively favorable circumstances the British gov-
ernment took a step which was variously interpreted, but in
general was considered to reflect apprehension concerning
the position of sterling. Since the early days of the war the
Treasury had prevented its operations in the sterling-dollar
exchange from influencing the market unduly by operating
a trading account known as the Dollar Exchange Account.
Since the funding of the American war debt one of the prin-
cipal uses of this account had been to handle the actual ac-
cumulation of dollars needed for the payments under the
agreement.83 Announcement was made on May 2 that a £20
million balance in this Account would be taken into the
193 1—32 budget as non-tax revenue. Because this balance was
held partly in dollars and partly in sterling this did not
necessarily mean that the Treasury was strengthening itself
31. Ibid. 82 Ibid.
The Dollar Exchange Account was the predecessor and first model of the
Exchange Equalization Account established in 1932; cf. Ch.The Establish.
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by a fund of $ioo million for the further defense of the
pound,84 though some proportion of the total was undoubt•
edly made available in dollars. The action finds a place in
the story of British gold movements chiefly because it was
part of the psychological background of later events.
The whole situation was changed with the outbreak of the
confidence crisis in June 1931Thebullion market became
very active. In June regular South African shipments were
being supplemented by imports from the Straits Settlements
and India, and in additionmillionin gold was received
from Germany. At the same time individual Germans were
buying gold in the market. These hoarding purchases were
small in individual amount, but large in the aggregate. The
movement of frightened capital from Germany brought
erland into the market. Competition was keen and on June
i6 the price went to 85 s. loi/4 d. In July England was sub-
jected to an international run described by Samuel Montagu
and Company in their Annual Bullion Letter, 1931:
"Allthe exchanges became adverse. Available supplies of South
African gold and other gold were readily absorbed, the former
being sold while on the high seas. The demands upon the Bank
of England were unprecedented, and during the period i6th to
2gth July, withdrawals of gold from the Bank, principally Eor
France, but also for Holland, Belgium and Switzerland, resulted
in a net efflux of no less than £32,061,408."
At the height of this crisis, in the week of July 15, the ster-
ling-dollar rate reached 4.8315/10, yet gold did not move to
New York. This notable fact was the result of informal re-
sistance by the London money market to the outward move-
ment of gold. Financial institutions in London dependent on
the Bank of England for the standing of their paper in the
market are sensitive not only to the state of the exchanges,
but to Bank of England atmosphere as well. When this at-
mosphere is clearly adverse to gold exports three gradations
84 The Economist, May 2, 1931, p. 936.
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of such resistance are possible. During the war the bullion
brokers themselves refused on patriotic grounds to execute
orders.86 This method was not resorted to between 1925 and
September i 931, but less conspicuous obstacles were on oc-
casion placed in the path of gold arbitrage movements. In
November 1928 English houses that usually did gold arbi-
trage business were inclined to hold back and let someone
else, either another house or a foreign branch bank, take the
initiative. From April to July 1931 English houses would
neither take the initiative, though the rate went below gold
export point, nor execute orders for others. This was a far
stronger and more general method of resistance to gold ex-
ports than the one used in 1928. The restraint exercised at
this time was sufficient to ensure that during that critical
period England's gold problem was not complicated by ex-
ports to America. After July 1931, when the exchange rate
was kept at the gold export point by the use of foreign credits,
orders were freely executed.37
On July 23 Bank rate was raised from 21/2 to 31/2 per cent,
followed by the announcement that credits amounting to
£50 million had been granted the Bank of England by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Bank of France.
Bank rate was again raised, to 41/2 per cent, on July 30, and
the exchanges moved in favor of England. On August 5,
however, they suddenly reacted, and a revival of continental
demand resulted in a loss of gold of £2,500,000 by the Bank
of England to France and the Netherlands. On August 28
the Treasury announced credits of $200 million and 5 mu-
hard francs from American and French financial groups.
With this help the exchanges were supported. "Until the
middle of September the Bank of England secured gold from
86Cf.Ch. 2,TheMinimum Change in Legal Form Consistent with the Neces-
sary Changes in Practice.
87Itwas stated to the writer on good London authority that these foreign
credits were not intended to prevent gold from leaving England, but to keep
the foreign exchange rates at the gold points, and that this was necessary be-
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the open market, but only by paying over the statutory buy-
ing price. An 'undisclosed buyer' was also in the market,
as had happened on previous occasions, the purchases were
followed by announcements by the Bank of either purchase
of bar gold or the 'release' of sovereigns 'set aside,' from
which it would seem that the gold secured by the 'undisclosed
buyer' had indirectly found its way into the Bank of England's
holding." 38
OnSeptember 15buyersfor the Netherlands appeared in
the market, and gold began to be withdrawn from the Bank.
Demand became intense and was the immediate precursor of
the suspension of the gold standard.
Prolongation of Established Credit Control
Techniques until June '93'
The international flow of gold described above was faithfully
reflected in the statements of the Bank of England. Until
June 1931changesin the Bank's gold holdings together with
the strong seasonal fluctuations in the amount of notes in
circulation caused a series of sharp fluctuations in the re-
serve of the Banking Department (Chart 40).Themanner
in which they combined to produce this result is shown in
Chart 39, which also indicates that during 1930theBank's
reserve was still being built up by a continued decline in
notes in circulation.89
Until the end of 1930 the established techniques of credit
control, which had from 1925 to 1929 prevented changes in
the factors playing upon the Bank of England's own reserve
or changes in the amount of government deposits from in-
fluencing 'bankers balances at the Bank of England,' were,
with very slight modifications, still in full force and effect
(cf. Ch. 19).Themain open market operations of the Bank
were directed toward offsetting the fluctuations in its own
38SamuelMontagu & Co., Annual Bullion Letter, 193!,p.7.
Thisappears graphically in Chart 89 in the rising of the Reserve line above
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reserve. In spite of budget difficulties, which were accumulat-
ing during the period, and refunding operations involving
over £100 million in government securities, public deposits
were kept within the now familiar range of (io to £20 mil-
lion. The fluctuations within that range were greater than in
previous years, and were not as closely offset by the combined
movement of reserves and securities though close inspection
of the top line of Chart 40 A and the 'public deposits' line
in Chart 40 B reveals that they were taken account of in open
market operations. In April they were more than fully offset,
but in September they were less than fully offset, so that
'bankers balances' were subject to some variation from this
cause. This was a minor matter. No trend appeared in the
movement of 'bankers balances' and the seasonal fluctuations,
which were of the traditional pattern, called by Mr. Smit
in describing the pre-war figures the 'W' pattern, had to be
taken care of as before by accommodation secured by the
banks through discounts and advances. During 1930, in fact,
the general movement of the two items was unusually alike
(Chart 42).
Upon this stable credit base, supplemented by a slight in-
crease in their cash holdings, the London clearing banks built
up during 1930 a credit superstructure which carried their
deposits to the highest point yet reached. On December 3,
1930 they averaged £1,838 million as compared to the De-
cember 1928 peak of £1,815 million. As stated at the end of
our discussion of the credit superstructure before the depres-
sion, this was due entirely to a large increase in their 'bills
discounted,' of which the major element was an increase in
treasury bills discounted. In the first quarter of 1930 the
government made a vigorous effort to reduce the floating debt
by the retirement of a more than seasonally large amount of
treasury bills, a step prepared for in 1928 when a substantial
portion of the floating debt was transferred from the form of
'advances from government departments' to the form of treas-
ury bills (Charts 6 and 7) .Nevertheless,the seasonal reduc-THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 1017
tion in 'treasury bills discounted' and the corresponding
reduction in 'total deposits' of the London clearing banks
was not unusually large (Chart 45 A), an indication that the
proportion of total treasury bills outstanding held by the
banks was increasing. After April i 930, when the process was
seasonally reversed, the government increased its treasury
bills outstanding more than in any other recent year except
1928 when the form of the floating debt was changed. At the
same time the London clearing banks increased their dis-
counts of treasury bills by more than the amount that had
been customary during the preceding seven or eight years.4°
This indicates that during this period also the clearing banks
were increasing their relative importance as holders of treas-
ury bills, and 'total deposits' were greatly increased.
In this respect, and in others the behavior of the credit
superstructure in 1930 was very much like its behavior during
the last preceding great cyclical recession, 1921—22. Almost
the same words used in our discussion of the English credit
superstructure during deflation in Chapter io can be applied
to the position in 1930. The banks were clearly giving un-
usual assistance to the government in facing the fiscal prob-
lems of a deflationary period through their support of the
treasury bill market, while at the same time, in their search
for employment of their funds, they were increasing their
investments as their advances fell off. Chart 76 B discloses
the similarities in the ratio system of the joint stock banks
in 192 1—22 and 1930. They are characteristic features of a pe-
riod of abundant credit and easy money.
With the release of pressure on the exchanges following
the ending of the New York Stock Exchange boom such a
period had begun in England. Bank rate was reduced by
40 The increases in the two items from May to December 1925—30 were (mil-
lions of pounds):
192519261927192819291930
Treasurybills outstanding 75 97 8g 231 96 124
Treasury bills discounted by the
London clearing banks i i 42 30 42 12 84ioi8 EXPERIMENTATION
successive stages of 1/2 per cent from 6½onOctober 31, 1929
to 3 per cent on May i, 1930, following at varying intervals
reductions in the New York rate. The open market rate for
three month bills fell even faster so that during the spring of
1930 a differential in interest rates in favor of New York was
definitely established (Chart 4g). A wide spread, amounting
at times to nearly i per cent, also appeared between the mar-
ket rate and Bank rate (Chart 48), rendering Bank rate in-
effective and creating difficulties for the discount houses.
Since the discount houses obtained most of their funds for
carrying treasury bills at i per cent below Bank rate there
was little profit in keeping a large portfolio, a circumstance
that may have had something to do with the increased hold-
ings of treasury bills by the banks. The domestic situation
seemed to call for a further reduction in Bank rate, but the
international position forbade it. With the end of the revival
of foreign lending in New York the need for a higher interest
rate in London than in New York became extremely im-
portant to strengthen sterling. In the autumn of 1930, a time
when seasonal weakness in sterling could still be expected,
the New York bid for gold, though not competitive with the
strong continental demand in the London bullion market,
was only just under the 'market gold export point' (Charts
50 and 51). Consequently Bank rate was held at 3 per cent.
The downward course of open market rates was checked,
and with subsequent reductions in New York rates, the Lon-
don open market rate for three month bills soon moved once
more to a position between the New York acceptance and the
New York call money rate (Chart 49). The gap between
the London market rate and Bank rate still persisted, how-
ever, until the Bank took steps, by its open market policy,
to draw the two rates closer together. Toward the end of the
year this became increasingly desirable from a foreign ex-
change point of view. Gold was moving heavily to the con-
tinent, as described above. The dollar, in spite of activeTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
support given sterling by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, once more moved above bullion market gold export
point, though it was not strong enough to draw gold from
the Bank of England (Chart 50).
Itis not, therefore, surprising that during the first months
of ii anincrease in Bank of England reserves duea
seasonal return of notes from circulation was more than fully
offset by open market sales of government securities. Though
'discounts and advances' were not substantially reduced,
'bankers balances' declined (Charts 40 and 42). The market
was tightened, and by April the gap between Bank rate and
market rate was brought once more to normal proportions.
Meanwhile the gold flow had again changed. Gold began to
flow in steadily, and on May '4 the Bank of England reduced
its rate to 2½ per cent.
The English Credit Base and Credit Superstructure
under Emergency Measures
After the total deposits of the London clearing banks reached
their peak in December 1930adeclining trend set in which
lasted beyond the time when England abandoned the
gold standard. This reflected a steady fall in 'advances' while
'investments' remained stationary and 'bills discounted' re-
.sumed their customary seasonal fluctuations without special
features. The moderate decline in 'bankers balances at the
Bank of England,' in progress since the spring, was ac-
centuated after the half-yearly seasonal in June, but further
deflationary pressure was avoided after the end of July. This
was, however, accomplished only by resort to exceptionaJ
measures. The effects of the international run on Germany
immediately preceding and following the proposal of the
Hoover moratorium are clearly reflected in the growth of
the Bank's gold holdings which, subject to slight modifica-
tions by changes in the note circulation, built up the reserve
(Chart 59). The effects of the general crisis following the1020 EXPERIMENTATION
closing of the Darmstädter Bank and the freezing of foreign
short term assets in Germanyappearin the great gold
losses of the weeks of July 15 and 24. It was at this time that
the Macmillan Report was published so that extraordinary
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internationalindebtedness of the London market. During
this crisis also, as already indicated, the New York exchange
dropped far under gold point without loss of gold to the Bank
of England, and credits of £25 million each were obtained
by the Bank of England from the Bank of France and from
the Federal Reserve banks. Bank rate was raised from 2½
to 31/2 per cent on July 23 and to 41/2 per cent on July 31,
and the proceeds of the new credits were used to support
sterling. This may be seen statistically in the exceptionally
large increase in foreign bills purchased by the Federal Re-
serve banks in August (cf. p. 985). Together with the rees-
tablishment of a substantial interest rate differential in favor
of London as compared to New York (Chart 49),thisstopped
the drain of gold, but not before the Bank of England re-
serve had fallen £17 million below the so-called 'Cunliffe
Limit,' and its proportion had fallen from 57 to 32 per cent.
To offset the deflationary results of these gold losses large
open market operations were undertaken. In this instance
the contraction in 'bankers balances' due to the gold exports
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was not fully made good, and they fell £' i million below
the level prevailing after the conclusion of the half yearly
settlements. When added to the contraction of the ear]y
months of the year this represented a substantial reduction in
the credit base. During the remaining seven weeks of
CHART 6o
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Britain'sadherence to the gold standard there was no further
contraction, but also no increase. When early in August ad-
vantage was taken for the first time of the provisions of the
Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1928, to increase the fidu-
ciary issue and strengthen the Bank of England's reserve,
this was done without affecting 'bankers balances.'
The Bank's statement of August 5 showed an increase in the
fiduciary issue of £15 million, but because of seasonal move-
ments in the note circulation, the full effect of this increase




ever, the reserve was slightly higher than it had been on June
3. The policy of insulating the British domestic credit system
from the full consequences of international gold movements
was, in this instance, applied to the reserves .of the Bank of
England itself. The transfer from the Banking Department to
the Issue Department of £15 million in securities to provide
for the increase in the fiduciary issue was not accompanied by
a corresponding decline in securities in the Banking Depart-
ment or increase in 'public deposits.' The presumption is that
securities were purchased in the open market to provide a sub-
stantial part of this requirement. After August 5 total securi-
ties in the Banking Department actually increased. These op-
erations, together with a return flow of currency, would have
increased 'bankers balances' after August 5 had it not been
for simultaneous increases in 'public deposits' followed by
increases in 'other deposits.' The increases in 'public deposits'
were, in view of their behavior in previous years, probably
seasonal, though the fluctuations were substantial and were
now reflected in 'bankers balances.' The increase in 'other
deposits' was the first major change in this account since early
in 1920. Since it coincided with the use of the international
credits secured by the Bank in defense of the exchange, it may
be inferred that it represented a part of this indebtedness. The
net result of these operations was that about two-thirds of the
contraction of the cash basis of credit that otherwise
have accompanied the loss of gold in July was replaced by
Bank of England credit.
The Suspension of the Gold Standard with
Bank Rate at 4.1/2percent
The increase in Bank rate to 4'/2 per cent on July 31 was the
last increase before Great Britain abandoned the gold stand-
ard on September 21, 1931. in the first week of August the
Committee on National Expenditure (the May Committee)
made its report (Cmd. 3920) on the British budget. Applying
the strictest canons of fiscal probity to their problem, theTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 1023
majority of the Committee envisaged an approaching budget
deficit of £120 million, after meeting sinking fund require..
ments, and recommended cuts in expenditure of £100 mil-
lion. This report was followed on August 23 by the resigna-
tion of the Cabinet and the formation of a National
Government. Confidence in the British position was however
badly shaken by the succession of events and was not revived
by the announcement of the two groups of foreign credits ob-
tained from France and the United States.42 Withdrawals of
foreign funds continued and the proceeds of these credits were
rapidly used up. On September 15 the Admiralty announced
'unrest' in the Navy as a result of pay cuts and on September
i6 dispersed the Atlantic fleet to its home ports. This was fol-
lowed by general declines in foreign stock exchanges, by a
liquidation of British government securities, and an intensi-
fied withdrawal of British capital. On September i8 the
Treasury requested further credits in New York and Paris and
was refused.43 Still Bank rate remained at 4½percent, and
when the decision was taken to abandon the gold standard,
this rate still prevailed. On September 21 the suspension of
the gold standard was announced and an explanatory state-
ment was issued by the government in which it was disclosed
that from July to September foreign withdrawals from Great
Britain had amounted to £200 million. On the same day Par-
liament passed a short act known as the Gold Standard
(Amendment) Act. This Act provided that Section 2 of the
Gold Standard Act of 1925, which placed the Bank of England
under obligation to sell gold in bars of approximately 400
fine ounces at the fixed price of 77S.101/2 d. per standard
ounce, should cease to have effect and that Section iof the
Gold Standard Act of 1925, which relieved the Bank of Eng-
land from the duty of redeeming its notes in gold and sus-
pended the free coinage of gold in England, should continue
42Cf.supra, p. 1014.Forthe details of these arrangements cf. The Economist,
Sept. 5, 1931,p.421.
'A Diary of the Crisis,' ibid., Sept. 26, '931, p. 555.1024 EXPERIMENTATION
in force. It also empowered the Treasury to take such meas-
ures "in relation to the exchanges or otherwise as they may
consider expedient for meeting the difficulties arising in con-
nection with the suspension of the gold standard."
For six years England had defended sterling with the aid
of a relatively high Bank rate. The resulting pressure upon
the British economy had been resisted by the banks and re-
sented by industry and labor. It had not forced the fundamen-
tal changes in British industry required by England's new
position in world commerce. In the absence of a true laissez-
faire economy and in a social system that forbade any en-
croachments upon the minimum standard of living of the
working classes, Bank rate had lost its effectiveness as an
engine of economic reconstruction within the country. It was
well recognized within the Bank of England that a high Bank
rate in the summer of i931 wouldnot have contributed to
the solution of England's fundamental problems. It was pos-
sible, even probable, that a high rate imposed in the midst of
the crisis would have been interpreted as a sign of weakness
and have added to the outward flow of funds rather than the
reverse. The time was past when the British, justified by the
knowledge of their great commercial strength, could boast
that a 10 per cent Bank rate could pull gold out of the earth.
Properly interpreted, the fact that England left the gold
standard with Bank rate at 41/2percent is the key to the un-
derstanding of the defense of sterling during the whole Ex-
perimentation period.CHAPTER 28
TheDefense of the International Gold Standard
as a Whole, 1929—193I
Theimposing edifice of the international gold standard as a
world institution was not allowed to crumble away without
a struggle. The weakness of its foundations, the ways in which
that weakness was made manifest, and the efforts put forth to
combat it in various countries have been analyzed in Chap-
ters 2 1—27. Only the task of presenting certain aspects of the
defense of the system as a whole remains before our account
of the great post-war Experiment of returning to gold is com-
plete. This task has four parts: first, to emphasize in a few
summary statements the nature of the uncoordinated natural
response of the world credit system, under the private profit
motive, to the forces of the depression in the international
field; second, to describe the effort to complete the post-war
movement toward currency stabilization; third, to indicate
the new techniques of financial cooperation developed during
the crisis; fourth, to show the role of politico-economic con-
flict in weakening the cooperative effort to preserve the gold
standard system.
The Attempt to Finance the Depression by Short Term
International Lending
Under the impact of world-wide deflationary forces the de-
centralized post-war world credit structure as a whole at-
tempted to follow, in the international sphere, the pre-war
British precedent of financing a period of cyclical depression
by providing adequate short term credits until a new basis for
long term lending could be reestablished. The means to do so
were abundant, and the motives leading to their employment
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were strong. One of the most striking features of the first
years of the depression was the failure of bank deposits in the
creditor countries to contract on a scale at all proportionate
to its severity. The banking systems of the creditors were un-
der pressure to find employment for their funds, as is indicated
by the spread between long and short term interest rates.
They were offered remunerative employment by the debtors,
for another striking feature of the depression was the intricate
process by which the flow of funds from debtor to creditor
countries contributed to wide differences in their respective
interest rates. These were accentuated by the policy of cen-
tral banks in creditor countries, especially in the United
States, of promoting extremely easy money conditions in their
own markets. The powerful motive of self-interest was thus
enlisted in the task of bridging the gap in credit extension
created by the falling off of long term international lending.
The short term foreign lending of credit institutions of all
kinds in response to this motive completed the series of steps,
inherent in the very organization of the world credit system,
by which private banking adapted itself to meet the needs of
the downward swing of the cycle in the international field.
This natural response of the world credit system to the
calls made upon it was modified by the decentralization of
financial power. In Great Britain the whole weight of long
banking tradition was behind it, but the foundations that
made it safe to follow that tradition were undermined. In the
United States the whole process of shifting from the long to
the short term shoulder in international lending was largely
robbed of its effectiveness because the United States, though
a creditor country, still continued to attract much foreign
capital. In France the assumption of an active role in inter-
national short term finance was contrary to established tradi-
tion and to the banking organization and habits of the coun-
try, and the French effort to remove from the New York and
London markets the responsibility for the employment of
French short term funds in debtor countries did not progressTHE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 1027
far beyond the stage of good intentions. Finally the rise of
international deposit banking and the substitution, in the
centers of international finance, of deposit-attracting policies
for deposit-compelling powers introduced a new major ele-
ment of risk not present before the war. Nevertheless the re-
sponse of the center countries as a group to the demands of
the debtor countries for short term accommodation was im-
pressive. In every debtor country whose position has been
reviewed the receipt of short term credits from abroad at
strategic points in its efforts to protect its exchanges or solve
domestic problems has had an important place.
Had the lack of balance in the world economic system been
of the kind that led even to the great world cyclical depres-
sions of the past this short term lending might have been
adequate to perform its financing function. But the lack of
economic balance was at this time of a different type. A price
had to be paid for the economic disorders of the preceding
fifteen years. Twice postponed by the misuse on a grand scale
of the traditional means of adjustment of the international
gold standard, a genuine restriction of consumption to capac-
ity to pay and of productive capacity to available markets had
to be worked out. The illusions surrounding the payment of
international political debts without transfer of goods had to
be abandoned. Under these circumstances short term inter-
national lending was not fundamentally bridging a gap in
world credit extension until a healing financial liquidation
and readjustment in trade and production had run its normal
course. It was part of a severe and long continued struggle for
the final allocation of many of the real costs of war and re-
construction and for the discovery of a new basis for the
world's exchange of goods.
The Attempt to complete the Gold Standard System after
Disintegration at the Periphery had already begun
One aspect of this struggle was the shifting of economic bur-
dens by periphery countries whose exchanges had depreciated1028 EXPERIMENTATION
in London and New York early in the depression. Another
was the simultaneous effort to complete the unfinished busi-
ness of returning to gold. The conversion of the de facto
stabilization of Roumania into de jure stabilization with
French assistance was described in Chapter 24. In June 1931,
uponthe advice of a League of Nations commission and after
two years of de facto stabilization, the Portuguese escudo was
stabilized at io8 escudos to the pound sterling. This involved
not only the abandonment of the old parity of 4½escudosto
the pound, long an historical relic, but also the 'official' ex-
change rate ofescudos to the pound left over from preced-
ing attempts at practical exchange control.' Of far greater
importance in influencing the international movement of
gold and testing the efficiency of new instruments of inter-
national cooperation were the currency experiments of Japan
and Spain.
Japan
At the end of 1928 the foreign exchange holdings of the Japa-
nese government and the Bank of Japan were only i14 million
yen, as compared to 1,343millionyen at the end of 1919.The
yen, weakened by the crisis of 1927,graduallydeclined until
the summer of 1929, but the underlying position was improv-
ing. The large adverse merchandise trade balances of previous
years were not repeated owing in part to exceptionally good
rice harvests, and in 1929, for the first time in a decade, a
balance was approximately struck in the merchandise items
inthe balance of payments. On November 21,1929 itwas
officially announced that the embargo on the export of gold,
in force since 1917,wouldbe removed on January ii, 1930.
In preparation for this step the Japanese government and the
Bank of Japan had begun to strengthen their badly depleted
holdings of foreign exchange. At the time of the announce-
ment these holdings were already 240 million yen, which was
to be increased to 300 million before the end of the year. In
1TheEconomist, June 6, p. t214.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION U029
addition,the government arranged for two foreign credits,
one for £smillionin London and one for $25 million in New
York.2 Armed with these special resources Japan returned to
the gold standard in January 1930.
The appreciation of the yen from a monthly average rate
of 43.88 cents in June 1929 to 49.13 in February 1930 had a
depressing effect on Japanese export trade which was already
in difficulties owing to a reduction in American demand for
raw silk and Asiatic demand for cotton piece goods, and the
fall in price of these staples. Exports were consequently heav-
ily reduced in value, raw silk, for example, falling i 8 per cent
in quantity, but 43 per cent in value. On the other hand, Jap-
anese imports, consisting chiefly of food and raw materials,
fell greatly in price, and the approximate balance in mer-
chandise trade of 1929 was repeated in 1930 without great
curtailment in the quantity of imports.3 The position
Japan therefore differed from that of other countries depend-
ent upon the production of staple raw materials falling rapidly
in price, because the terms of trade did not move heavily
against her. Her international debtor position, moreover, was,
relative to her resources, not so burdensome as that of many
such countries. Notwithstanding these advantages, the foreign
assets provided to support the yen proved inadequate and
gold exports began on a large scale almost immediately after
the return to gold. The maturing of American loans and credi-
its drew a steady stream of Japanese gold to the United States,
though this was partly offset by imports from China and
Siberia. In 1930 the gold holdings of the Bank of Japan and
the government were reduced, according to figures published
in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, $131 million, while Japanese
gold shipments to the United States were $156 million. In
1931 the general situation developed along the same lines un-
til the outbreak of the confidence crisis in Europe. The
2 Ibid., Nov. 23, 1929, p.963;Jan.4,1930, p.24.
8 League of Nations, Memorandum on Trade and Balances of Payments,
Vol. 1, Review of World Trade, .1930(Geneva, p. 40.1030 EXPERIMENTATION
percussions of this crisis in Japan are described in the Annual
Report of the Bank of Japan for '93' (Federal Reserve Bul-
letin, May 1932, p. 309):
"Thefinancial difficulties which began in Austria and Germany,
and led eventually to the suspension of the gold standard by
Great Britain, made their influence felt in Japan, where the situa-
tion was further aggravated by the outbreak of the Manchurian
disturbance about the same time. Prices of staple commodities
and securities underwent so sharp a decline that stock exchange
transactions were temporarily suspended. Owing partly to anx-
iety regarding the gold standard in Japan, the foreign exchange
market had to meet a strong demand for dollars, which caused
an outflow of gold in considerable amount and a decline in the
volume of funds available to the market. Toward the end of the
year money became tighter and dearer. With the change of Gov-
ernment on December 13,goldexports and the conversion of
bank notes into gold coin were prohibited except under license,
and thereafter the yen exchange declined steadily, while com-
modity prices advanced."
In the preparations for and in the history of the short lived
return to gold by Japan the dominant role of the New York
exchange is in sharp contrast to the pre-war management of
the yen through the use of sterling balances. The outflow of
gold from Japan was one of the most important elements in
the general movement of gold from debtor to creditor coun-
tries (Table 67) .Thefact that, because of the previous di-
version of Japanese borrowing from London to New York, its
destination was America rather than England is one of the
most striking illustrations of the general change that had
taken place in the position of London in world gold distribu-
tion.
Spain
In contrast to the decided and direct course pursued by Japan
in formulating a program for returning to gold and the liberal
gold exports permitted after the removal of the export em-THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
bargo, the attempts to stabilize the Spanish peseta were
marked by vacillation and indecision, by a traditional re-
luctance to use existing gold reserves, and finally by a rejec'
tion of orthodox methods of stabilization altogether. Though
London was the center through which the major flow of Span-
ish external payments passed and though the gold exports oc-
casionally permitted to support the Spanish exchange were
shipments to London, the direct participation of Great
Britain in the stabilization efforts of Spain was gradually
diminished as the depression progressed. Indirectly her inter
est in these efforts probably remained substantial and her ad.
vice was at all times sought.
For various reasons Spain had remained up to the eve
the world depression outside the main current of the world-
wide post-war stabilization movement. In 1920 the war-time
premium of the peseta over the dollar disappeared and dur.
ing the next five years Spanish resources were drained and
her political institutions disturbed by the Riff wars. The pe-
seta fluctuated violently, though in general it followed the
lead of sterling (Charts 22 and 24). At the time of England's
return to the gold standard in April 1925 the rate on London
was pesetas to the pound, about three-quarters of pre-
war parity. This parity, however, had been for years before
the war merely theoretical and does not accurately represent
the pre-war position of the peseta in the world system of ex-
change rates. Its existence, however, was of practical impor-
tance, for the Spanish government, even during the first
stages of the world depression, never clearly renounced the
ultimate aim of returning to it. In 1926 the successful con-
clusion of the Riff wars and the firm establishment of the
dictatorship seemed to promise a more stable future, but the
gradual concentration of European exchange speculation
upon the peseta as one after another of the European cur-
rencies achieved de facto or de jure stabilization was a constant
threat hanging over the market. In January 1927 a speculative
movement, based upon the impression that the peseta would1032 EXPERIMENTATION
soon be officially forced upward toward its old par of 25.22
pesetas to the pound carried the rate to just under 28. 'Favor-
able export trade helped to maintain this rate but it clearly
overvalued the peseta, which soon began to decline. The
government, however, intervened, giving the exchange offi-
cial support, and in June 1928, with the rate just under 30 to
the pound, formal measures of exchange pegging were intro-
duced. A Foreign Exchange Committee was established to buy
and sell foreign currencies and to supervise the exchange op-
erations of private banks. This Committee was provided with
foreign resources through a £5 million credit arranged in
London and a $25 million credit arranged in New York.
Armed with these credits and with the aid of a £2 million
gold shipment to London in November, the Committee was
able for the next six months to keep the peseta relatively stable
in spite of speculative activity which had now turned to the
other side of the market.4
In December 1928 a commission was appointed by the
government to study the possibility of returning to the gold
standard, but almost immediately afterward the revival of
political disturbances invited the reappearance 'of bear raids
by speculators. In January and February 1929 the peseta fell
to about tothe pound, a rate at which, according to pur-
chasing power parity calculations, it was definitely under-
valued. In June the government commission made its report
which was not published. It appears to have advised against
any attempt to return to the nominal parity and in favor of
stabilizing the peseta at a point corresponding as nearly as
possible to its external value. At the same time it held out
hopes that world prices might rise more nearly to Spanish
prices and therefore suggested a postponement of the whole
problem. This faint reflection of similar British hopes, de-
The facts in this summary are taken from the excellent short account of
'The Troubles of the Peseta' in The Economist, Dec. 28, 1929, pp. 1239—40,
and the article on Spanish Monetary Developments in the Midland Bank
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scribed in Chapter i o, was thoroughly unrealistic at a moment
when a declining price trend was already in motion on a
world scale (cf. Ch. 21) .Nodefinite course was charted. The
government declared formally in July in favor of
and revised the budget with that end in view, but even ther.
did not accept the devaluation of the peseta as part of its pro.
gram. It renewed its £5 million London credit and $20 rnil•
lion of its New York credit which expired in July, and
tinued to support the exchange at the cost of gradually
exhausting its foreign resources. Until September the peseta
was held at underto the pound but in October 1929 offi-
cial support was abandoned. As shown in Chart 55, this in-
augurated a period of steady decline which lasted a full year.
In December the government attempted to raise funds with
which to repay the foreign credits and provide itself with fur••
ther foreign balances for the defense of the peseta by offering
a Pta. 350 million 'gold loan.' By this loan it hoped to attract
a large amount of foreign exchange from Spanish citizens
abroad and other Spanish speaking peoples. Though success-
ful in Spain, the loan did not prove to be a constructive factor
in supporting the peseta.
After this series of failures the Bank of Spain and the gov-
ernment enlisted the help of the newly organized Bank for
International Settlements, which from July 1930 to the spring
of 1931 was much concerned with the problem of Spanish
stabilization.o Its Managing Director, M. Quesnay, twice vis-
ited Spain, the Governor of the Bank of Spain, Señor Bas, met
the governors of other central banks at Basle, and the Presi-
dent of the B.I.S. and M. Quesnay on one occasion accompa-
nied Señor Bas to London and Paris. In November 1930 M.
Quesnay presented a report to the Bank of Spain in which he
concluded that Spain was in a position to embark upon the
first step of a stabilization program, that of confining day to
day fluctuations in the peseta within defined limits. In De-
cember the B.I.S. granted the Bank of Spain a stabilization
E. L. Dulles, The Bank for International Settlements at Work, p.117.1034 EXPERIMENTATION
credit of £3 million against deposit of gold. This gold was
physically sent to London where it was held under earmark
for the B.I.S. by the Bank of England. Essentially a device for
overcoming the psychological gold export embargo existing
in Spain, this arrangement was subjected to criticism partic-
ularly in London on the ground that the Bank of Spain, with
gold reserves of 2,500 million pesetas and a note circulation
of 4,500 million, was amply able to part with sufficient gold
to provide the foreign exchange needed for the stabilization
operation without calling for assistance of this type, but the
credit was granted when the B.I.S. became convinced that
such sales of gold were politically impossible. At the same
time negotiations were begun for private banking credits, but
were interrupted by threats of revolution in Spain in Decem-
ber.° In January 1931 Señor Bas resigned as Governor of the
Bank of Spain but the negotiations were renewed by his suc-
cessor, and in March a $50 million Spanish loan was arranged
with J. P. Morgan and Company of New York and a further
credit, the equivalent of million, was arranged in Paris
with a syndicate headed by the Banque de Paris et des Pays
Bas. Hardly had these loans been arranged when revolution
broke out, culminating in the abdication of King Alfonso on
April 14.TheRepublican parties had opposed the credits,
which were canceled by the Republican government without
having been drawn upon. The new government undertook to
support the peseta by using existing foreign balances and tak-
ing measures to prevent the flight of capital. The peseta,
which had recovered in March to the level prevailing at the
time of M. Quesnay's report, again began to fall (Chart 55).
This decline was not checked by the publication on May 29
of an elaborate decree restricting private exchange dealings
and the export of capital which made Spain the first impor-
tant European country to pass under the regime of formal ex-
change control during the world depression. The great task
6 Ibid., pp. 225,235.
B.I.S., Foreign Exchange Regulations, ist Issue.THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
of completing the international gold standard facade was left
unfinished even in Europe, and the first major attempt of the
B.LS. to perform the functions of the money doctor ended in
failure.
The Attempt to develop New Techniques of Interna-
tional Financial Cooperation through the B.I.S.
Between the New York Stock Exchange crisis and England's
abandonment of the gold standard every one of the agencies
for international financial cooperation developed during
Restoration (cf. Ch. 1i) wasused with energy, and in many
cases, with effect. In addition, new techniques of centrai
bank cooperation through the B.I.S., directed toward over-
coming some of the difficulties of operating the international
gold standard in a decentralized world credit system, were de-
veloped and the new bank was used as a channel for coopera-
tive lending to meet emergency situations. Both aspects off the
work of the B.I.S. were illustrated by the assistance it offered
Spain. The broad and many sided activity of which this was
a part cannot, of course, be comprehensively treated here.
Using Miss Dulles' work as a guide, however, we may sum-
marize its main outlines. The program of technical coopera-
tion through the B.I.S. was designed to promote the following
objectives:
i) It was the object of the B.I.S. to increase the strength and
liquidity of central banks. As was natural from its form of
organization and ownership the Bank was animated by a gen-
eral desire to strengthen the control of each central bank in
its own market. At its first Board meeting in May 1930itwas
agTeed that all transactions should be carried out through
central banks but not necessarily with central banks. Both the
Bank of England and the Bank of France requested that all
transactions be made with them, thus asserting fully their
own veto power over B.I.S. transactions in their own markets.
In harmony with this principle the policy of the B.I.S. during
the first year of its life was to refuse the deposits of private1036 EXPERIMENTATION
banks and most other forms of contact with them except as
depositaries of B.I.S. funds. Even this contact was progres-
sively reduced and B.I.S. funds were more and more concen-
trated in the hands of central banks. In order to promote the
liquidity of central banks the B.I.S. discouraged the growth of
its own time deposits by paying only a small differential inter-
est rate on them.
2) It was the aim of the B.I.S. to provide a clearing mechan-
ism for inter-central bank and inter-governmental payments.
One of its original and primary purposes was to clear the pay-
ments made on reparation and war debts account, a circum-
stance that compelled it to keep a large part of its deposits in
New York where most of its commitments were. The duties
of the Bank in facilitating this large one-way movement of
funds in pursuance of its primary purposes were in funda-
mental contradiction to its secondary aims of promoting the
smooth and effective functioning of the international gold
standard. In addition, the Bank made available a more gen-
eral clearing service to central banks through the develop-
ment of its so-called Deposits D. The privilege was offered to
central banks making deposits of this type to withdraw them
in any one of ten currencies at an exchange rate to be fixed
by the Bank within.the gold points. This arrangement was
made possible by the discount facilities of the Bank in the
ten markets and it was hoped thereby to effect more clearing
cancellations by taking transactions out of the open market,
and to avoid sudden pressure on the exchanges. These hopes
were not realized in practice and the facility was little used.
TheB.I.S. hoped to deal with the problem of unfaithful
money by encouraging the development of the 'money em-
ployed' account by central banks. Under this form of deposit
central banks, which usually did not pay interest on deposits,
accepted the deposits of other central banks and paid to the
depositing bank a return based upon the use made of the
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The Bank hoped to become the intermediary between central
banks in the placing of such deposits, and thus to concentrate
gold exchange balances of central banks.
4) The B.I.S. hoped to soften the competitive features of the
gold exchange standard by concentrating gold exchange re-
serves in some degree in its own hands in order to decrease
somewhat the dangers of sudden withdrawals of these bal-
ances.
5) The B.I.S. hoped to overcome the psychological barriers
to the international movement of gold existing in many coun-
tries. It was ready to lend against gold and to buy and sell
gold for central banks and hold it in custody. In addition to
economy and convenience, secrecy was an important advan-
tage in these transactions, for gold bought through the B.I.S.
by a central bank could be sold again without public criti-
cism. Greece, Australia, Poland, Spain, Estonia, Lithuania,
and other countries utilized this facility before the end of
193O.R
The development of techniques of this sort in a tentative
and preliminary way was constructive but not in sum very
important under the exceptional circumstances of the time.
Had the decentralized world credit structure been the result
of slow evolution and had it operated in a basically balanced
world economic system, these techniques would have had
greater significance as refinements of an already effective fi-
nancial machinery. In 1930 they were in the nature of a very
mild poultice on a very inflamed surface, more indicative of
the presence of the sore than effective to heat it.
More important was the use of the B.I.S. as an agency for
cooperative lending. This also may be formulated in a brief
classification:
i) The B.I.S. acted as Trustee for the Dawes and Young
Loans and for the Austrian Loan of July 1, 1930. The corn-
8Thepassages in Dulles, op. cit., in which these five objectives are described
are found on pp. 204, ion, i86, 92—3; 352; 170—2; 158; 79—80.1038 EXPERIMENTATION
plexity of the problems involved in handling this duty is indi-
cated by Miss Dulles (op. cit., p. 360) in describing the mar-
keting of the Young Loan:
"It is probable that the loan issued by the B.I.S. in June, 1930,
was the most complicated piece of international finance which
had ever been arranged. The issue was made on nine markets
and in as many currencies. The proceeds were distributed among
seven countries, not all included in the other nine. Moreover, the
loan was served out of two separate sources, and in all of the cur-
rencies of the original issue. There were financial agreements
with the seven different governments who were to share in the
proceeds, as well as with banks, lawyers, and commission houses
in the nine countries who were taking portions of the loan."
The existence of an agency that could administer these details
and perform the international clearing functions involved in
them was undoubtedly a great technical advance in the effi-
ciency with which international cooperative lending, once de-
cided upon, could be handled, and was to that extent an en-
couragement to such lending.
2) The B.I.S. lent its influence to forwarding the movement
for mobilizing middle term and long term credits. In October
1930 it set up a committee on middle term credits and en-
couraged the initiative of private international bankers in
substituting long for short term credit by subscribing "by
way of example" to the capital stock of the International
Mortgage Bank of Basle and the Compagnie Centrale des
Préts Fonciers of Amsterdam.° This, however, amounted to
little more than giving its blessing to a movement that was
still-born.
3) The B.I.S. directed investment of its own funds in
such a way as to meet the most urgent needs of international
financial cooperation. Most of its long term investments
in Germany. These investments were relatively small, being
limited both by the size of the Bank and by the nature of its
9Ibid.,p.202, and2d Annual Report of the Bank (Federal Reserve Bulletin,
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own liabilities. The Bank could not meet the demand
debtor countries for long term accommodation, and there
was no demand for the short term accommodation in stable
currencies which it could provide.
4) The B.LS. was receptive to calls made upon it for emer••
gency short term international credits by central banks and
governments, and active in the negotiation of such credits
supplied by others.
It was by the exercise of the fourth of these functions, and
by providing a natural and regular channel of communica-
tion between central banks, and fulfilling the special obliga-
tions laid upon it by the Young Plan that the Bank played an
important role in the series of events immediately preceding
the break-up of the nucleus of the gold standard system.
The Attempt to combine Technical Cooperation with
Politico-Economic Conflict
The increase in political tension in Europe from the Nazi
electoral victories in Germany in September 1930tothe an-
nouncement of the proposal for the Austro-German Customs
Union and its effect upon the defense of the gold standard in
Central and Eastern Europe was emphasized at the end of
Chapter 24. The effectiveness of all international financial
cooperation, including the work of the B.I.S., was seriously
diminished by this tension. Not only that, but the whole
effort to bridge the gap in international lending by short
term credit, whether by the uncoordinated action of the
credit system or by the deliberate effort of central banks and
international agencies, was threatened by it. As in 1914,the
money markets had become adjusted to the existing volume
of short term international debt, and any sudden change in
its amount and distribution constituted a serious danger to
the whole international financial mechanism.'° During the
summer and autumn of 1931thesedangers became actual in
a series of events in which many of the elements isolated in
10Cf. Ch. i, and World Economic Survey, 1931/2,p.179.1040 EXPERIMENTATION
our analysis were acting and reacting upon one another in a
most intricate way. These events have been so often and so
ably treated that they have become a more than twice told
tale. They may therefore be summed up here in the briefest
form, in the hope that the background of analysis presented
in these studies will place them in their true perspective in
the history of the international gold standard.
The Austro-German Crisis
The difficulties of the Credit Anstalt were announced on May
1 1,1931.Three days before, the French Chamber of Deputies
had concluded a debate on French policy toward the
Anschluss question during which the whole Briand policy of
reconciliation was under attack. Two days later, May 13,
M. Briand was defeated in the French presidential elections.
The political atmosphere could not have been worse for se-
curing united international action to help Austria. Such help
was almost immediately requested, however. The first run on
the Credit Anstalt was met by heavy discounts at the National
Bank resulting in an increase in its bill portfolio and a loss
in foreign exchange reserves as early as May 15. On May i6
proposals were laid before the International Committee on
Austrian Loan Control for a new loan of ioo million schil-
lings to cover advances by the government to help the Credit
Anstalt. On the same day the B.I.S. sent representatives to
Vienna to offer assistance and on the following day the appli-
cation for the new loan was approved in Geneva. Negotia-
tions for this loan were at once opened by the Austrian gov-
ernment with a banking group headed by Rothschild's and
Lazard Frères. The loan was to take the form of an issue of
Austrian treasury bills. On May i8 the B.I.S. informed the
Austrian government that it had authorized a credit of ioo
million schillings ($14million)in cooperation with various
central banks under which it would discount Austrian com-
mercial bills and paper guaranteed by the National Bank of
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fromthe government loan negotiations for help to the Credit
Anstalt, for it had become clear that the granting of this loan
had become subject to the condition that the Austrian gov-
ernment should give up the Anschluss Agreement.
while, the whole question of the Anschluss had been raised
before the League of Nations, and on British initiative the
legal aspects of the case were referred on May 23 to the Hague
Court for an Advisory Opinion. The flight of capital and
losses of foreign exchange reserves by the National Bank,
however, continued to increase and on May 28 an agreement
was reached with foreign creditors of the Credit Anstalt for
a two year moratorium under a government guarantee of its
foreignliabilities. On June g the ioo million schilling loan
was granted by the B.I.S., but negotiations for the loan from
private bankers had reached a deadlock. Rather than accept
the political conditions attached the Austrian government
resigned on June 18. The next day the entire amount of 1150
million schillings (J5 million) was advanced by the Bank of
England. This action had very constructive effects in Austria,
but met with a very unfavorable reception in France and ren-
dered later Anglo-French cooperation more difficult.
On June 5 and 6 Dr. Bruening and Herr Curtius went to
England, a visit which had been postponed because of the
urgent questions, including a critical phase of the disarma-
ment negotiations, that came before the May meeting of the
League Council. The German statesmen were able to impress
the City with the gravity of the German position, but the
Treasury and the Bank of England were not yet convinced,
and were not prepared to admit the necessity of a drastic
revision of the Young Plan or large scale assistance to Ger-
many. At the same time, a further drastic step was taken in
the development of the German government's economic
policy by the publication of a new set of emergency decrees.
The main features of these were further salary cuts for gov-
ernment officials, reductions in war pensions, reduction in
departmental estimates, more indirect taxation, and a 'crisis1042 EXPERIMENTATION
tax' on wages and incomes. Further, state and communal
budgets were also reduced, principally by salary cuts, and
reforms in the unemployment insurance system designed to
reduce its cost were undertaken. These drastic deflationary
measures provoked a political crisis in Germany during which
great pressure was brought to bear on Dr. Bruening to
convene the Reichstag or at least the Budget Committee. A
fresh outflow of foreign funds began and by the second week
in June the situation became alarming. On June 13the
Reichsbank raised its rate from 5 to 7 per cent without check-
ing the withdrawals. On Friday, June 19,therewas a panic
in Berlin, and the Reichsbank prepared to put into effect
drastic credit restriction, in order to prevent its foreign ex-
change and gold from being further drained by discount
operations. Further French withdrawals at this time prac-
tically completed the repatriation of French funds from Ger-
many. The severity of the crisis may be judged from the fact
that there were times during June when absolutely no mar-
ket for reichsmarks existed in Switzerland. In the United
States the German difficulties were watched with greater ap-
preciation of their gravity than was shown in Great Britain.
On June 14PresidentHoover summoned hisfinancial
advisers and on June 20 he announced his proposal for a one
year moratorium on all inter-governmental war debts and
reparation payments. The panic in Berlin was stopped and
the credit restriction measures were made mild instead of
drastic. It soon became clear, however, that acceptance of the
moratorium by France, next to the United States the largest
loser, was not to be won easily. Two weeks passed in negotia-
tion before agreement on the plan was announced, and dur-
ing these two weeks the flight of capital and withdrawal of
foreign funds from Germany became even more violent. To
help meet the half yearly settlements in Germany, which
were extremely difficult under the circumstances, the BI.S.
offered the Reichsbank a $ioo million loan for two weeks on
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was announced but by this time confidence in Germany was
profoundly shaken and the outward movement of capital
continued. On July 7, however, more help was secured in the
form of a $50millioncredit granted to the Gold Discount
Bank by an American syndicate. These short credits were
merely stop-gap measures and on July 9 Dr. Luther, President
of the Reichsbank, started on a four day journey to Paris,
London, and Basle in search of foreign loans. It was too late.
The political price demanded by France was one Germany
would not pay, and the difficulties of her banking system and
of her economy as a whole had made Germany a bad credit
risk. The failure of the 'Nordwolle,'" the biggest German
textile concern, whose far flung investments had largely been
acquired by the use of short term money, caused a run upon
the Darmstädter Bank which was closely associated with it.
In the absence of adequate support from the other banks the
Darmstädter Bank was forced to close on July 13,theday on
which Dr. Luther returned, empty handed, from abroad. On
the same day the government guaranteed the deposits of the
Darmstädter Bank and issued an emergency decree ordering
all banks to suspend cash payments and interbank clearance
on July 14and15. "The government utilized this short res-
pite to issue various emergency decrees to protect the bank-
ing system from domestic and foreign runs and to prevent
the flight of foreign capital. A decree issued on July 15 con-
centrated all foreign exchange transactions and payments
abroad in the hands of the Reichsbank or institutions desig-
nated by it as agents." On the same day the Reichsbank, whose
losses of reserves (Chart 56) had brought them below the
legal limit, raised its rate of discount from 7 to io per cent.
11Oneof the causes of the collapse of the Nordwolle was its failure to follow,
in its wool buying policy, the trend of the market in Manchester. It tried to
make itself independent in wool which it shipped directly to Bremen from
Argentina. Nevertheless the Nordwolle was bankrupted by the fallin the
price of wool and its failure was in a sense a demonstration of the great
psychological importance the world over of the lead taken by Great Britain in
the commodity markets. Cf. Ch. 21.1044 EXPERIMENTATION
"On July i6 the banks were permitted to open for limited
payments, and on August irestrictions on domestic with-
drawals were completely abolished." 12 The Reichsbank rate,
however, was simultaneously raised from io to 15 per cent
and was kept at this level until the signing of the Hoover
debt plan on August i i, when it was reduced to io per cent.
At the height of the crisis on July 15,the$ioo million two
week B.I.S. credit to the Reichsbank fell due, but was pro-
longed until August 4 with Federal Reserve bank participa-
tion. On the same day the British government invited
representatives of all the Powers to a conference in London
on July 20. Active consultations were undertaken in prepara-
tion for this conference. The French made proposals for aid
to Germany in the form of a loan subject to very severe
political conditions including the abandonment of the Zoll-
verein, resumption of Young Plan payments after the Hoover
year, and cessation of agitation for treaty revision for ten
years.13 This proposal was at once rejected by Dr. Bruening
on July i6, and on the next day it was officially announced in
Washington that the United States would not become in-
volved in any political situation connected with economic
help for Germany and that the Federal Reserve Board would
give no credit to Germany except in conjunction with all
central banks, including the Bank of France.14
From July 20 to 23 the Seven Power Conference met in
London and recommended that the $.ioo million Reichsbank
credit be renewed on due date for another three months, that
concerted measures be taken to maintain the then existing
volume of foreign credits in Germany and that the B.I.S. be
invited to convene a committee to study the possibility of
converting a portion of the short term credits into long term
credits. This committee became known as the Wiggin Com-
mittee and its report as the Layton Report. Before this was
12 Madden and Nadler, op. cit., 102.
Cf. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 74—7.
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drawnup,atemporary agreement was reached in Berlin on
July 29 to prevent further withdrawals of short term British
and American banking funds.
With this agreement the most acute phase of the crisis
Germany ended after Germany had in seven months, accord..
ing to the Layton Report, repaid to her foreign creditors
31/2 milliard marks. There was, however, no return to
ma!' conditions. Exchange control was further developed,
an abnormally high bank rate was maintained, and Germany
entered upon a thoroughgoing banking reorganization which,
contrary to the expectations of the government of the day,
culminated in the complete subordination of the banking
system to the state and the complete reversal of the post-war
stabilization principle of the independent central bank. This
reorganization began with the guarantee of the deposits of
the Darmstädter Bank by the government and a substantial
government participation in the capital of the Dresdner
Bank A new clearing association (Ueberweisungs-Verband)
was created and a new institution, the Acceptance and Guar-
antee Bank of Berlin, was organized to accept bills not
themselves eligible for discount at the Reichsbank and to
pave the way for the resumption of business in the private
discount market. The government, directly and indirectly,
provided more than half the capital of this institution. On
September 19, 1931 government supervision of the banks was
introduced and the office of Reichs-Commissioner for Bank-
ing was created.16
While this reorganization was in progress withdrawal of
foreign funds continued, and the Reichsbank suffered further
losses in reserves (Chart 56). The freezing of foreign short
term funds in Germany was confined to banking funds, and
other short term funds were freely withdrawn. On September
15 The provision of government capitalto the banks was intended to be
temporary and the Bruening government looked forward to a future program
of decentralization in banking.
16 Madden and Nadler, op. cit., pp. 402—3.1046 EXPERIMENTATION
i negotiations were completed for a formal Stilistand agree-
ment with banking creditors, which immobilized $1,250 mil-
lion of foreign funds, and on September 2 the Reichsbank
rate was reduced to 8 per cent. In this Stilistand agreement,
in which the utmost limits of German law were explored in
the search for liens upon the German debtors, the note of
political conflict was still struck. For the agreement was to
endure for six months from September i, 1931, or until the
adoption of a plan suggested by a financial committee ap-
pointed on recommendation of the London Conference, or
for the period of central bank advances through the B.I.S.,
whichever was shortest. The periodical renewal of these very
short term central banking credits therefore gave occasion
for the exertion of periodic political pressure upon Germany
upon pain of a breakdown of the Stilistand agreements.
The Breakup of the Nucleus
The closing of the German banks on July 15 and the freezing
of about £70 million 17ofBritish short term assets in Ger-
many was the signal for heavy withdrawals of foreign funds
from Great Britain. At this time French withdrawals of gold
from London were suddenly resumed on a large scale, and
the political atmosphere was not improved by charges that
these withdrawals were partly motivated by resentment over
the Bank of England loan to the National Bank of Austria on
June ig. Meanwhile the mobilization of foreign central bank-
ing funds in the United States had been begun and the steady
flow of gold from both New York and London to the Neth-
17Ina statement issued by the London Clearing House in December 1931,
basedon returns from banks and acceptance houses in London doing business
with Germany, the amount of credit facilities held at the disposal of Germany
by London banks and acceptance houses under the first German Stilistand
agreement was on July 31, 1931"lessthan (Samuel Montagu &
Co., Weeldy Review of the Foreign Exchanges, Dec. p. 733). In
introducing the Gold Standard (Amendment) Act, 1931, into the House of
Commons on Sept. 21,1931, Mr.Snowden said (The Times, Sept. 23, 1931,
p.7): "Apart from the Agreement as a result of the London Conference we
have locked up £70,000,000ofour assets in Germany."